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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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***Political Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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7 October 1991

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**French Opinion Poll Published Concerning  
Yeltsin, Gorbachev, CPSU**

914B0369A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 29 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by N. Dolgoplov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent, Paris: "Frenchmen Are Looking for the One Who Is Best"]

[Text] BVA is one of the largest and most authoritative institutes in France for studying the market and public opinion. It is noted for its objectivity and rather accurate assessments. This is why the results of a survey conducted in Moscow by the BVA on August 26th are so interesting.

**So, do you have a good or bad opinion about Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin?** (The answers are in percentages).

Yeltsin: Good - 74; Bad - 7; Don't Know - 19. Gorbachev: Good - 22; Bad - 35; Don't Know - 43.

**Are you hopeful that Mikhail Gorbachev will be able to cope with the crisis in the USSR within the next few months?**

Yes - 12; No - 62; Don't Know - 26.

**The same question about Boris Yeltsin:**

Yes - 52; No - 15; Don't Know - 33.

**Who do you think is holding on to real power in our country?**

Mikhail Gorbachev - 2; Boris Yeltsin - 51; Both - 29; Neither one - 16; Don't Know - 2.

**With regard to Mikhail Gorbachev's position during the state coup, with which of the following answers do you most agree?**

He prepared the coup - 2; He was involved in it - 15; He knew about it - 44; He did not know about it at all - 34; Don't Know - 5.

**Do you believe that another coup is possible?**

Yes - 39; No - 38; Don't Know - 23.

**Are you for or against a total dissolution of the CPSU?**

For - 76; Against - 9; Don't Know - 15.

**Change in Public's Perceptions, Attitudes in  
Coup's Wake Discussed**

914B0388A Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by Boris Leonov: "The Coup: Thoughts on the Platform of the 'Communist Dead End'"]

[Text] The three August days of the anti-constitutional coup became the beginning of a turnover in the consciousness of our society. They forced many of our fellow

citizens, who did not hide their weariness from endless, often fruitless debates waged against the background of the impoverishment of our life, to stop and think about what is going on and to define their place—on one side or the other of the barricades. The barricades erected on the night preceding 20 August in front of the "White House" on Red Square extended through many families, arose between desks at institutions, between work benches in plant shops, and simply between people who stood in endless lines at half-empty shelves or around the emptied newspaper kiosks.

The invisible barricades extended throughout our entire vast country, in some places separating Russia from certain republics whose leaders assured us that, despite the usurpation of power on the part of the GKChP [State Committee for Emergency Action], they have no reason for concern and intend to wait and see how events develop. Thus, all the burden of responsibility for the fate of the country, including these republics, for the future of the transformations which had begun, fell on the shoulders of Russia and its elected president, B. N. Yeltsin.

And in these fateful days it became crystal clear: There had been not only an anti-constitutional coup, about whose possibility many had warned. There had also begun a real, deep-seated and long-awaited turnaround in our very consciousness, which few had believed possible on the eve [of the coup]. Not only did tens of thousands of Moscow residents rise up on the same side of the barricade with the President of Russia—not only the democratic forces in the country, but the majority of the population, which had voted for Yeltsin in the presidential elections.

A turnover was occurring in the attitude of our people toward their government. After all, never before had they felt sincere devotion to their rulers. Then again, they had never before elected them by democratic means, and had not considered them their elected ones, although the latter proclaimed themselves with ultimate humility to be the "servants of the people".

The reports published by TRUD (the junta did not venture to forbid the publication of the worker's newspaper with circulation of 19 million) sent in by its correspondents from various regions were perceived as communiques from various sections of the front in the struggle for democracy, for the adherence to constitutional standards, and against the return to totalitarianism. The authorities of over 2/3 of the Russian krais and oblasts immediately voiced their resounding "no" to the GKChP members.

The same position, and not one determined by GKChP decisions, was taken by many military men, who recently have often been criticized from various tribunals and pages of the press. Such a "military coup" filled with new meaning the slogan, worn by time and demagoguery,



about the unity of the army and society, about the popular character of the army, which in those days really did stand with the people.

It was specifically these circumstances in combination with the decisiveness and uncompromising position of the Russian leadership that tied the hands of the putsch members, forcing them to put off the time for storming the "White House", and then to reject its takeover altogether, and ultimately, seeking salvation, to set off, like boys who had done wrong, to beg forgiveness at the feet of the country's president whom they had betrayed.

During these heated days, not only were there thundering angry words addressed to the "friend of the President" (as he called himself), Yanayev and company, but also remarks of indignation at their mediocrity and cynicism. After all, they defined for all of us the role of a silent herd, hoping to buy the people with promises of rapid abundance of products and goods at low prices, increased wages and 15/100 [acre] of land for anyone who wants it.

That is how, in ancient times, foreign conquerors won the confidence of the trusting natives with shiny trinkets. But could it be that these self-proclaimed sorry excuses for leaders, walled off from life by the armour of limousines and the strong fences of villas, did not stop to think even about the fact that our people have already emerged from the "native condition"? Having forgotten the taste of real noodles, they nevertheless do not want them to be hung on their ears [they do not want to be made the fools]. Can it really be that "our saviors" could not even imagine that the people, whom they and others like them had made fools of for decades, would inevitably experience a turnaround from believing in empty promises of a bright future and heavenly programs through the year 2000 to attaining the confidence needed to cast off from their backs a bunch of gluttonous and greedy bureaucratic clerks who not only sucked up to free feeding troughs, but also kept a huge and rich country from emerging from a state of poverty and degradation?

A difficult and sharp turnaround has begun, I believe, in the minds and souls of those communists who are capable of thinking, who have become ultimately convinced in these difficult days that the "October Revolution" communist express which left the station in 1917, having run over tens of millions of lives along the way, has come to its final station—the "communist dead end". It has brought with it a cargo of pain, disappointments, lies, and the rubble of shattered ideals. And it was the communist leaders who brought it to this, having rudely trampled into the dirt the concepts of fraternity, freedom, equality, and justice in the name of which the slaves of ancient Rome, the Paris communards, and many other honest, conscientious people of our much-suffering century fought and died.

Millions of television viewers became witness to the turnover in the fate and consciousness of perhaps the brightest and most tragic personality of our time—M. S.

Gorbachev. Having undertaken the destruction of the last empire in the modern history of the world, he himself was almost buried under its ruins. Having returned after his 72-hour imprisonment in Foros, he announced at a press conference that he intended to act decisively. In fact, it is difficult to hold up the roof and walls of a collapsing building with one hand, and with the other—to try to build something onto it. But when the Secretary General expressed his intention to reformulate the CPSU, most of whose leaders had at some level either directly or silently supported the GKChP, it seemed that, once having taken half a turn, it would be difficult for Gorbachev to follow the current of the democratic movement. And so, 24 hours later, it seems that the President finally made the final turnaround in himself, having rejected the office of secretary general and calling for the CPSU to disband itself.

Following the failure of the putsch in the Russian parliament, appeals are often heard from meeting rostrums about the inadmissibility of euphoria and ecstasy in the wake of the victory. These appeals are very timely, because ahead of the victorious democracy there lie immeasurable difficulties and a huge responsibility for the country which has been demolished by the former regime. Undoubtedly, it is important today to expose and eradicate the roots of the oaken putsch, and not merely to chop off its branches. Yet at the same time it is just as important not to break up the firewood, as had been the case in our country, which has not been marked by democratic traditions.

The banning of a number of newspapers, the appeals for brutal measures, the developing war against the monuments, the taking to the streets by those who thirst for and are accustomed to destruction, passing it off as revolutionary action, warn of (God forbid!) a possible turnaround among the democratic forces in the direction of... anti-democracy. The turnaround is necessary here too, but primarily in the direction of social and economic transformations, a directionality toward long, patient, at times routine work, so as to first of all feed and clothe the impoverished country, to gather the not so abundant current harvest, and to protect the population against the wanton spread of crime and unrest. If we do not do all of this, then where is the guarantee that the acceleration in reforms which has finally become possible will not again bog down, and that the hungry and cold people will not once again take to the streets and pose the question which has become traditional in Russia: "What did we fight for?"

Yes, the "directing and determining" force has brought us to a communist dead end. And how simple it would be if the turnover in minds and in deeds could be performed, as in the Army ranks, upon command: "About face! Forward march!" But forward where? Toward the station of the "October Revolution", where 74 years ago there was a world-historical turnover and the path toward 19 August 1991 began? Shall we return to that prerevolutionary Russian capitalism, and start a new direction from there?

Alas, history is the river of life. And rivers do not recognize dead ends. They may meander, they may be swift or calm, but they never flow backward. They are always aimed forward. And God save us from more experiments with the turning of rivers—both in nature, and in politics.

#### **Academicians Discuss Coup Failure, Warn Against Potential 'Chaos'**

914B0404B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 10 Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Discussion between Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladlen Loginov and Doctor of Political Sciences Dmitriy Olshanskiy, moderated by Vladimir Lagovskiy: "The Putsch as a Futile Trump Card: An Attempt at Reading Political Cards"]

[Text] Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladlen Loginov and Doctor of Political Sciences Dmitriy Olshanskiy are sitting at the table. One is a specialist in the revolutions in Russia, and the other is a specialist in changes in the people's consciousness at critical turning points in history. They know their cards, as they say.

"This is not a full deck," they say as they join the game. "There are not enough aces, and it does not have all the sixes, either."

"It doesn't matter. It may be even more difficult to examine it further. The truth is already lost in the discordance of confessions and new legends. So do I 'deal'?"

#### **WHAT HAS HAPPENED**

[Lagovskiy] I recall that about 1000 hours on the 19th the sun was coming out, illuminating a depressing scene: the dusty, spotted tanks and the bright "Zhigulis" scurrying between them. And people all around. Some standing in lines, and others hurrying about their business... As if nothing were happening. A bad sign. It appears that we are beginning to get used to troops in the streets. But these are my impressions. What are yours? More specifically, how did the putsch strike you as a historian, Vladlen Terentyevich, and you, Dmitriy Vadi-movich, as a specialist in emergency situations?

[Loginov] I would only add a detail to the urban scene you have depicted: the tanks and BTR's [armored personnel carriers] moving down Tverskaya [Street] stopped at the red light to let pedestrians cross... But I was struck most of all by two episodes. When I went to the "White House" on 19 August, construction of the barricades had just begun. And one of them was almost lined up with the monument to the voluntary militia of 1905 at the Gorbatty Bridge. On the pedestal was a sculpture of a group of young people full of resolve—which seemed too pompous before. And under them were the same kind of resolute young persons, enthusiastically piling up a barrier with everything they had transported, carried, or laid their hands on. And in

recent days even the arrangement of the barricades coincided almost completely with the arrangement of the Krasnaya Presnya in 1905.

And the second thing. When the funeral of the three victims in the "White House" defense was being relayed, Aleksandr Gradskiy sang: "You Fell in a Fateful Struggle," and we immediately recalled that the same song was sung at the funeral for Bauman in 1905 and the funeral at Marsovoye Polye in March of 1917.

It is apparent that after finding themselves in certain similar circumstances, decent people act and proceed almost identically, giving little thought to doctrines or to who they are—bolsheviks, mensheviks, cadets, or anarchists. Incidentally, it was most paradoxical that communists—Rutskoy, Stolyarov, and Kobets—were among the leaders of the "White House" defense. Although what is paradoxical here is that they are honest patriots, as if they had not been defamed at one time by "true" communists.

[Olshanskiy] I will first tell you about an almost improbable occurrence which came to my attention on the approaches of the "White House." To a certain extent, it reflects my impressions.

A colonel in the internal security troops was strolling by the barricades. In civilian clothes, of course, and already in a democratic mood.

"However, they built it more sensibly in Vilnius," he shares his expertise, kicking the protruding iron rods with his boot. "They rang up all the housebuilding combines, they said, to bring the day's output to the parliament... When the tanks came later on, they realized right away they could not move ahead. Because permanent emplacements had been erected. But are these really barricades? Who is building them this way?"

"Listen," said a communist nearby, "revolutions are not conducted this way either."

[Lagovskiy] What is "this way?"

[Olshanskiy] What did the junta actually do? It can be counted on our fingers: it isolated Gorbachev, brought in troops, provided them with orders that made little sense, and wrote an Appeal to the people and Decree No. 1. A horrible decree, I will note, consisting of 16 paragraphs which cannot be retained and are hard to understand. It devised the extremely idiotic title GKChP [the state of emergency committee]. The people did not want to utter it, and quickly turned it into the GKChK. Later on, very different letter combinations made their appearance. And that was all. Then the junta sat and waited.

But what didn't it do? There were practically no arrests. It is ignorant to leave all the potential enemies of a future regime at large.

[Lagovskiy] But why didn't they arrest Yeltsin, by the way?

[Olshanskiy] That is a mystery. He flew to Moscow early in the morning and went to his dacha, and he went from there to the "White House." They say that the car with the KGB [gebeshniki] arrived at the dacha 20 minutes late. But this is what happened, it was either undisguised amateurishness or some kind of incomprehensible game.

No one kept track of the time. After all, it is common knowledge that a successful revolution should take a few hours. After days of delay, it was doomed. Key positions were not seized. Excuse me, but the "White House" could have been seized by 10 militiamen before 1000 hours.

Then there were the communications. Did they cut them off? No. The telephones were working in the "White House." Newspapers and magazines were issued throughout the country. Only in Moscow was there an attempt to "cut off" the press. Radio and television were not completely under control.

[Lagovskiy] RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA will remember the conspirators' "gift" for a long time—the permission to publish. I am still at a loss to explain just how the newspaper "pleased" them, for example.

[Loginov] It is really strange. After all, it is well known that you did not abandon Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev at a difficult time, you had Ruskoy and Lipitskiy speaking out, and before the putsch you had an entire page supporting the Gorbachev-Yeltsin tandem, calling upon them for constructive cooperation...

[Lagovskiy] So the junta may have thought that the newspaper would not take its side?

[Loginov] Do not forget that even in the highest echelons of party authority RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA was not "called" pro-Gorbachev. It is not ruled out that you unwittingly "moved yourself up" precisely for this reason. Look, in the same decree on authorized newspapers, yours was named along with the newspaper TRUD. But this makes us wonder. How could the junta have been reasoning? The trade unions stand behind TRUD—was that the reason? It was. Let us give permission to the newspaper, and we will show the people that they are with us. But who is standing up for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA? It is common knowledge that the President is. Let us give it permission, and we will imply that even "Yanayev's best friend" has no objection to beginning a new life. Everything is all right, they said—we have a large and friendly group.

[Lagovskiy] This cunning has cost us a great deal... But we have digressed from the "analysis of errors."

[Olshanskiy] How do intelligent persons proceed? They position the guard first, then they declare the revolution. But everything was just the opposite here.

[Loginov] All the same, we cannot look upon these events as an amateur operetta. Any historic deed, even the greatest one, appears to be a conglomeration of absurdities, stupidity, and accidents when it is examined

ironically under a microscope. Remember that Napoleon lost at Waterloo because of a head cold... Or our October Revolution: storming of the Winter Palace was delayed because they could not find a rope to raise the signal lantern at Petropavlovka. There are many such anecdotes in history. But time goes by, and a historic and major turning point is described by all these absurdities and acquires more and more of its own "salvos from the Avrora"—in a word, myths and legends.

[Olshanskiy] But there were too many incongruous things here. And the most absurd thing was the press conference. It was contraindicated altogether in situations such as this, but especially for "the magnificent eight." The best possible alternative from the dictatorship's viewpoint would have been brief official communiques every 3 or 4 hours. If worst came to worst, an official representative of the junta could be assigned to deal with the mass media. As a last resort, if the dictator wants very much to appear on the screen, he writes an appeal to the people. Only not "questions and answers." The new authority should be secretive and thereby fool the public. But when his trembling hands and the ever-present handkerchief at his nose appear on the screen, we have to get the impression that the dictator is snotty. But if that is the way it is, we naturally think that ordinary persons, only much worse and weaker than we are, are sitting next to him. In a word, the press conference produced nothing but laughter. And laughter destroys fear.

[Loginov] Several basic models have been developed for coups d'état throughout history. Read Gaius Suetonius' "Lives of the Twelve Caesars"—from Julius Caesar to Domitian—and you will see almost the entire collection of them. Our favorite version has been the "intimidation" model. Old Muscovites remember that tanks rumbled through the capital's streets in June 1953. They blocked off the Dzerzhinskiy School and a number of other places. And the arrest of the omnipotent Beriya by a group of generals was handled quite smoothly and without bloodshed. The "intimidation" model also worked in Czechoslovakia in August 1968...

On 19 and 20 August, I walked from tank to tank standing in the center of Moscow and persistently asked the question: "What orders do you have?" The soldiers and officers—some angrily and some confused and embarrassed—all said the same thing: "To take up a position..." "And then?" "To hold the position..."

[Lagovskiy] I am prepared to argue that two or three years ago we could have been "intimidated." But not today. The plotters expected the public to be passive, but they ran into active opposition. They found themselves in a completely different environment. And if "the bold eight" had been more intelligent, they would have realized that the results they had counted on were not produced when the troops were brought into the capital on 28 March 1991, either.



[Loginov] The ringleaders of the putsch clearly did not suffer from an excess of intellect, of course, but they were not empty-headed, either. Moreover, each one of them was backed up by a well-defined staff—intelligent advisers and consultants. What were they counting on? Apparently on the excessive amount of weariness and indifference toward any political talk which our parliamentarians have been demonstrating. The advisers and consultants eagerly seized upon every failure of by-elections in the regions because of insufficient voters. They were thrilled to record every sigh, every appeal from exhausted people for "order" and "a strong hand." In other words, the plotters did not consider the people's political activity to be support for them, but the people's political passivity, which could well become their support, to be their principal ally. Hence their selection of a model for revolution.

[Lagovskiy] I doubt that most of the people—even those who really wanted "order"—would have wanted to obtain it from the hands of these individuals, who were completely discredited before. In any of the reforms which the junta could have proposed, the people would have detected the dishonor beforehand. "Don't expect anything good from them"—this is what I heard on the street on the morning of the 19th.

[Loginov] But I don't think the junta had any doubts. The inertia of the bureaucratic method of thinking had worked for them. It always operates with categories of "command" and "representation." Do you remember our past congresses? A distinguished lathe operator speaks: "I, as well as my entire brigade (the shop, the plant, as well as the entire working class), fully support..."

Evidently the plotters also reasoned this way: who is the director (or the ispolkom chairman) there? Our man. Whose division is this, who is commanding it? Our man—we went fishing and took steam baths together... And they could not understand that the Army is not the same one, that it has already been divided by attitudes, sympathies and antipathies. That there are old, conservative generals, but there is an unsettled officer corps and there are soldiers who took part in meetings and demonstrations and voted for Yeltsin only a year ago...

I can remind you that in December 1905 the Semenov Guards Regiment mercilessly shot down the Presnya barricades. But on 17 February that same Semenov Regiment was one of the first to go over to the side of the revolution. It was not the same people—and it follows that they were not the same soldiers.

The plotters did not take into account that the same "organized political minority" which is prepared for a desperate struggle, based on the mood of the majority, had already taken shape. And in the final analysis, it decides the outcome of it at the moment of crisis.

[Olshanskiy] Not long ago I conducted an interesting study. I attempted to ascertain what members of the CPSU Central Committee were thinking about by

attacking Yeltsin—they expelled him from the Central Committee and set up commissions; in a word, they persecuted him. Didn't they really understand that this would lead to a colossal surge in his popularity? That many persons would not vote for him as a result, but **against** the CPSU? And it turns out that this was their logic. The Central Committee is at the head of the party, right? Right. The party is the vanguard of the people, right? Right. So if the Central Committee commands, the party will obey. After all, the party expresses the people's interests, and the Central Committee expresses the party's interests. "...But a ring has no beginning and no end." This endless circle explains a great deal, I think.

[Lagovskiy] All the same, when I saw the frightened "heroes of the putsch" at the press conference, I had the feeling that these people were playing someone else's roles. There was no leader, or "main hero," if you wish. There is probably something behind the fact that we heard the words "so-called revolution" in the very first days. Later on, the assessments became even more drastic: a "performance." But this led to a great many questions. If it is a performance, whose is it? Who is the producer? Who profits from it?

[Olshanskiy] I myself have many questions. For example, did Pugo really shoot himself, and why did Akhromeyev, who had an authorized weapon, suddenly hang himself, and where was "the nuclear suitcase" ["the football"]?.. I think we still have a great deal to learn about events before the coup attempt, but in the meantime, I would not begin looking for mystery plots in the events. After all, it may well turn out that the junta did not count on a bloody outcome, either. And it did not venture to seize the "White House" for this reason.

[Lagovskiy] But what was it counting on?

[Olshanskiy] On a kind of constitutional coup in accordance with the scenario that the "Soyuz" group was talking about last spring. It assumed that the Supreme Soviet would introduce a state of emergency and that some kind of emergency organ would be established with the consent of the President. The idea is a simple one—seize as many powers as possible and put pressure on the President, forcing him to do what the conservative forces consider necessary. After all, everything was leading up to this last fall. And it seemed that the president did not offer any particular resistance. He did not react to the statements by Yazov, Pugo, and Kryuchkov at the closed session of the Supreme Soviet and he "ate up" Pavlov's demand for emergency powers. It is logical to assume that "the eight" considered Gorbachev's consent to the "so-called coup" to be almost automatic.

[Lagovskiy] So perhaps they also went to the President for his blessing?

[Olshanskiy] Perhaps so, and perhaps the junta went simply to inform him, saying: we are beginning, come with us. And it is very interesting exactly how their conversation was held...

But I will continue the thought. The "constitutional coup" did not envision bloodshed or an attack by storm, either. It was supposed that the legal authorities would become tougher and do what was needed to return the country to its totalitarian existence. And right here it appears to have been really a misfire—the President refuses to play the "performance" according to their scenario. But we're sorry, the tickets have already been sold and the presentation has begun...

[Lagovskiy] But when wasn't it too late to seize the "White House"?

[Olshanskiy] Technically it was never too late. Even the persons most optimistic in the "White House" agreed that the defense could not hold out for more than an hour and a half. Specialists on the other side allotted 10 or 15 minutes for the attack, assuming a procedure such as this, for example: a gas attack from the air. Or even simpler: an injection of gas through the sewer system.

[Loginov] I will say further that the danger continued even when the people were celebrating victory. Was there any guarantee that some desperate general among those supporting the conspirators would not bring his troops up closer? A regiment from some remote place, let us say, where they had not heard about democracy yet?

[Olshanskiy] Alas, I do not think this revolution was the last by any means. We should all realize that we have regretfully entered a period of political instability.

#### WHAT WILL HAPPEN

[Lagovskiy] But you have been talking about the future here yourself. So what can we expect in the days ahead?

[Olshanskiy] The cards are such that we cannot expect calm. The putsch has blown up all the remains of the previous political system. The union has collapsed, the presidential structures of government have collapsed, and the party has collapsed. And in general, a great deal of everything has collapsed. For the present, there is no new political system. So political chaos is being added to the economic chaos. And we must proceed from this.

[Loginov] When I am asked about the future, I tell about the past. It often repeats itself, although not completely. Judge for yourselves, though...

In August 1917, the generals' revolt under Kornilov was supported by high-ranking military-industrial circles. The slogans were the same as those of today—a state of emergency, the need to put things "in order," to bring the country out of the crisis, to toughen the repressions...

The head of state at that time—Kerenskiy—was aware of the general outlines of Kornilov's program. Moreover, he expected that he himself would become the head of a new authoritarian government by retaining certain democratic institutions. But the insurgents thought differently. They were tired of the talkative Kerenskiy's indecision and constant vacillation. They did not plan to remove him altogether—the "honorary" post of minister

of education was waiting for Kerenskiy. But it was assumed that the democratic organizations would simply be dispersed.

[Lagovskiy] What is this, a hint?

[Loginov] No, these are only facts... On 25 August the Army was given the order to move to the capital. And it was begun... Those same empty but threatening appeals to the people. The same disorder and confusion in moving the troops. The same failure to understand the mood of the masses. But in the capital, there was universal solidarity and enthusiasm in opposing the Kornilov forces. The people rushed to dig trenches and erect barricades. The troops began crossing over to the people's side, convinced that they would be carrying out the orders of "the legal government." It ended with the revolt being quelled without one battle. One of the putsch leaders, General Krymov, committed suicide. The other rebellious generals were arrested. An investigation was begun, and the Army and state institutions were purged. A young colonel became the war minister.

There was universal euphoria after the victory for several days—a feeling of the people's strength and unity. Even Lenin yielded to these moods. He called for a compromise, because the unity of all the democratic forces, he wrote, really demonstrated the opportunity to prevent civil war. It appeared that light had begun to appear at the end of the tunnel for weary Russia...

But alas! Dissension among the victors began in a few days. At first regarding the question of who should wear the laurels of victory. Then about the distribution of government positions... But the crisis continued to deepen, the standard of living dropped even lower, and the threat of famine increased. And here there is a sharp division in the political forces once again—the left and right extremist currents grow stronger before our eyes. This split makes a reformist solution to the impasse impossible and opens the way to civil war.

[Lagovskiy] Are you frightening us?

[Loginov] No, I simply want to remind you that the Kornilov revolt was quelled on 30 August, but on 25 October the October Revolution swept away the Provisional Government. Kerenskiy, who had already emigrated, noted half in jest and half seriously that monuments for the October Revolution should not have been erected for Lenin, but for Kornilov. Because he had given impetus to those events that foreordained the bolsheviks' victory.

[Olshanskiy] Sometimes I am simply frightened by the historical analogies. Our Provisional Government essentially has been established... I think in order to protect Russia from new coup attempts, at least conservative ones, the "White House" will devote itself to abolition of those structures which made it possible for this one to mature and develop. Everyone understands very well that the problem lies with the structures, not the persons. They will concern themselves with the Army and with



elections. But the main blow will be at the party, of course. It is logical that some will argue. But doubts are raised. For one simple reason. Let us make a rough estimate: there are about 15 million party members in the country, and nearly every one has a husband or wife, children, parents, relatives, and finally, friends. On the average, it turns out that roughly 100 million people are associated with communists one way or another. This is one-third of the country's population—people who are not indifferent about their fate, by any means. But what is dangerous is not just their possible social eruption; there is also the risk of pulling down the machinery which sets the country's economy in motion. As an example, after World War II, the Allies understood this very well. And the denazification of Germany was essentially symbolic in nature. Because they were interested in seeing that the machinery worked. The result that is now apparent is an unarmed view. I hope that leaders of the democratic forces, after they look around and calm down, will grasp rather quickly that it is better not to take sharp movements. And they will appeal for civic peace and consolidation.

[Lagovskiy] There are appeals, but no one is heeding them. The average person has swung to the side of destruction.

[Olshanskiy] This is no surprise—people always rally against someone easily, but it is much harder to unite closely for something.

[Loginov] One more lesson has been learned from 1905, by the way. When the uprising began in Moscow in December and the barricades were erected, the number of participants, especially as they were the people's militia, was extremely small. But when the the barricades began approaching the center—the Sadovoye Koltso—and the authorities lost their heads, the illusion developed that the development of the uprising had been victorious. And at that time the people's militia was supported by the average person: he always follows the ones who have the power. Even the loyal servants and shopkeepers sawed up posts and trees and helped to catch and disarm the police. But when the uprising suffered defeat, those same servants and shopkeepers joined the ranks of punitive groups, routed the black sotnya, cut ice-holes in the Moscow River (near the current "White House"), and drowned the people's militia that were caught alive... I relate this to the fact that one group of people predominated at the "White House" on 19 and 20 August and others were there on the 21st, but completely different types of people predominated later on in Dzerzhinskiy Square. And this refers not so much to the change in "the overall look of a person" and the composition of people involved as to the rapid transition from self-sacrifice to readiness for violence.

[Olshanskiy] An interesting observation: it is known for certain that employees of the CPSU Central Committee moved toward the "White House" on the third day—to be photographed at the barricades...

[Loginov] The range of fluctuations in the moods of a crowd is extremely broad and dangerous. A crowd can become either a revolutionary people or an outrageous mob. And if the political and economic situation is not stabilized in the near future, if we do not preserve what has been gained, we will remember these days as just a prologue to a period of social upheavals on an even larger scale.

However, this involves more than fluctuations in attitudes. A future historian will probably divide these August events into two stages. The first stage was opposition to the attempted coup and defense against those involved in it. The second stage was the shift from defense to a broad-scale offensive not only against those involved in the putsch, but against the entire "old regime," as they say in such cases. And there is barely enough psychology and physiognomy for this analysis.

[Lagovskiy] You may be reproached for clinging to the "old, obsolete structures."

[Loginov] Before reproaching, it is important to understand that even the most loathsome system, in addition to its punitive functions, has one more very important function—survival. Someone has to do the plowing, the sowing, and the stoking, and someone has to supply the water and electricity and haul away the trash. They forget about this in the relentless struggle for power. And after the victory they are surprised to discover that the victors have inherited the same problems—the decayed pipes, the boilers that have been burned through, and the moist potatoes. How do we resolve these problems if we raze the structures of management to the ground? This is why pursuing civic peace and unification of all the wholesome forces, not sharing battle honors, is the only sensible path. Otherwise, the processes of disintegration will be irreversible in nature.

[Olshanskiy] It will not be in accordance with ideology here. Disintegration will begin because of the everyday economic difficulties. Shall I terrify you? It may well happen that a people's militia for self-defense will be organized for each doorway in order not to be robbed, in order to find subsistence. Alas, this has happened. People abandoned the cities, which were left without light and water, seized villages, and lived at the expense of the poor peasants.

[Lagovskiy] Incidentally, Western intelligence services are already predicting famine for us, and appeals to take grain away from the peasants by force are being heard from high rostrums...

[Loginov] How can we help but recall one of the first actions in the civil war here? Workers from the Urals, brutalized from hunger, the crying of their children, and the curses of their wives, seized a barge, put machine-guns in it, and went down the river to take away some grain. It was in the villages then. But the peasants did not want to give it up for the tsar, for the Provisional Government, or the bolsheviks. And today the village is

in no rush to "turn the grain over to the state." The people are struggling to remain destitute.

This is the scene that I visualize: the workers of some institution organize a group, arm themselves, and—go after food. Where? It makes no sense to travel a long distance—they would be robbed on the way. So they will travel to Central Russia. At first they try to exchange odds and ends of their belongings for food. But when it becomes clear that such things are not needed in the village, they obtain weapons... And "a man with a gun" will not have to work.

For this reason, the choice today is simple—either civil peace or civil war.

#### HOW WE CAN SET OUR MINDS AT REST

[Lagovskiy] Is there hope for a favorable outcome?

[Loginov] The Gorbachev-Yeltsin tandem—this is what is capable of giving real hope. But a tandem is not decorative when one person has the handlebars and pedals and the other one has only a seat behind his partner. It is a real tandem when both racers have handlebars and pedals... I am not disregarding other important political leaders and I am not overrating the personal abilities of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But their alliance is capable of making the least painful reformist transition to the new reality and of rallying those forces which—in the event of a confrontation—may lead to a civil war.

[Olshanskiy] Work should reassure everyone. And there are people who realize this, fortunately.

At the height of the putsch, on 20 August, I found myself at one of the rayon ispolkoms. A meeting was under way there. The managers of institutions and enterprises in the rayon were assembled to hear a major in the MVD who had come to prepare the people for the state of emergency committee and to issue instructions. A prefect from the Northwest hears all of this. Later he does not contain himself and asks: can I help you, Comrade Major? Please, the major agrees. Then the prefect comes out and continues in this manner: "Peasants, forget what you have just heard. There has been a decision by the Moscow Government not to recognize any of the GKChP orders. But I have not come to you for this reason. I want to talk with you about carrots and potatoes." And he explained clearly: if we do not start sending people to the oblast, we will starve. There are two vegetable centers there which must be filled up right away. And thank God, a contract has been concluded with farms which are now prepared to sell potatoes at 80 kopecks. But the rains are coming, and every day the roads..."

Here is a person that is really thinking about the fate of the people today. And not one who is shouting louder than everyone else. Excuse the appeals, but the principal focus of attention today is on systems for survival. Settle down and repair the water pipe, store up the carrots, lay

in supplies for winter fuel so that the rayon heat and power stations can maintain at least a minimum temperature in the houses. And long live the Northwest prefect.

**P.S.** This discussion in the editorial offices of RAB-OCHAYA TRIBUNA took place on the third day after the putsch was quelled. And some of what our speakers predicted has already come true...

#### Luchinskiy Interview on Secretariat's Actions During Coup

914B0386A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 31 Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with P. Luchinskiy, by I. Korolkov: "They Bided Their Time Too Long"]

[Text] The title is the conclusion that can be made from an interview that Petr Luchinskiy, CPSU Central Committee secretary, gave to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's political commentator Igor Korolkov.

[I. Korolkov] Petr Kirillovich, the CPSU has been disbanded. You, a Central Committee secretary, are practically unemployed. If we may speak plainly, this is bankruptcy.

[P. Luchinskiy] What happened is what was supposed to happen. Recently within the party there has been formed a very strong opposition between its progressive segment and its conservative, orthodox one. We might recall if only the April Central Committee plenum, at which the conservatives wanted to remove Gorbachev from the position of General Secretary. It was obvious that it would not be possible to keep the party united. Nevertheless no step was taken to make a formal split, although the ideological demarcation had already existed for a long time. The Central Committee, which was supposed to encourage the split, decided not to do that, and therein lay its error.

From today's positions I understand that that should have been done then. But we had only arrived at the new draft of the party program in order to reform the CPSU. And there was also the draft of the Union Treaty. All this greatly intimidated the conservatives, who just did not understand what was happening in the country. They proceeded from the view that society was not accepting the reforms, and they undertook an adventurous putsch. They made a move in secrecy from the elected agencies. I want to state with complete authority that there was no official discussion of the imposition of a state of emergency in the country either at the secretariat, the Politburo, or at sessions of other elected party agencies. Those who joined the putsch members did everything in deep secrecy.

[I. Korolkov] When did you learn personally about the putsch?

[P. Luchinskiy] At 0700 hours on 19 August on the shore of the Black Sea. I was staying at a CPSU Central

Committee sanatorium close to Gorbachev's dacha. Over the radio I heard a report concerning the state of emergency. I dashed to the telephone. It wasn't working. Using the internal telephone system, I get in touch with Primakov.

[I. Korolkov] Was Primakov staying at the same sanatorium?

[P. Luchinskiy] Yes. And also the President's aides Chernyayev and Shakhnazarov. We began discussing the situation. It turned out that, the evening before, we had not had any communication. We recalled that Chernyayev had left to see Gorbachev and had not returned. We learned that, the night before, Gorbachev had talked to Bagrov, the chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, and was planned at 1915 hours on the 19th to arrive at the airplace. We began to compare facts and came to the conclusion that there had been a coup in the country. We ascertained whether there were approaches to the President's dacha. It turned out that there was absolutely no communication with the dacha. We began looking for ways to get back to Moscow. Primakov asked the sanatorium's chief physician to give us a telephone, and we began ordering tickets.

[I. Korolkov] Do you mean that the chief physician had communication?

[P. Luchinskiy] He had requested to have a local telephone left to assure the sanatorium's viability.

On the morning of the 20th I talked things over at work with several secretaries. No one knew anything at all. Everyone was completely confused. There was no great amount of communication among them, but in a conversation with some of the secretaries I learned that we were dealing with a coup. There had been no communications confirming that Gorbachev was ill. It was necessary to take some steps. But this was the state of affairs: there was no General Secretary, and Ivashkov, the General Secretary's deputy, was in the hospital. Central Committee secretary Shenin was left as senior person. It turned out that on the 19th he had held the first assembly. At that time a telegram to the first secretaries of the republic Central Committees and the party's obkoms had been prepared, expressing a recommendation to the Communists that they support the actions of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency].

[I. Korolkov] Who of the Central Committee secretaries were at that meeting with Shenin?

[P. Luchinskiy] It turned out that Ivashko had not been there in the morning. I was told. Semenova had not been there. Toward the end of the session, Girenko and Dzasokhov arrived. At that meeting on the 19th, I was told, the opinion had been expressed that a meeting with the General Secretary was needed. That was followed by an answer: I cannot say anything in this regard.

On the morning of the 20th Semenova arrived by air. Ivashko was already there. They began thinking that it was necessary to make some kind of declaration to the Politburo. I will say that even in the draft of that declaration no support was given to the members of the putsch, but there were matters of principle when we had to declare that we were not involved in that affair and insisted on a meeting with Gorbachev. But those two matters were not expressed in a clear-cut manner. Therefore Semenova and I went to see Dzasokhov. I told him that I could not take any steps at all without having had a meeting with the General Secretary. I would not sign the declaration to the Politburo if it was not stated there that we were not involved in the putsch. Inasmuch as the draft of the declaration to the Politburo had gone to the vote, I told him that it was necessary to collect all the comments and to convince Ivashko that that declaration could not be released until we had taken into consideration all the comments made by the Politburo members. Dzasokhov drove to the hospital to see Ivashko, and returned on the 21st. We confirmed once again that we could not make a decision without a meeting with Gorbachev. So Ivashkov telephoned Yanayev. He said that the secretaries were there with him, and that he could not make any decision without a meeting with the General Secretary. Yanayev began saying that he did not have an airplane. Ask the military to give you one, Ivashko said. It became obvious from the conversation that someone from the GKChP would be flying to see Gorbachev. We told Ivashko that we did not need to fly with the committee, and that we did not have anything in common with it. We learned that presumably Lukyanov would also be flying. We got in touch with Lukyanov. Apparently the aircraft was being prepared for 1400 hours.

[I. Korolkov] During Ivashko's conversation with Lukyanov, didn't you manage to obtain any new information? For example, didn't you get the feeling about how he was evaluating the actions taken by the members of the putsch? Did he want to take Ivashko with him? What did you understand from that conversation?

[P. Luchinskiy] I did not get the feeling that he had any special desire to take Ivashko with him.

[I. Korolkov] Did any of the Central Committee secretaries talk to Yeltsin during those difficult days of 19-21 August? Was any support expressed to him? Was that known to you?

[P. Luchinskiy] There were discussions with the Russian Central Committee. There were certain contacts there. But our people proceeded from the view that if we were not immediately able to deal in a clear-cut manner with the declaration, then a second factor was important: not to drag the entire party into the confrontation, into the bloodshed. I can guarantee that many of us and in the Russian Communist Party had discussions with the party committees, telling them not to drag people into the bloodshed until the situation was completely obvious.

[I. Korolkov] How did the members of the Central Committee's Secretariat evaluate the Declaration of Yeltsin, Khasbulatov and Silayev to the nation? How did they evaluate the Russian leadership's appeal to a general indefinite strike?

[P. Luchinskiy] You know, none of this was discussed. But at least it was obvious that the nation was resisting the putsch. For us it was clear that this adventure was not being supported by people.

[I. Korolkov] A critical day was the 20th. Is it possible that even one document might have been adopted on that day? True, it was impossible to gather the entire secretariat, but those members who were there could have made a decisive declaration censuring the junta and forwarded that declaration to the mass media, couldn't they?

[P. Luchinskiy] That was our mistake. But it is necessary to understand our bad structure. This was a kind of syndrome, and this is wherein it is expressed. I was ready to make such a declaration. I know that Semenova was ready, and Dzasokhov agreed with us.

[I. Korolkov] ...To censure the junta?

[P. Luchinskiy] To disassociate themselves from it.

[I. Korolkov] Only to disassociate themselves? Why not to censure it?

[P. Luchinskiy] It was our general practice that if you crawl out by yourself, it's as though you are using all the other ones as hostages. We did not have enough bravery to say, "Whoever wants to can sign it." That was the most correct path. But that moment was spent in discussions. We left it until the morning. On the morning of the 21st Ivashko arrived, and we had had made our determination.

[I. Korolkov] You disassociated yourselves from the putsch when it became clear that it had failed.

[P. Luchinskiy] For whom had it become clear? We possessed one-tenth of the information that the Russian parliament had. No one knew anything. The first day there was discussion, and on the second day there was discussion again. Of course we could have acted like this: stir up the Crimea and move on Gorbachev's dacha. I had ideas like that. But you begin thinking: but what if this encourages the members of the putsch to do something to him?

[I. Korolkov] Did you have any conversations with anyone in the "group of eight"?

[P. Luchinskiy] No.

[I. Korolkov] Did any of the secretaries attempt to find out what was happening? Did he attempt to use telephone calls to exert an influence on the situation?

[P. Luchinskiy] Do you know what kind of situation it was? The fact of the matter is that we learned later that

Shenin was present at the session of the GKChP. When I arrived there and, in the morning, we asked him to tell us what was happening, he gave us a small amount of information.

[I. Korolkov] How did he explain and evaluate all this?

[P. Luchinskiy] I would not say that he... He was not very communicative. He reported very briefly that steps were being taken to keep society within the confines of law and order, that everything was normal. He said that it was fabrications that the troops were taking the side of the Russian government. He said that they were awaiting a quick declaration from the Politburo.

[I. Korolkov] The attempt to create a CPSU Central Committee plenum was viewed in society as a desire to support the members of the putsch.

[P. Luchinskiy] This is what we thought about the plenum: what would be the placement of forces there? Recently there had been such a fight at the plenums. You convoke a plenum. You plan one thing, and everything turns out just the reverse. Incidentally, I learned last night that Shenin used to say: if you convoke a plenum, it is necessary to send in your resignation to the Politburo, to whom the plenum will give the assurance that they will be left. I spoke about the need to entrust to someone temporarily the duties of General Secretary. So, knowing our Central Committee, we decided not to convoke a plenum.

[I. Korolkov] The junta is practically all the Central Committee members who occupied key state positions.

[P. Luchinskiy] The Central Committee Secretariat has nothing to do with selecting cadres of such a rank. They became part of the Central Committee on the basis of old tradition.

[I. Korolkov] What steps do you intend to take now?

[P. Luchinskiy] The Central Committee must disband itself. But the party program must become the basis around which there must be a discussion about some kind of new party with leftist orientation. It is necessary to give people the opportunity to complete stage of disassociation in a civilized manner.

[I. Korolkov] Will you take part in creating the party or will your political career end with this?

[P. Luchinskiy] I have not made a final determination. It's a matter of trust. If my experience proves to be necessary, I shall participate in creating the party. If not, it will be necessary for me to look for a job, and I do not make any tragedy out of that.

#### Epilogue to the Interview

Petr Kirillovich Luchinskiy is a person who is known in the CPSU as a proponent of democratic reforms in society and in the party itself. It is specifically people like him that Gorbachev relied in the Central Committee. I



personally remember him from one of the Central Committee plenums. At that time he was still the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party. Speaking after a highly played-official who had sharply criticized the reforms, he denounced them and spoke out in favor of realism in politics.

The interview that Petr Kirillovich gave to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA leaves a bitter feeling. The behavior of the Central Committee secretary during the days of the coup is a brilliant example of how an intelligent, progressive, and conscientious person proved to be a hostage to the party structure in which it is unseemly to be an individual and where one always takes the side of the strong.

It is awkward to hear that for two days the Central Committee secretaries kept whispering to one another that on the third day, after the failure of the plot, it was obvious, they could state that they had not been involved in the putsch. To make no statement of course, but only to disassociate themselves from it! And this is supposed to be a brave step!

From the very first minutes of the GKChP day of seizure it was clear to probably everyone except a handful that a coup d'état had occurred. Hundreds of thousands of people made a choice for themselves immediately. But the Central Committee member took two whole days to "ascertain the circumstances." The Russian leadership, that needed support, did not receive it from every Central Committee member.

What prevented those who did not share the decision taken by the members of the putsch from making a declaration censuring them? What prevented them from demanding that the participants in the plot, all of whom were well known to them personally, stop the madness? What prevented them finally from leaving Staraya Ploshchad and going to aid the White House? It was possible to take many steps against the GKChP, and they should have played their role. It was possible and necessary to issue to all the Communists and the people an appeal to civil disobedience toward the members of the putsch. Instead of that, in the critical situation the "progressive" Central Committee secretaries considered it to be their chief task "not to drag people into the confrontation." That is, they behaved in the way that the junta needed.

They bided their time. At a time when tens of thousands of Muscovites, risking their lives, went to the White House to defend the parliament, the Constitution, and democracy, the "progressive" Central Committee members sat things out in their labyrinths on Staraya Ploshchad, waiting to see which side would win. I am, however, not speaking about those who frankly supported the coup that had been carried out, or who helped it.

In attempting to justify the inactivity of himself and his colleagues in the Central Committee, Luchinskii demonstrated the entire insolvency of the highest party elite as citizens. The Communist Party, as the leading and

guiding force, has collapsed in the mind even of those who yesterday believed in the CPSU. It was a sad but inevitable finale.

### Semenova Interview on CPSU Secretariat's Behavior During Coup

24 SEPTEMBER Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
[in Blackout] 23 Aug 91 p. 2

[Interview with Galina Semenova by O. Dmitriyeva. "We Crossed Through a Line of the Jeering Crowd"; (Soviet group not specified)]

[Translator] Semenova is one those women that everybody turns to look at all her life, the kind whom everyone envies.

For many years, she has been the editor of a flourishing women's magazine (a subscription to KRESTYANKA could be gotten only through connections), and at the same time, a Politburo member, a CPSU Central Committee secretary. At the same time, a former...

Yet even now the very experience of these acquisitions and losses is unique—and thus probably invaluable.

[Correspondent] By the will of circumstance, your party career has ended. What are your feelings as you leave?

[Semenova] I leave with a feeling of undeserved offense. The day when the Central Committee building will be demolished for a long time.

I don't want to justify the actual "style" of our expulsion. Even the emotions of the crowd were boiling those days. The majority's dissatisfaction with the party ripened long ago. But still...

[Correspondent] There was an announcement for us on the party Central Committee radio that every had to leave the premises within one hour—otherwise we would be arrested. People convulsively started to collect their things.

I have worked in journalism for many years. I have lots of notebooks with entries, some personal effects—a ring and one of my granddaughter. My boots stayed in the closet. I didn't have time to collect anything.

We crossed through a line of the jeering crowd. A woman had her purse knocked from her hands, and she couldn't pick it up. It was all terrible!

[Correspondent] Are you afraid of what tomorrow holds for you?

[Semenova] I'm not afraid for myself. To a certain extent I even felt free. In many ways, that position in the party's upper echelon had been a burden. I am afraid of a process of reprisals beginning against the party, against its rank and file workers.



Six women, my former Central Committee staffers, gathered in my home the other day. One of them is expecting... They looked at me with one question in their eyes: "Why?"

[Correspondent] But you yourself understand full well that in the eyes of the people, you were not just "apparatus staffers," but personified the Communist Party. Weren't you prepared to answer for its mistakes?

[Semenova] That is not how the old party should finish its work. The process of its rebirth was under way; the party was evolving. And the reformation was to have been radical. This was the foremost goal of the draft of the new program. We did not have time to complete all this.

[Correspondent] But did you personally believe that a principal renewal and renaissance of the Communist Party was possible?

[Semenova] Of course I did. It was with that hope alone that I went to work in the Central Committee. True, the illusions began to fall away after the April plenum. Perhaps the ardent aggression of the conservative forces was what I found most sobering.

But after all, no coup took place within the party, although we know that attempts were made to oust Gorbachev.

[Correspondent] So then the coup within the party took place on 19 August, when a secret cable came from the CPSU Central Committee with the signature of the Secretariat, instructing all party committees to "take measures for the participation of communists in assisting the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]?"

[Semenova] I think that the Secretariat did not have the right to make any decision in the absence of almost half its composition. I cannot offer any other comments, since I was not in Moscow on 19 August. On the 20th, I returned from an official trip to Alma-Ata. On that same day, Ivashko got out of the hospital, Girenko returned from a health spa, Luchinskiy interrupted his vacation. And telegrams were already coming into the Central Committee from the provinces demanding that a plenum be convened.

We met as the Secretariat on that same day, the 20th. We sat down and said, "Stop, guys, what kind of plenum is this. What's it for, to 'approve'? Or what—to elect a new general secretary?"

And we swore not to permit a coup in the party.

Today, we are justifiably being reproached that we of the Central Committee took a passive position. That was not how we should have acted. We shouldn't have waited for agreements from the primary organizations, rather we should have gone on television and screamed: "Communists, don't give in to temptation!"

Nor should something else be forgotten: There was indeed a temptation! Unlike the democrats, whom the GKChP threatened directly, both their ideals, and even their lives, there was nothing threatening the Communist Party. On the contrary, they offered the party the chance to become the only one, great, and inimitable.

[Correspondent] Even today you persist in believing in a chance for the rebirth of the party? Don't you feel that the very communist idea has compromised itself, and that it is senseless to try to revive it?

[Semenova] Yes, reality today is such that people pronounce the word "communism" with disgust. But communism as a teaching, as a theory of an issue, is another matter. As far as the actual Communist Party is concerned, it was important first and foremost as a school for leadership, for administrative work. We simply have no other such school. And it is not by coincidence that even the current democratic leaders learned everything in that same school. Yeltsin and Yakovlev and Shevardnadze are former party functionaries. And they shouldn't be defamed for that: Oh, he worked in the Central Committee! Well there wasn't anywhere else to get leaders from!

Of course, the party cannot be reborn in its previous form. As you know, immediately after the putsch, a group of CPSU Central Committee members proposed creating an organizing committee for the formation of a party of leftist forces. Of course, this will be a new party, but relying upon communists. Although—and this is my personal conviction—no new structures should take the former leaders of the CPSU into key positions. For the moral responsibility is still their own, and this can only repulse those people who will want to join a new party.

[Correspondent] Galina Vladimirovna, what was it that forced you to quit real journalism and go over to the apparatus? Didn't you have any suspicions that you were simply filling a mandatory "women's" quota space in the higher echelon of party power?

[Semenova] I did have suspicions. And in the beginning, when Gorbachev made me this offer, I refused. I am not by nature an "apparatchitsa," and to the surprise of many, I made it to chief editors without any such notation in my biography.

To be frank, not a day went by that I did not regret the choice I made, both as a woman and as a human. But all the same, I understood that with the help of the party structures I could do more for the women's movement than I would while remaining with the magazine.

[Correspondent] How concretely have you managed to affect the status of our unfortunate women?

[Semenova] We prepared the ground for the social defense of women and the family under conditions of the transition to the market. We prepared protection for women in business and entrepreneurial activity. With

the tremendous support of Aganbegyan, we managed to create the Businesswomen Training Center.

Lyudmila Shvetsova and I had planned to create a President's higher council for the defense of fundamental human rights, but we didn't have time...

Unfortunately, during my work, the party was no longer very "functional," or in any event it was alienated from solving practical issues.

[Correspondent] Had the party not left center stage, what would have been the next step in your career?

[Semenova] I hadn't planned on developing a party career. A straightforward return to journalism was in my plans. I am still a member of the KRESTYANKA editorial board. Possibly I could take part in creating a new family magazine. I have no claims on a leading role.

[Correspondent] Wasn't it hard to give up the privileges you had as a Central Committee secretary?

[Semenova] I'll tell you about my privileges. A two-room apartment for three people (myself, my husband, and my mother); I got it when I was still working at the magazine. The salary of a Politburo member is R1,200, but as an editor, I earned more, if you count the bonuses and honoraria. An official car, the same black Volga that transported me at KRESTYANKA as well.

Yes, I remember, there is also the "House of Services" for party Central Committee staffers; my husband had a suit made there.

On the other hand, I had a 12-hour work day, and one day off a week. And never enough sleep.

[Correspondent] Whom do you see as the country's real leader today?

[Semenova] Gorbachev. I am constant.

[Correspondent] But did your circle change after resignation? Did you keep all your friends after your descent from Olympus?

[Semenova] I kept them all. Fortunately, I still haven't noticed any traitors. On the contrary, the joyous encounter reaction I find somewhat unexpected, as if I had come back from the front or exile.

Even journalists from OGONEK called, people with whom I would scarcely seem a comrade at arms, even with my reformist basis... I got calls from the Baltics.

They tell me, "Galya, we're glad you're free now, and you can just be a journalist. Thank God you have finally gotten rid of your illusions.

### Former Politburo Member Semenova on Coup

914B0376A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with Galina Vladimirovna Semenova, former member, CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and secretary, CPSU Central Committee, by Irina Vereykina, correspondent: "We Lived in Self-Delusion Until the Final Days"]

[Text] [Vereykina] Galina Vladimirovna, how did you find out about the coup d'etat?

[Semenova] On the night of Sunday, 18-19 August I had flown down to Alma-Ata in order to attend a congress of Kazakhstan's women's organizations. I found out about what had happened early in the morning and was upset, first and foremost, as a mother. My son is approximately the same age as those kids who perished on the barricades in Moscow on 21 August. I knew nothing about the conspiracy which was being brewed. The reactionaries made half-hearted plans for a similar "sortie" after the 28th party congress, when the intraparty struggle between the conservatives and the reformers became exacerbated. The split in the party was always evident. After the April plenum I asked Gorbachev to release me from my position in the Politburo. He turned down my request, and he placed great hopes for an improvement in the party's position in connection with the adoption of the new CPSU Program. The general secretary made enormous efforts to preserve the party, and he hoped to renovate it, above all, by making sure that the older staff members left their leadership positions in the party organs.

[Vereykina] How, in your opinion, could it happen that the conspiracy was headed up by those very people who were closest to Gorbachev? Is it really possible that there were no specific alarm signals in the behavior and utterances of the future junta leaders—who were, after all, members of the highest party leadership?

[Semenova] It could be said that one alarm signal was Gorbachev's statement at the April plenum concerning his resignation.

[Vereykina] So just what was it that prevented Gorbachev from being removed from his post as general secretary at that time?

[Semenova] Most of the participants in the April plenum were persons who would not permit Gorbachev to be removed. And, therefore, those participants in the plenum who were in favor of the future putsch members did not insist on such a removal.

[Vereykina] But why, then, on the day when the military coup took place, didn't we hear a precise evaluation of the situation from the general secretary's like-minded associates who were Politburo members?

[Semenova] Unfortunately, the lack of development and deployment, as well as the clumsy awkwardness of the

entire party apparatus, manifested itself and became evident once again. Each official tried to take independent steps without "harmonizing or coordinating" them. I attempted unsuccessfully to make a connection with the Central Committee Secretariat from Alma-Ata on 19 August. Not a single telephone was answered, everybody was at a session of the Secretariat, and so I decided to fly to Moscow. On 20 August the Secretariat assembled in a plenary session: I flew in, Luchinskiy, Gerenko, and others arrived from their vacations, and Ivashko left the hospital in order to attend. Lengthy efforts began to be made over the telephone to harmonize and coordinate a draft statement by the Politburo with the republic-level secretaries. The text of this draft statement was distributed right away. The nature of the statement was neutral. The final text of this statement was not adopted by the Secretariat because of the contradictory proposals made by the participants in the session. They all boiled down to an attempt not to permit a coup or a turnaround in the party. The basic evaluations in the statement being proposed were as follows: nonsubordination to the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency?], an appeal to party organizations to keep calm, and a call not to proceed to conflict-type situations. One of the initial demands made by the session on the GKChP was a demand for a meeting with Gorbachev, but this was immediately refused. By the way, when it was already known that Ivashko was about to fly to the Crimea in order to see Gorbachev, the GKChP would not allow him to be accompanied by a physician.

[Vereykina] How do you evaluate the statement by M.S. Gorbachev dissolving or disbanding the CPSU Central Committee and the measures connected with this? And what work will you engage in now, since—beginning as of today—you are actually unemployed?

[Semenova] I support this statement with all my soul. It is with great joy that I consider myself free, and I will return to journalistic work. By the way, the collective of the journal KRESTYANKA was one of the very first to elect its own editor-in-chief (me).

[Vereykina] And what do you see as the subsequent fate of the Communist Party? After all, you were one of its leaders until its final days.

[Semenova] I link my own hopes with the party to be headed by Rutskiy. As a member of the CPSU, I consider that none of its former leaders should occupy key posts in the new party. It should be led by persons who immediately and unconditionally rejected the members of the putsch; it should be headed by those who stood on the barricades in Moscow. I support a call for the creation of an organizational committee for a new party of left-wing forces. And I am prepared to assist it—if I am called upon to do so—as a consultant or an aide. In my opinion, this organizational committee should include Volskiy, Stolyarov, Oleynik, Latsis, Bekenin, Mikhaylov, Dyagterev, Babichev, and others, working jointly with members of the Committee for Developing a

New CPSU Program. Good causes and people's high moral impulses should not fall by the wayside.

[Vereykina] Tell us, what kind of relations did the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat have with the leadership of the RCP [Russian Communist Party]?

[Semenova] Relations with Polozkov were always "strained." The RCP conducted itself separately, in a somewhat "removed" manner, from the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. And it obviously did not approve of many of our Secretariat's renovated staff. Kuptsov is an interesting person, who enjoys authority among the deputies. I must say that the new persons who have entered upon leadership positions in the CPSU are figures of broad-based thought and well-educated. At times they would tell humorous stories about the lives of former Politburo members. Unfortunately, however, we were unable to overcome a hostile attitude in the people's consciousness toward many members of the Communist Party. And the party itself lived in self-delusion until the final days.

[Vereykina] What has changed in your life since the time when you became one of our country's highest political leaders?

[Semenova] I live just as I used to, in the same apartment which I obtained when I was working in the editorial offices of KRESTYANKA. To be sure, it is a "crackle-type" [?] house, but my family—consisting of three persons—occupies a two-room apartment. My service motor vehicle was the same as I had when working as an editor. My earnings remained the same as in my previous position, but the workload was twice as great. It may be said that I never did become a political leader; I never became accustomed to that new role.

[Vereykina] What segment of the work was assigned or entrusted to you when you were a Politburo member?

[Semenova] I was chairperson of the Commission on Women's and Family Affairs, while, at the same time, being a member of the appropriate committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for continuing and implementing this line of work in accordance with the government's line. My "apparatus" consisted of only five persons. We succeeded in confirming, i.e., getting approved, and promulgating the following, extremely important documents of help to Soviet women: "On the Basic Directions of the Women's Movement," "On the Social Protection of the Family," etc. We succeeded in establishing women's centers within the local party organs and sociopolitical centers. For example, in the Altay Kray, in Ivanovo, a letter was sent to M.S. Gorbachev setting forth a draft proposal for founding a family-type newspaper to be entitled OCHAG. It was planned to make this publication not an inherent part of the party press, inasmuch as I have always considered human interests, particularly those of women, to be higher than all political interests and problems. I hope that the present-day reorganization of the CPSU will not put a stop to or spoil our good and useful beginnings.

[Vereykina] And, returning again to the subject of the tragic days of the reactionary putsch, how would you evaluate the personal "contribution" made by each member of the highest party leadership to organizing the rejection or rebuff of the putsch members or to a tacit complicity with the junta? I ask you this because, of course, all the participants were your comrades in the party....

[Semenova] I took part in the party meeting held by the members of our commission—a meeting which adopted a rebuke aimed at the entire Secretariat for keeping silent at the decisive moment when the split in the party had already become clearly marked. What we had to do was to issue appeals to communists of all types: to come out onto the squares, to speak out over the radio. Unfortunately, neither I myself nor any of us did this. Of course, I would not have called upon women to throw themselves under the tanks, but we should have rapidly organized a rebuff to the putsch members. Now, I think, the party plenum, upon creating a new party structure, will decide the fate of the CPSU. I view my own mission as continuing to struggle for women's rights.

#### In Lieu of a Commentary

As related by our own correspondent in Alma-Ata, at 1700 hours on 19 August, when all the junta's documents had already been "trumpeted" [?] several times over the Union-level airwaves, G. Semenova did, indeed, speak before a working conference of the Congress of Kazakhstan's Women's Organizations. However, she did not comment upon the coup d'état, declaring merely that "one would have to be in Moscow in order to evaluate these events."

Well now, "illumination" sometimes arrives late.... But allow us to have some doubts concerning those "good beginnings and causes," about which the party secretary responsible for women's destiny is so concerned. Just about six months ago G. Semenova was engaged in implementing the following policy: Women should not make their political choices in solitude or isolation—their minds should belong to the party, and it is the party which should dictate their political sympathies (which is directly contradictory to her words in this interview: "Women's interests are higher than all political interests and problems."). And it was for this purpose that staff headquarters of party women's organizers were again opened not only in the CPSU Central Committee, but also in raykoms. A special women's fund was planned; it would have encouraged the activities of those women who fully share the platform of the Communist Party. What is this if not an attempt to subordinate women and "poison" them with the party ideology of obedience? By the way, we can now declare that this task has been partially carried out: Not a single women's organization "headed up" by the Communist Party spoke up with any sober words about this "adventure"—they all remained silent and waited for a command from the Central Committee. They did not go out among the masses to explain to women that the junta's dictatorship would inevitably affect their destinies, would

subject their husbands and children to risks, and would even make orphans of some. Just where were you then, you women's councils? It seems that your viewpoint was similar to that of your leader....

#### Valeriy Boldin Career Profiled Following Recent Arrest

914B0409A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by Aleksey Panchenko: "How the Conspirators Mature: Anatomy of the Career of Valeriy Boldin"]

[Text] People did know something about each one of that "group of eight." This extraordinary ambassador of the conspirators who appeared in Foros with an ultimatum to the president and the nation was simply unknown. But those who are familiar with the secrets of the Kremlin and the Old Square knew that of those immediately around Gorbachev in recent years the president did not even associate as often with his "friend" Lukyanov as with this pompous and slick 55-year-old functionary, to whom he entrusted the management of his own apparatus and who betrayed him without hesitation.

Ten years ago, M.S. Gorbachev, one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, invited Valeriy Ivanovich Boldin, a member of the editorial board of PRAVDA and editor of the agriculture department, to be his assistant. And there was no member of the large editorial board who should not have been surprised: what qualities could the Central Committee secretary find in this most unimposing (by no means externally!) member of the editorial board of the "first newspaper of the country"? In PRAVDA by that time, Boldin had acquired the firm reputation of a person of ordinary and uninspired thinking, an editor without original or profound ideas, and an extremely boring speaker in editorial boards, "urgent meetings," and conferences of correspondents.

He generally spoke with his interlocutors across a very wide desk in a measured and quiet voice, which meant that one had to listen to Valeriy Ivanovich respectfully and intently. In rare moments of particular kindness, he permitted a little relaxation and a few jokes and anecdotes. But God forbid that there be any mention of politics.

He looked after himself very carefully. He went to the sanatorium only at the best time. Harvest or no harvest, every year he used passes to the most prestigious sanatoria during the bathing season. On him one could see more easily than on other members of the editorial board what suits made in the special shop of the CPSU Central Committee mean. Coming from a working family in Kryukovo-Zelenograd near Moscow, he did not know what suits of the consumer brand are. Nature did not give Valeriy Ivanovich boldness but instead an abundance of craftiness. And he became one of the participants in the putsch not out of zeal for the people, as was proclaimed in their primitive and arrogant manifest, but out of a personal fear that through the reforms and



democracy he would lose everything that he had gained under his lucky PRAVDA and Central Committee star.

... But he began his career rise with a denunciation. A third of a century ago, Valeriy Boldin, the rosy-cheeked graduate of the Timiryazevka school, betrayed his professors and teachers when he came out in PRAVDA with a letter in which he denounced the fact that in his alma mater they do not fully appreciate the "queen of the fields"—the hunt for "anticorn witches" was still in full swing. Light in weight and unfounded and without specifics and convincing analysis, it was nevertheless, for those times, an indication of the "highmindedness" of the young communist (even in his student years—a rarity!—Valera joined the party, as though preparing his own Baykonur launching pad for his career). At Timiryazevka, they properly understood the connection between this "signal" of their pupil and Khrushchev's idea of moving the world-renowned VUZ [higher educational institution] out of Moscow.

The "high-minded" but empty memorandum was subsequently mentioned in a leading article and in numerous conferences at the oblast and union level. Khrushchev himself referred to it. Well, after this how could they fail to invite the bold graduate of Timiryazevka to PRAVDA? The vigilant state security specialists and chief editor were not disconcerted by the fact that this graduate who knew nothing about agriculture had in no way distinguished himself even on the pages of a large academic newspaper (although generally this same chief editor, coming down angrily on some obstinate person and threatening to fire him, shouted that lined up beyond the gates of the editor's office were 10,000 talented paper boys from the province who were dreaming of coming here).

In short, Boldin "fell into line" and ended up in the agriculture department of PRAVDA. He was a literary associate in probationary training, the lowest step of the creative ladder. But he was at PRAVDA! In the central press organ!

"We will teach and educate him." This is what the editor told himself and us, colleagues in the department.

I was working at PRAVDA at the time. It was the will of fate that at almost the same time as Boldin I was transferred from the kray newspaper SOVETSKAYA KUBAN. After several articles by the trainee, the editor called me to his office:

"See here, from now on you and Ivan Antonovich Totskiy will be Boldin's instructors. Help him and teach him revision, the art of reporting, information, correspondence.... I do not think that he is cut out to be an essayist. I can already see that it is not in the cards. But with time he may gain some proficiency in leading articles. That is not so difficult: 11-13 paragraphs, the instructions of the party, and some quotes from the works of leaders living and dead...."

The "education" did not continue for long, no longer than six months. It became obvious that as for creativity the warrior for corn was incompetent. It is amazing but even then he developed the tongue of an office worker and functionary. Whatever his pen touched, one could feel the icy breath of protocol.

The happy opportunity to get rid of ballast soon presented itself and the editor's office did not hesitate to avail itself of that opportunity.

The chief ideologist of the CPSU L.F. Ilyichev turned to PRAVDA with the request that it recommend for his circle a young, ...certainly, industrious, nondrinking, and nonsmoking man with an attractive appearance. So that there would be prospects of training him as an assistant to the Central Committee secretary.... So, just a year later (!), the former trainee had climbed the Second Step. He immediately got an apartment in the famous house number 30-32 on Kutuzovskiy with a spacious hall and a marble bath and floor. I remember how my former "pupil" ecstatically related that there were no problems installing the amenities in his little nest: the powerful auxiliary services of the Central Committee took care of everything in just a few days.

I do not know how the service of Valeriy Ivanovich would have continued under one of the creators of the CPSU program in which the party triumphantly promised communism within 20 years but the October revolution of 1964 came. Its chief was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The connections acquired in the Central Committee worked and Boldin found himself as a student at the Academy of Social Sciences. The main thing was not to become separated from the structures of the Central Committee, to keep afloat, and there one could be resurrected.

After having studied for four years, Valeriy Ivanovich also "came to his senses." To be sure, not immediately but after a year or two, now being in the agriculture department of PRAVDA—deputy in the agriculture department and simultaneously acquiring the rank of economic observer.

This invitation (it was said in the editor's office that he was recommended by V.G. Afanasyev, the future director of PRAVDA) had a prehistory. After the Prague spring of 1968, PRAVDA chief editor M.V. Zimyanin continued for several months to tolerate two free-thinking agrarian specialists whose articles ran contrary to the immutable antimarket positions of the CPSU Central Committee—Aleksandr Volkov, deputy editor of the agriculture department (now a professor and doctor of sciences) and the economic adviser Genadiy Lisichkin (now a professor, doctor of sciences, and people's deputy of the USSR). Valuing them as among the most intellectual staff members of his newspaper, the cautious Mikhail Vasilyevich nevertheless dismissed them under pressure from above. But a holy place does not remain vacant and they combined both of these



positions for Valeriy Ivanovich. It did not matter that the replacement was insultingly unequal. Instead of the bold and in-depth analyses of Volkov and the brilliant original articles of Lisichkin, they forced the reader to swallow insipid but orthodox articles without any doubts or vacillations. One thing was fortunate: the economic observer did not appear often, for he wrote with great effort, which did not hinder him in soon becoming the editor of the department and a member of the editorial board. This was the desired Third Step.

By the way, there is an explanation for this as well. His talented predecessors sought to avoid coordinating their articles with the Old Square. Valeriy Ivanovich very quickly beat down the path to the offices of various deputies and heads for concordance and approvals and had free access to F.D. Kulakov and later to his replacement, M.S. Gorbachev.

Obviously his diligence, wheedling, and expeditiousness were noticed. And here comes the Fourth Step: as already mentioned, M.S. Gorbachev, Central Committee secretary for rural affairs, asked him to be his assistant. Ten years remained until August 1981.

Here is a characteristic feature. Even before Boldin was invited to the Old Square, some secret and powerful person recommended his inclusion in the brigade of talented journalists and writers—the true creators of Brezhnev's "Virgin Land." After this, he began to be considered an expert on virgin land farming. But Brezhnev's "Virgin Land" yielded a rich harvest not only for its vain creator, who won the Lenin Prize for his "historical" trilogy, but also for the literary "Negroes" who remained behind the scenes. All of them were decorated and others were given apartments and prestigious houses. By that time Boldin already had luxurious apartments. They also gave him the highest decoration in the entire brigade, although he "plowed" less than the others in carrying out general management, following the schedule for writing and progress in the press.

Four years under the wing of the Central Committee secretary. And then comes 1985. He takes off again—the Fifth Step in the in Boldin's career: he becomes (Did he see such a thing even in his rosiest dreams?!) the assistant of the general secretary of the vanguard party and a short time later the head of its General Department (we use capital letters, as was customary just a little while ago). From here, in normal times, it is a direct path to secretary of the Central Committee and even to candidate—and not just candidate—member of the Politburo! Let us recall the rapid rise of the fiery orator Chernenko, the recent (in the cycle) predecessor of Valeriy Ivanovich at this post.

In essence, since the time of Chernenko, this department—the most paper of all the Central Committee departments, with the boring name of General—has become all-powerful, a unique secret police in the very heart of the Central Committee. And certainly the chief of this department is all-powerful as well. He is at the

pinnacle of power day and night. He has the power to filter and dole out the access to the general secretary of people and information from other departments and all agencies, above all the KGB, the Defense Ministry, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.... It is key post! Especially for people like Boldin. High-ranking emissaries—dignified party leaders from the localities, self-satisfied marshals and powerful aces of the military-industrial establishment, academicians with world-famous names, stars of the opera and ballet—they all groveled before this slick functionary, trying to get to see the general secretary (and later the president).

Things were burning all around the party and Valeriy Ivanovich immediately rose to his Sixth Step but this time under the wing of state services. Unexpectedly for many, the list of members of the Presidential Council included the name of Boldin. By that time they had already nominated him people's deputy of the USSR. The system demanded this—the general secretary's assistant had to be a deputy.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, believing in Valeriy Ivanovich, helped him climb the Seventh Step by appointing him head of the president's apparatus. Here they had a "reliable comrade." Fearing radical changes, he finally took the path of the participants in the putsch (or they followed him—the investigation will look into this).

It has been noted that Boldin had a small weakness. He had the ability, as no one else among the persons below Gorbachev, to position himself in photographs of top-level receptions and meetings in such a way that the viewer or reader will know that Valeriy Ivanovich Boldin himself was standing there. Of course such a presence made an impression, especially on peripheral party bosses and people from the highest echelons. The legend of the great power and special closeness to the president and general secretary had to be maintained in this way as well. Remember the television reports on the meetings at Novo-Ogarev? In the foreground is the president, whereas in the depth of the hall one can see a prominent man who is clearing trying to get in the picture.

He suffered a fiasco as a political adventurer. He was not able to climb the last step in his brilliant career. He will take another step—to the criminal courts....

This individual had everything: a pretty wife—his sweetheart from his schooldays, a wonderful daughter, a luxurious apartment, and a very fine library: he received books for it for 30 years (under the "first list"). But he did not read them, although just in case he memorized several of their titles (he must not be known as an ignoramus!).

Fate gave him the opportunity to associate with outstanding personalities—colleagues in the Presidential Council—such persons as Chingiz Aytmatov, Stanislav Shatalin, and Aleksandr Yakovlev. But he preferred to be with others, the conspirators. For he understood that in the life to come people like him will not be needed.

...How naive the attempt of long ago to "teach" and "educate" Boldin seems to me. It was a vain endeavor. The system raises and educates such persons. It grows with them. It lives through them. Now, after 3 lightning days and nights in August, it depends on all of us whether the monster of the system will rise again or disappear irrevocably.

#### Attempts To Reach Gorbachev 20 Aug Recounted

914B0380A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian & Spanish Union Edition p 8

[Report: "Foros, Crimea, 20 August—"]

[Text] Since the first day of the coup efforts had been made to reach Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, if only to find out what had happened to him. IZVESTIYA found persons who had tried to do this in Foros itself. Film director Oleg Uralov and a number of RSFSR people's deputies who happened to be vacationing on the Crimean shore during the fateful days of 19 and 20 August.

#### Statement by Oleg Uralov

"On the evening of 18 August, I saw some soldiers surfacing, and at dawn on the following day the property on which Gorbachev's dacha is situated was surrounded by two speedboats and five patrol boats. I was struck by the fact that the guns of these boats were uncovered. I then tried to place a call to Assistant to the President Anatoly Chernavets (who was staying at a consultant on a film we were making about the coup). Three days earlier we had agreed to meet on Monday (the 19th). But I could not get through to him.

"That morning I got in my car and drove past the dacha. The main entrance was closed by a barrier. I showed my credentials and asked to see Chernavets in order to see Guard Medvedev. Without explanation my request was denied, so I decided to seek access through the back entrance without knowing exactly where it was. A dirt road led down a slope to a hut by the sea on which was situated on the land adjacent to that of the President's dacha. The person on duty, a young fellow, came out and said: 'What do you think you are doing? Making a rescue attempt?'

"I thought: What a strange thing to say. So I took out two spools of barbed wire that had been around. The young fellow advised me to leave in the direction of the dacha, which lay beyond a grove of trees. Then I bumped into a line of barbed wire and stopped. I was in front of a wall with gates, guarded by a single line of border guards. No one of them would let me through, or for that matter even talk to me. Finally, a senior warrant officer told me about a guard post nearby. I found them. They were RSFSR guards.

"But my greatest surprise came later in the day. I was in the White House when I happened to overhear a conversation about a telephone message. He [on the telephone] mentioned the use of combat weapons. Gorbachev.

statement by RSFSR People's Deputy Stanislav Shugrov.

After having contacted the White House by telephone and taken down the initial ukazes of the President of Russia by dictation, I and Deputy Vyacheslav Volkov set out for Sevastopol. Much depended during these hours on what side the seamen of the Black Sea Fleet would be on.

The master of Sevastopol was eventually found. He refused us to get in touch with Khasbulatov's office; he gave us permission to relay his Fax number to Moscow; and he told us that I. Laptev, with whom he had talked on the telephone in the morning, considered the actions of the State Emergency Committee unconstitutional. We even had a meeting with Vice Admiral V. Nekrasov, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet and a delegate to the Ukraine Supreme Soviet. Although fully informed of Yeltsin's ukazes, he declined to issue orders to have them published in the fleet newspaper, defending his decision by saying that what had happened was perhaps not the best. He added: 'The Fleet will not go against the people. As for Gorbachev, don't worry about him—he is sitting in his dacha, alive and well.'

In the evening we made our first attempt to gain access to the President's dacha. The guards were cordial enough as they looked at our deputy credentials. They expressed no interest in where we had come from. Soon, however, they informed us that it was not possible for Mikhail Gorbachev to receive all deputies who happened to be on vacation in the area. 'But do not worry,' they said. 'All is well with him—today he even had guests.' We had no choice except to leave.

On the AM of 21 August I was finally able to reach Gorbachev by phone and a short time later received the President of Russia's official authorization to meet with him. By that time Volkov had taken a plane to Moscow, so I was going to call as the dacha in Foros stood. But Ludya Shapovalova, Aleksandr Pochinok, Vladimir Zherun, Sergey Ivanov, Sergey Druganov, and Nikolai Vidernikov persuaded me to take them along. We decided that by going together it might be easier to make arrangements.

Major GAI A. Fedchuk refused to admit our delegation because, as he put it, the border guards could be confused. He advised us to drive around to the service entrance at the lower gate. There they signed us in. But I could not only be given permission to enter the gate house. I expressed my doubts that all these precautionary measures were at the instructions of Gorbachev. But Major G. Shcherban of the Ukraine KGB hotly denied this. Two days later, I received official word that the content of the telephone despatch from Yeltsin had not questioned Gorbachev's personal guards and that Major Sergeyevich would therefore be unable to

On the morning of 22 August I became acquainted with Gorbachev and with him 18 hours later, on the evening of

21 August, I did meet with Mikhail Segeyevich, after all. The look in his eyes astonished me."

### Emma Yazov Defends Husband's Actions

914B04154 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 11 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Emma Yazov, wife of former defense minister Dmitry Yazov, by A. Kraynin; place and date not given: "I Found Out What Had Happened When I Heard the Roar of the Tanks"]

[Excerpt] [Passage containing background information omitted]

[Kraynin] Emma Yevgenyevna, did you know about what was planned for 19 August?

[Yazov] What do you mean? How could you... Dmitry Timofeyevich even in what you might call better times never let me in on the essence of his problems. On the morning of the 19th he came into my room as usual, kissed me, and left for work. It was not until after that, later, that I heard the roar on Minsk Highway; it is quite near here. I phoned my husband and said: "Dima, what is happening?" He started to calm me down, telling me not to worry; it might be necessary to introduce a state of emergency. And I started shuddering all over and shouted into the phone: "I am coming to your office immediately!" He had to agree to this, a large white Volga came to the dacha, and the boys from the guard somehow fit me and my wheelchair in. A lady friend of mine also went with me. With a great deal of difficulty we got there and they took me in the elevator up to the fifth floor. We have been together for 17 years but I have never seen my husband in this condition. It seemed to me that he was completely confused, perhaps even ready (she makes the gesture of shooting herself). He said one thing to me: "Emma, I will never be a Pinochet."

[Kraynin] Excuse me, but when you saw him the last time did you speak with him?

[Yazov] I saw him on the morning of the 21st and our last conversation on the telephone was on the 22d. And I do not even remember any more what we talked about. He calmed me down, and with tender, kind words such as I have never heard from him or anyone else before.

[Kraynin] Tell me, was your husband a friend of Yanayev, Kryuchkov, and the others?

[Yazov] These people had never visited us and they were never discussed in our home. In general my husband had no respect for many of them, and this is why I still cannot figure out how he could end up in their company. When I read the list of the people who participated in this I was very surprised. None of these people were friends or even thought as Dmitry Timofeyevich did.

[Kraynin] How do you think your husband ended up among the putschists?

[Yazov] In my opinion, first of all, that was no putsch; a putsch is carried out in order to seize power, but you must understand that my husband had plenty of that. He was the minister of defense and he had the highest rank of a military person—Marshal of the Soviet Union. He was planning to go on pension and we had talked about that a lot. You know, we had nothing of our own, neither a dacha nor a car. I said to him: "Dima, we should get a different apartment; why do we need such a large one if you are going on a pension?" He agreed with me: "I will retire and we shall handle our own affairs; I do not have time for that now." And he really did not.

I think he was sincere in his actions; he was very worried about what was going on in the country.

[Kraynin] Emma Yevgenyevna, tell me, do you feel different about your husband?

[Yazov] I love him and will always love him.

### Creation of Socialist-Style Party To Replace CPSU Urged

914B0411A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 91  
Single Edition p 2

["Letter to the Issue" by A. Butenko, doctor of philosophy, P. Volobuyev, academician and doctor of history, V. Danilov, doctor of history, and V. Kelle, doctor of philosophy; date not given: "Ideas Cannot Be Prohibited"]

[Text] We gave many decades of our life to the Communist Party. Its bureaucracy did not treat us kindly. It must be confessed that the anticonstitutional coup of 19-21 August was a crushing blow to the party and became a political catastrophe for it. This is a historical given that would be senseless to deny and the significance and consequences of which it would be senseless to underestimate.

The attempted state coup was undertaken by figures who not only came out off the depths of the CPSU but also occupied high positions within it. The central leadership of the party did not call upon the millions of rank-and-file communists to fight the mutineers, however. By occupying itself with behind-the-scenes maneuvers it covered itself in shame. We find it particularly bitter and painful to admit that this shadow has fallen on the entire party.

We, rank-and-file communists, accept our share of moral responsibility for the inaction of the CPSU during those critical days. Neither the spontaneous participation of many rank-and-file communists in active struggle against the mutiny nor (we shall tell the truth!) the passively expressed but negative attitude of the overwhelming majority of party members to the handful of putschists was able to save the organization as a whole.

The catastrophe that has befallen the CPSU is no accident; it is consistent. We had hoped that the CPSU would find within itself the powers to renew itself as a

new party, true to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and genuinely humanitarian socialism. A draft program for the party had been published that was oriented specifically toward these goals. But the party lagged hopelessly behind society's development through the fault of the all-powerful conservative apparatus, which undermined the party's perestroika. Actually, the CPSU never did manage to restructure itself from a monopoly organization (the core of the totalitarian, administrative command system) into a normally functioning political party. Healthy reformist forces, in particular such movements as Communists for Democracy, were not supported but, on the contrary, subjected to persecution. The masses of party members, as in former times, were deprived of the opportunity to exert any influence on CPSU policy.

But the political demise of the CPSU and its party apparatus does not mean the demise of the ideas of socialism in our country. Naturally, many opponents of communism and socialism now think just that. But they are falling into yet another illusion or self-deception.

Indeed, the Stalinist model of socialism, the party, and statehood has been buried (for good, we hope!). But socialism itself as an idea, as a social movement, cannot perish. The idea of socialism will live as long as there are grounds for socioeconomic inequality, as long as there exists exploitation of one man by another, as long as people are forced to defend the principles of social justice. We cannot get away from the fact that the idea of socialism is present throughout the entire development of modern civilization. Knowing history, we will dare assert that the October revolution was an expression of long-held aspirations of the popular masses for social justice and freedom, an attempt to bring the country out of Russian society's very severe crisis. October merged the idea of socialism with the historical destiny of our multiethnic country.

You can clear away all the monuments of the revolutionary era, close all the Lenin and similar museums, rename cities and streets, and replace the domestic and state symbolism, but you cannot escape destiny, as the saying goes. Whether you like it or not is unimportant. Socialist ideas and principles have taken root in the historical soil, in the mentality and life style of our people. And most important—we are not going to be misled—the impending and long-prepared privatization and transition to market relations will not make everyone property owners and rich men. The interests of the people of labor will need political representation and economic and social defense. This is why our country needs a socialist-oriented democratic party that will bring together all supporters of the new forces who believe in social justice and the ideals of socialism. Such a party could unite the energy, intellect, and will of many former communists and new members. It must become a component part of the general democratic movement to avert the national catastrophe threatening our country and all its peoples.

There is one other objective reason that insistently dictates the necessity of creating a new parliamentary-reformist socialist party. Democracy cannot come about, to say nothing of strengthen and become the standard of public-political life, without an influential opposition party, without a left-wing force representing the people of labor. This assumes that there can be no question of resurrecting the old Communist Party, of retaining its former discredited fundamentalist ideological postulates, as well as its hopeless functionaries.

The creation of a new party of the socialist type, given the current anticommunist campaign and many people's distress, is a difficult matter, and perhaps not without its perils. However, we support the proposal of several communists to create a party of new forces, a socialist-oriented party, a party combining the defense of social justice with the creation of an effective economy that will defend freedom, the dignity of man, and national accord.

[Signed] A. Butenko, doctor of philosophy, P. Volobuyev, academician and doctor of history, V. Danilov, doctor of history, and V. Kelle, doctor of philosophy.

#### **Investigation of CPSU Archives Continues; No Leads Reported**

914B0434A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Sep 91 p 2

[Report by I. Potekhina: "The Victory Smells of Campfire"]

[Text] St. Petersburg—When Leningrad City Council deputies—armed with Yeltsin's decree on the suspension of Communist Party of the Soviet Union activities on the territory of Russia—arrived to seal the Smolnyy, they found an interesting situation there. Papers were being taken out of the building by the sack and taken away by buses in unknown direction. In a special room in Smolnyy, designated for destruction of documents, a special machine—a shredder—was working full speed. Still, it was obviously not able to handle the volume of waiting documents.

In another room, where especially secret papers were being burned, everybody was also working hard.

All recent operational documentation (except for what had already gone to the archives) was being destroyed. Including the documents of particular interest to the investigation—those written or received during the three famous August days. Only two staff employees were found in possession of some fragmented notes related to the time of the putsch.

In his first testimony in the criminal case on the anti-constitutional activities of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], the proceedings of which were instituted in August, the obkom's former first secretary Boris Gidasov firmly declared: on 19 and 20 August he did not receive any directives from above; no documents



arrived from the CPSU Central Committee, and there were no directives for action. (For instance, a coded cable on taking steps to preserve the property and money of the party arrived only on 21 August. Gidasov, however, did not even see it since he was absent from Smolnyy for health reasons).

The investigation established, however, that the first directive issued by the Central Committee Secretariat arrived at the Leningrad Obkom on the 19th: to organize work with Communists in support of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. The second one, prescribing to report on the situation in the city, originated in the same place and arrived on the 20th.

Neither the former, nor the latter coded cables could be found, since they had been destroyed on the 20th on Gidasov's order. By the same order (let us emphasize: of 20 August!), the liquidation of "some other junk paper" started in Smolnyy. (It looks like quite a bit of it had accumulated, since one week was not enough to get rid of it all).

In addition, one more extremely interesting document was destroyed. The document in question is a secret instruction that prescribes who is, and how and in what order they are to act in an emergency situation. (Including in what order papers are to be destroyed). The fact that offers special food for thought: This instruction had been adopted by the party's central organs in 1990. On the one hand—probably because there had been no need for it earlier: The CPSU position had been solid and unshakeable. On the other—probably because the party could "guess": An emergency situation is not too far away.

When a duplicate of this document is found (the investigation has no doubt that it will: The instruction exists in more than one copy), we will discover quite a few interesting things. Still, there is already a lot of interesting things. As soon as the fact of the coded cables arrival at the CPSU obkom became known, a whole chain of other facts started to surface. For instance, that the obkom had special code clerks and supersecret codes, to which a strictly limited number of people had access. The same instruction clearly prescribes for what leadership rank a cable coded in some or other way is designated.

In short, the party's secret department, judging by all attributes, was only slightly behind (if at all) a skilled intelligence service.

By now the contents of some destroyed documents has been established. So far, *nothing* especially mysterious or not known until now have been discovered in them. Perhaps, they had been burned "to keep others company." Perhaps, they will start "playing" when the meaning of the rest of them is revealed. The investigation is now looking for answers to these questions. A great many documents will be very hard to find, however. Especially those concerning the obkom's commercial activities, which had been classified in every possible

way and discussed at the bureau's secret meetings. On top of that, it had purposefully been structured in such a way so as to make an audit practically impossible.

At the time the criminal proceedings were instituted the only money in the CPSU obkom's account were the payroll money. Therefore, the city mayorality took over only that part of the party property that was impossible to hide: the Smolnyy, the garage, the hotels, the medical complex, the dachas, and so on.

#### BY THE WAY

**The mass media publishes numerous reports on commercial deals being made in regard to the CPSU's property, its parts, subunits, offices, and enterprises, for the purpose of hiding and appropriating this property by various legal and physical personae.**

**Striving to stop the consummation of any deals in regard to the CPSU property until its fate is determined by law, the presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet declares that any deals in regard to property, valuables, assets, or other objects belonging to the CPSU or its parts, organizations, or enterprises, both in the USSR and outside its borders, are, in accordance with the RSFSR legislation, invalid with all resulting consequences.**

[signed] Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet 16 September 1991

#### Claims of CPSU Money Laundered by Shipping Company in Greece Denied

914B0433A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 19 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Malyshev specially for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, followed by comments by Viktor Mishin, CPSU Central Committee first deputy administrator of affairs, given to TASS correspondent in Moscow Nikolay Morozov: "Sensation!: Who Started the 'Canard' and Why: About the CPSU Central Committee Money 'Laundering'"]

[Text]Athens—For a number of years the shipping company owned by the Communist Party of Greece was used for "money laundering" by the CPSU and its highest party officials. That was the story published in last Sunday's issue of the Greek newspaper VIMA, which quoted "well-informed sources."

According to the newspaper, the transfer of tens of millions of dollars was made legal through "payments" for the freight services of nonexistent ships. The dollars received for the "shipments" were allegedly given into possession of the Transorient Shipping Company, but later they accumulated in accounts in Switzerland and other countries. In cases when payments were made in rubles, the Transorient Shipping people helped exchange them for Western currencies. For all these services the intermediary firm was paid a considerable percentage.



VIMA insists that the center of operations was located in the Moscow office of Transorient Shipping. On the Athens side, Florakis and other eminent officials of the Communist party of Greece were well aware of the existence of this "money laundering center."

"We do not know anything, we did not receive any money from the CPSU, we do not have any relations with the Communist Party of Greece." These were the answers given to a TASS correspondent by the Transorient Shipping Company in Piraeus when she asked a question with respect to the sensational information in VIMA.

"First of all," said one of the company managers, Georgos Khasapodimos, "Transorient Shipping is not owned by the Communist Party of Greece, as stated in the VIMA article. I am not a communist myself, and have never had anything to do with the Communist Party of Greece anyway. Secondly, we do not have an office in Moscow, where, the newspaper alleges, the main CPSU 'money laundering' center is located. Thirdly, we have never received any money from either the CPSU or the Communist Party of Greece. Therefore, the article in VIMA is nothing other than total fabrication. I have already asked our lawyer to look into this story."

The Transorient Shipping and Trading Company is located in a big, multistory building in Piraeus. The same building houses the Transorient Overseas firm as well as the Transblasko company. Soviet representatives work in the last two, and Transblasko is a joint venture between the Black Sea shipping line and the Greeks. Transblasko Director/Manager Rostislav Yarmolovich told the TASS correspondent that he knew nothing about any CPSU money operations. He also said that his company had no links with the Transorient Shipping Company mentioned in the article.

#### Our Commentary

*Our TASS correspondent in Moscow asked Viktor Mishin, CPSU Central Committee first deputy administrator of affairs, to comment on this article.*

"I can tell you officially," said Mishin, "that not a kopek, in Soviet or any other currency, was transferred to this Greek company through the Administration of Affairs. This information is just as false as the news that the CPSU Central Committee sent money to S. Husayn or that it indulged in multimillion money transfers. It is not accidental that the article does not specify its source. As for the 'reliable sources' mentioned by the newspaper, I think that they must be certain sources within our country, who are whipping up anticommunist hysteria instead of helping to consolidate forces at these difficult times. I understand that there may be different views on the communist concept, but the article in the Greek paper is dirty business."

#### Employees of Central Party Organs View CPSU Banning as Unjust

914B0369B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 34, Aug 91 p 2

[Article by V. Gushchin: "The Party Had Nothing To Do With It?" The article is published under the rubric, "Escape From the Sinking Ship of the CPSU." First paragraph is in bold type in the original. Other bold type and underlining is shown as in the original.]

[Text] Moscow, August 23rd, 1600 hours. By direction of G. Popov, mayor of Moscow, and agreed to by M. Gorbachev, President of the USSR and First Secretary of the CC CPSU (at the time), and B. Yeltsin, President of the RSFSR, the CC CPSU building complex on Staraya Square was transferred to the mayor of the capital city. A. Muzykantskiy, prefect of the Central Okrug, made an announcement about the immediate evacuation of everyone working in these buildings. Exactly one hour later, at 1700 hours, the buildings were evacuated and sealed off.

These events were so unexpected that they resembled more an escape from a sinking ship than an evacuation. Employees of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the staff of the President of the USSR (Some of them worked in these buildings), and technical personnel jumped out of doorways, having time to grab only what was most essential, and immediately outside the gates they fell into the "embraces" of thousands of Muscovites who made a living circles as they surrounded Staraya Square. The secretaries of the Central Committee left the last stronghold of "the mind, honor, and conscience of our epoch" in their black "Volgas," accompanied by happy cries and jeering of the crowd.

With great difficulty and practically on the run, we still managed to speak with some employees of the central party organs. Glasnost notwithstanding, they all refused to give us their family names.

**What is your opinion about the decision made by USSR President M. Gorbachev and RSFSR President B. Yeltsin regarding the cessation of the activities of the CPSU Central Committee and the nationalization of CPSU property?**

**Employee of the agricultural section of the CPSU Central Committee:**

I am an ordinary employee and I feel a gross injustice is being done by those who decided on this. The party has wonderful and smart people who wish well for the Fatherland and they do good things.

**Employees of the socioeconomic section of the CPSU Central Committee:**

Naturally, our feelings are unusual. My colleagues and I consider this decision to be unjust. If we are building a state based on law, then any action has to be justified.

The decision of the President has not even been published yet, and we are already being expropriated. And exactly why the CPSU?

Everything should be based on common sense and the law. The passive role of the CPSU Central Committee during the coup served the party badly.

**Employees of the defense section of the staff of the President of the USSR:**

This is unjust. What is this, fascism or democracy? This is real fascism.

**Employees of the general section of the CPSU Central Committee:**

Everything should be done within a legal framework. The USSR Supreme Soviet should decide on such important matters. The leaders of the party who took part in the coup were one group, but the party as a whole consists of honest workers. It turned out that an illegal coup has become a legal coup. What kind of democracy is that? All the party newspapers have been shut down. And in general, what has the party to do with all this?

The party has to be looked at, first of all, as a party of 15 million honest people who are at the same time the very best people. As a rule, the worst people were not accepted into the party: No drunkards, no shirkers, no speculators.

**V. Kuptsov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, accompanied by 10-12 employees.** No comment.

**Technical employees of the CPSU Central Committee:**

The party had nothing to do with it. The leaders are guilty.

**V. Falin, secretary, CPSU Central Committee:**

We still do not have a state based on law. But a decision has been made and it has to be carried out.

**A. Dzasokhov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, accompanied by 12-15 people.** He categorically refused to comment on the situation.

**Employees on the staff of the President of the USSR:**

This is an anticonstitutional decision. But, since it was approved, our job is to implement it.

**Actions Against Party Premises in Moscow, Fate of CPSU Viewed**

914B0385A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Sep 91  
Single Edition p 3

[Article by V. Nikolayev: "Report From the Party Entrance: But Why Break the Chairs?"]

[Text] Since morning, sullen people holding large bags have been lined up outside the doors of the building of

the former CPSU Central Committee. They await permission to enter the offices they occupied only a week ago. Their personal items, books, and official papers are still there. Young men from the Russian security service, after carefully checking their lists and checking documents, issue the Central Committee employees temporary passes and let them go inside for a short time. As they come out, the young men check the contents of their bags and dig through their briefcases. Needless to say, it is a humiliating procedure. But the new guards at these well-known buildings in central Moscow explain that their actions are motivated solely by concern for safeguarding party property.

In the space of one week, the guards have changed completely three different times (there were three different commandants), and perhaps this is why some things have nonetheless turned up missing. In the Administration of Affairs office, I was told that a refrigerator and several strips of carpet had already been stolen. It's hard to suspect the erstwhile apparatchiks, whom the guards keep under constant watch, of having carried them out in their briefcases.

On August 25, by decree of the RSFSR President, all real estate and other property belonging to the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party, including cash, was declared to be the state property of Russia. Under the supervision of P. Luchinskiy, a commission is taking inventory of the property and handling organizational and other matters. On Friday, I met with one of the commission's members—V. Mishin, Central Committee first deputy administrator of affairs, who recounted events preceding the apparat's eviction.

On August 24, at about 16:00 hours, two representatives of Moscow's mayor appeared at the Administration of Affairs office, saying that they had to make an immediate announcement over the intercom. The announcement, they explained, was an order that all offices be vacated by 17:00 hours.

"On what grounds?" asked V. Mishin in surprise. "Have you gotten a tip that our buildings have been mined?" "No," said the guests, dismissing the joking tone. "This is an order from the authorities of Moscow. Otherwise, force will be used."

By that time, a large and rather aggressive crowd had gathered on Staraya Ploshchad. "It wasn't a spontaneous rally," asserted V. Mishin. "The people were brought here in an organized manner and skillfully directed. Incidentally, the evening before, guards started subjecting everyone coming out of the Central Committee to degrading searches."

One of the mayor's representatives presented a document essentially saying that since intensive efforts were allegedly under way in the Central Committee to destroy archives, it had been deemed necessary to temporarily suspend the work of its apparat. The document was signed by Burbulis, with the following notation in the corner: "Agreed. Gorbachev."

"Since I'm a disciplined man," V. Mishin recounted, "I opened the room with the intercom system and allowed the visitors to make their announcement. An hour later, all Central Committee employees, from typists to department heads, had left the offices; the scenario was arranged in such a way as to force them to pass by the raging crowd as it whistled and jeered."

"The KGB officers who had always guarded the Central Committee had left their posts the day before. The buildings were sealed by the commandant's office reporting to the mayor."

"On Sunday, August 25, I managed to arrange a meeting with the mayor the next day to discuss all these questions. But early Monday morning, tragedy struck: Administrator of Affairs N. Kruchina had thrown himself off the balcony of his apartment."

"I insist," said Kruchina's first deputy, "that Nikolay Yefimovich was a level-headed and in no way impulsive man. It is known that he hadn't slept the whole night. At 5:00 hours, dressed in a sweatsuit, he went out on the balcony, had a smoke, and... I think that he was driven to his death by his unwillingness to endure the possible humiliations and insinuations. He was an honest and upright man."

"You know best, after all, you worked with him. But could it be that Kruchina had some secrets about the expenditure of party funds? For example, it is known that the CPSU provided foreign currency to communist parties and leftist forces in other countries."

"In the six months I have worked here, I became convinced: The CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs Department provided no foreign-currency aid to no one. Maybe some sort of other channels existed, but you'd have to look for them somewhere else, not here."

"But let's get back to Monday: Did the meeting with Moscow officials take place?"

"When we arrived at the Moscow Soviet, I was taken aback: The hall was packed with press, television cameras, and floodlights. I had thought that the meeting would be a purely working, businesslike meeting, but they had arranged a show, some sort of press conference. True, Luzhkov had some kind words for Kruchina, but then he promptly said the following into the outstretched microphones: 'We know that the Communist Party has transferred large sums of foreign currency abroad.' That's nonsense! As I am now the chief administrator of credits, I can say in no uncertain terms that even if we had wanted to, doing such a thing surreptitiously would have been impossible. Impossible!"

"Moreover, the CPSU Central Committee still owes nearly \$2.5 million to a number of Western firms that have supplied equipment, in particular printing equipment. Our relations with these firms are based on trust, without any so-called 'prepayment.'"

"Then a popular television program made the sensational claim that billions in foreign currency had flowed from CPSU coffers directly to S. Hussein. You know, that charge is so serious that it could bring the death penalty—were it to be proven. But it's all a lie. A lie!"

"But you will agree that it's completely understandable just why such rumors are circulating around the globe. For many decades, behind a curtain of absolute secrecy, enormous, utterly unaccountable power was concentrated in these buildings. You would seem to have one option: Open all archives relating to the Central Committee's activities, including its financial activities."

"All our archives are fully intact, and a process of transferring them is now under way. The current archive is being turned over to the General Department, as it should be."

Incidentally, in the course of our conversation, it suddenly became known that the electric wall sockets in the building had been turned off. Mishin assumed that the security service had done this in order to prevent anyone from using special devices to destroy documents.

V. Mishin let me see another decree of the USSR President, dated August 24. The document instructs Soviets of People's Deputies to secure CPSU property and to decide questions of its subsequent use "in strict accordance with USSR and republic laws on property and public associations." Law-enforcement and other state agencies are instructed to "prevent any violations of civil rights." Unfortunately, said Victor Maksimovich with a shrug, "this decree is being flagrantly violated, as you can see. There is no 'strict accordance' with laws whatsoever in the actions of the Russian and Moscow authorities. Moreover, tensions have already arose between them: How is the pie to be divided up between them?"

Yes, the party apparat that only yesterday held power in this country has now meekly left the arena, to the whistles and jeers of a crowd. Compromised to a considerable extent by the CPSU's ruling clique, especially during the tragic days of the coup, it deserves no leniency. With rare exceptions, these people have long since been political impotents, their pompous declarations in defense of democracy glaringly at odds with their practical deeds. History itself had condemned them, and recent events only speeded the end. This is all very true. But the only thing I can't understand is why those who have chosen the role of gravediggers are so assiduously repeating their old mistakes? Can it possibly be that history has taught us nothing, that "totalitarian" lawlessness will now give way to "democratic" lawlessness?"

Only now have we all learned (or, to be more precise, are we learning) the vast extent of the property held by the party—or, to be more precise, by the party apparat. It goes without saying that these buildings, sanatoriums, hospitals, dacha settlements, car fleets, and dining halls should belong to the people. But not the people generally in the form of the crowd, smashing things up and

carrying things off, as has happened before in our history, and not to the new nomenklatura that is already appearing and multiplying (something we have also known). What we need to display here is not greedy haste or wretched vengeance, but statesmanlike wisdom.

On leaving, I asked Mishin about his personal plans.

"Friends are calling and saying, 'leave it all, come to us.' But can I really leave all this right now? I need to help officials of the central apparat and local committees to somehow sort out this difficult situation. To finish the careful inventory of all property, to make sure nothing is lost. People are now opening up in a new way. I know some who were among Kruchina's personal friends when he was alive, but for some reason I didn't see them at Nikolay Yefimovich's funeral—they didn't come. And there are others who didn't beat their chests, who didn't profess their personal loyalty, but who are now calling and offering encouragement and help. Life goes on.

#### **Sakharov Memorial Congress Proposes 'Stabilization Plan'**

914B0380C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Sep 91  
Single Edition p 2

[Text of telegram signed by Yelena Bonner, president of Andrey Sakharov International Memorial Congress, and Yuriy Samodurov, director of the congress organizing committee: "We Propose a Stabilization Plan"]

[Text]

#### **To the President of the USSR,**

#### **Presidents of Independent States (former republics of the USSR)**

#### **COPY: Yeltsin, RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Moscow**

While affirming the unconditional right of all republics to independence, as well as areas at all levels possessing autonomous status, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, we regard the following actions to be essential to stabilize the political, economic, and psychological situation that has arisen on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

It is necessary immediately with the participation of all 15 republics to form a Supreme Control Council, and under the direction of the President of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense to transfer to the council oversight responsibility for the control of all nuclear weapons situated on the territory of the former Soviet Union. No form of assurances by one or even by two presidents or by the Ministry of Defense that nuclear forces are under their control can serve as a guarantee in this respect to the peoples of our country or to the international community. We warn the leaders of the West against being unduly credulous. Only after the establishment of such a council can or should the West provide humanitarian assistance. It is incumbent upon them in doing so, however, to send it directly to the republics and make

certain to distribute it on a proportional basis. An inequitable distribution of aid could precipitate outbreaks of hostility directed at nonindigenous ethnic groups. The West must realize that if Russia becomes the primary recipient of aid, this will pose a threat to the lives and well-being of millions of Russians who live beyond the borders of the RSFSR. The sole and unconditional criterion for granting humanitarian assistance should be a respect for human rights as defined by the Universal declaration of Human Rights. All forms of long-term assistance should be held in abeyance; otherwise, such resources may evaporate or, even more dangerous, may serve to stabilize the military-industrial complex and institutional structures associated with it. We believe it feasible to submit the following preliminary stabilization plan designed for the ensuing transitional period:

1. The Congress of People's Deputies shall grant independence to all republics and autonomous regions wishing to exercise it through democratic means. After this act is passed, the Congress shall draft and conclude interstate treaties at the earliest opportunity (within two months at the latest), guaranteeing the rights of all ethnic minorities, and it shall establish permanent commissions of outside observers on their territories to ensure compliance.

2. All officers and warrant officers of the Soviet Army, upon their retirement occasioned by the return of Army units from Europe and the cutback of the Armed Forces, shall be granted land holdings in the region where they were on active duty or, if they so choose, in the region from which they were called to active duty. This parcel of land shall be transferred to their possession in perpetuity with concomitant rights of sale and inheritance. Land shall likewise be granted to all refugees under the same conditions. All persons previously deported by the state shall be given assurances of their eventual return to their places of residence. All persons deported in recent years, as in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas, shall be returned without delay. State assistance in the acquisition of land holdings or in the restoration of agriculture shall be made available to all the above-mentioned peoples. We invite the West to support this particular project.

3. The President of the USSR, together with the leaders of all the republics, including the autonomous republics, shall form an Interim State Council, consisting of persons who enjoy the public trust. The Council shall be entrusted to deal with all operational matters of temporary administration, and the existing Union ministries shall be under to its direction. After the Interim Council is in place, it remains for the the Soviet of People's Deputies, heretofore committed to the highest goals of preserving the lives of its fellow citizens, acknowledging that its mandate (and potential) is at an end, to dissolve itself.



We suggest that the states of the future, operating on the basis of equality, will be able to combine their efforts in performing the following priority functions:

1. The defense of the common borders of a Commonwealth of Free and Sovereign Republics of Europe and Asia (SSSR) with the concurrent establishment of their own armies in states that want them. A joint command of all armed forces shall be maintained only in case of an attack on the Commonwealth from the outside. Control over nuclear forces and nuclear weapons shall be under the direction of the Supreme Council.

2. A consolidated Ministry of Foreign Affairs to address problems of universal disarmament and to work out strategic objectives of foreign policy. At the same time, each state should have its own internal affairs ministry with a full range of functions for entering into treaty relations with other countries, inside as well as outside of the Commonwealth, as well as for consultative functions. Representation of the SSSR in the United Nations prior to this organization's admission of the states of the Commonwealth should be accorded to all states of the Commonwealth in turn with the other states attending in the role of observers.

3. Commonwealth states should assume responsibility for proportionally shared SSSR obligations to pay foreign debts.

4. Communications and transport throughout the territory of the Commonwealth should be common functions, pending the concurrent establishment by them of their own transport (of all types, including aviation) and communications systems. The power engineering network, in particular nuclear power (as well as its means of protection), should be in part commonly held.

While granting each independent state the right to refrain from joining the future Commonwealth if it so desires, we express the hope that as these priority tasks are carried out, a bloodless transition will take place across the boundless expanses of the former Union, creating a single economic region. And may this Commonwealth of Free and Sovereign Republics of Europe and Asia be accepted in a civilized manner into the universal family of peoples.

29 August 1991

**BRIEF CLARIFICATION:** We considered it necessary to send this telegram because the President of the USSR, since returning to his duties, has made no mention of the kind of future he envisions for peoples inhabiting one sixth of the planet. Once again, the Union Treaty, again an appeal to the West for help, and a casual account of what happened—instead of an analysis of the new situation. The President of the RSFSR has expressed himself in a more definitive manner. In announcing territorial claims against Russia's neighbors, however, he has, in effect, taken a dangerous step back into the past. Great Russia amounts to a new Military Revolutionary Committee, a new totalitarian structure, and an effort to turn

back the "locomotive of history." The time has come for all democratic forces, for all those who saved the country in three days, to decide just what it is we are creating: a powerful, militarized, bureaucratic, and easily led Russia—Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism—or a free and democratic community of nations.

**POSTSCRIPT:** Publishing this telegram in PRAVDA is our way of testing communications channels.

### Officials Comment on Future of All-Union Ministries

914B0404A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Sep 91 p 2

[Comments by various union government officials on impact of staff cuts, as reported by STUDINFORMO correspondents: "Fragments From the 'Mine Clearing'"]

[Text] STUDINFORMO correspondents questioned officials of some union ministries about the future of these departments and their employees following the recent decisions by the country's leadership.

#### Gennadiy Kutsev, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Public Education:

"Since the union no longer exists, apparently, the committee probably will be dissolved in the near future. But in time, the republics will understand the importance of a nongovernment commission to deal with the ties between republics. Naturally, there will be 10 times fewer staffers in this commission than the current 500. I do not think that the remaining 450 persons will be going to the labor exchange, since most of them are high-level specialists. If the committee is abolished, I personally will need exactly 30 minutes to find new employment: I am the head of the Philosophy and Sociology Department at the Timiryazev Academy."

#### Vadim Tarasenko, chief of the Financing Department, Ministry of the Coal Industry:

"All the ministry's employees are now at their places, waiting for the congress decisions and signing of the Union Treaty. At present, the ministry has essentially no influence on the coal production of some republics, such as the Ukraine, for example. In the event that it is abolished, the employees will be pleased to transfer to new republic structures if they are called, of course. As for my personal plans—I am a financier and I will find work in any market."

#### Lyubov Davletova, chairman of the Light Industry Committee:

"The gross product of light industry will drop by 15 to 20 percent by the end of this year. Light industry is on the brink of collapse, and I do not think the committee will be abolished for this reason. Otherwise, the committee's 379 employees will be placed through the labor exchange without special preference."

**Sergey Arzhakov, deputy and acting chairman of the Military Industrial Commission:**

"Complete uncertainty prevails in our commission. We do not know how we will exist in the future, taking into account the fact that enterprises in the military-industrial complex are being transferred to the republics' jurisdiction. About 200 persons work in the commission. If it is abolished, they will obviously have to turn to the labor exchange. As far as my personal plans are concerned, I am a doctor of chemical sciences."

**SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Sponsors A. Zavidiya To Run for USSR Presidency**

914B0436A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 19 Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with A.F. Zavidiya, sponsor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, by Arkadiy Bushuev, in Zavidiya's office on the premises of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA; date not given: "Andrey Zavidiya: I Will Impose a State of Emergency by the Very First Order"]

[Text] Zavidiya... This name "leaked" to the newspapers when its owner, Andrey Fedorovich, sought the post of vice president of Russia in tandem with candidate for RSFSR president V. Zhirinovskiy. At the time, few people paid attention to him, and still fewer took his candidacy seriously.

After the election failure, A. Zavidiya sort of retired into the shadows. He was forgotten. However, some time later the multifaceted personality of Andrey Fedorovich appeared in the political arena once again in a capacity which was unexpected for many—a sponsor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, as well as a future candidate for president of the USSR, no more and no less. An intriguing character, is he not? This is why I decided to meet with him. Our conversation took place in Room No. 416, which Andrey Fedorovich was given at the editorial office of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[Bushuev] Tell us briefly about yourself...

[Zavidiya] I was born in 1952 in Kaliningrad. As you can see, my name is Caucasian, my father is Ukrainian, and my mother is Belorussian. I graduated from the Leningrad Commercial Institute. I worked in various offices. I worked as head of a department and chief engineer. Nonetheless, I did not quite like it. I wanted more freedom. As soon as they announced in our country that cooperatives could be created, I set up my own procurement and commercial cooperative. This was before the Law on Cooperatives was adopted. That is to say, arrangements for new economic relations were fine-tuned by people like me.

I began my operations by depositing 10 rubles [R] in the current account of the cooperative. We then published an ad, and flower growers began to bring their products to us. I no longer remember what these flowers were

called: They looked like daisies, but they were bigger. We bought them at seven kopeks apiece. We bunched several of them together, wrapped them in plastic, and sold them at 10 kopeks. We generated a small profit as a result. This is what we built on. Later, they brought us truck loads of vegetables and fruit. We rescued a tremendous chunk of the harvest. People in the provinces only know how to grow produce, they do not know how to sell. Georgians can both grow and sell, but quite a few people are not such specialists.

[Bushuev] They say that you are a millionaire. How did you make your first million?

[Zavidiya] Our cooperative changed its line of business. You must remember an erroneous resolution of the Council of Ministers under which all procurement and commercial cooperatives were closed. We took up computer equipment, its servicing and repair. This was when we made a million. At the time, we were still taxed at preferential rates.

[Bushuev] Tell us what you did with the funds if it is not a secret.

[Zavidiya] I am one of the founders of Galand, the largest concern in the Union. The name of the concern consists of two abbreviated names—my wife's name, Galina, and mine, Andrey.

[Bushuev] What does your concern engage in?

[Zavidiya] For now, this is a business secret. For now, I may only say that about 600 enterprises belong to the concern.

[Bushuev] On what principles did they unite?

[Zavidiya] Our goal was to gather under our umbrella enterprises and organizations representing all property forms.

[Bushuev] It has become known that you intend to participate in yet another marathon and will offer yourself as a candidate for the post of USSR president as soon as this becomes possible. You must have already thought about what you will tell the voters.

[Zavidiya] I will outline my ideas in detail in an election platform which will be published. For now, I may say that man and his freedom are the focal point of my program.

[Bushuev] Do you have your own view of economic reform? Could you name those whom you view as authorities in this sphere?

[Zavidiya] The main point in the economy is to develop all forms of property. Some Communists were against private property; we must acknowledge that this was the case. However, some democrats also messed up the state sector. Neither should be done. We should march ahead in mixed step. As far as our economists are concerned, I do not have a preference for either Yavlinskiy, Shatalin,

or Aganbegyan. All of their studies may only be used together, that is, by merging them. Something else needs to be done, taking into account the experience of Galand. In economics, there should be neither right nor left, neither centrists nor conservatives, neither men nor women. There should merely be citizens of the USSR. If I am president I will be the president of every citizen of the USSR. Every person should find a niche in the large array of all forms of property.

[Bushuyev] Let us discuss your political bearings. What appears to be the main point for you as a candidate for USSR president?

[Zavidiya] Unambiguously, the preservation of the Union. I categorically denounce the decision of a number of republics and USSR President M. Gorbachev on acknowledging the actual disintegration of the Union. It would appear that quite recently, Mikhail Sergeyevich himself said that we could not permit the division of our country to commence when they begin to plow boundaries between territories. However, he himself brought about the situation in the country whereby we have to use a plow.

[Bushuyev] How will you herd back into the Union the republics which, say, by the time you are elected will have seceded from the Soviet Union? By force?

[Zavidiya] Of course, not. No so-called retroactive laws or political decisions will be adopted. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have seceded from the Union. This is their business. Mutual relations with them will develop on a mutually advantageous economic basis. Here is another example. I intensely dislike the fact that the city of Leningrad was renamed St. Petersburg. However, I will not issue an ukase on restoring Lenin's name because this will require considerable outlays.

[Bushuyev] Do you allow for the possibility of any coercive pressure on the citizens of your country? Many may simply disobey your directives.

[Zavidiya] I can act under any circumstances, be it a harsh dictatorship when needed, or ultraliberal relations. Everything depends on a specific situation.

By my first ukase, I would introduce an economic state of emergency in our country, perhaps, the same state which was introduced here, but without tanks. Incidentally, I would not call the organizers of the August coup plotters. Some time later, this fact in our history will be analyzed by other people. I do not rule out that they will remember with gratitude those who wanted to save the country from massive bloodshed. Those who are now being investigated may be called heroes.

[Bushuyev] However, blood is already being spilled in the course of interethnic conflicts. If not the president, then who is to extinguish them? How do you expect to do this?

[Zavidiya] I am going to take a hard line with formations opposing each other. I will give them, say, 24 hours to

disarm and surrender to the troops. The Army will surround an area in which an armed clash is underway. Leaflets for the belligerents will be dropped from helicopters. I will install loudspeakers on cars and will make announcements... The lives of those who disarm and surrender will be guaranteed. If someone disobeys the order he will be subjected to physical extermination. We will sort out those surrendering most thoroughly, and determine what the causes of the conflict and its origins are. It cannot be done any other way.

[Bushuyev] What is your prediction of the development of events in our country in the immediate future?

[Zavidiya] The fires of Sumgait, Nagorno-Karabakh, and North Ossetia are mere sparks compared to the giant fire which will burn two to three months from now.

### Postscriptum

While we refrain from commenting on the words of Andrey Fedorovich Zavidiya, we cannot help being surprised and concerned about the prospects which are planned for us, and which recently came close to materializing.

### Laptev, Others Comment on Congress

914B0408A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 35, Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Interviews with Laptev et al: "On the Kremlin's Steps"]

[Text]

### D. Granin, Writer

[Question] At the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet you sat next to A. Lukyanov. And he was talking to you. If it is no secret, what was it?

[Granin] He commented on the speeches. For example, when Akayev spoke and called Lukyanov Pontius Pilate, Anatoliy Ivanovich said: "This man has sent me the most flattering letters and telegrams." I asked him: "Anatoliy Ivanovich, then why are you sitting here? I could not. I would get up and leave." He answered me: "You were at your mother's funeral?" I answered: "Yes." He said: "Right now they are burying my business." "What business?" "The Soviet Union." When Nazarbayev spoke, Lukyanov said: "It's the end." I asked: "What is ended?" "It is the end of the Soviet Union." Here was a mixture of the personal and the impersonal.

He is a multifaceted man. He is like the young Smolensk poet that Tvardovskiy brought to Moscow.

[Question] You have known him a long time. And what do you think, he is a criminal, a victim, or a man who has fallen into an absurd situation?

[Granin]: This man is a master of every situation. He is a watchmaker, and he knows splendidly the mechanism of power.

[Question]: The upshot is, someone has beat him in this political game?

[Granin]: Why have they decided on this? They have exaggerated the role of the forces of reaction.

**I. Laptev, Chairman of the USSR VS [Supreme Soviet] of the Soviet of the Union:**

[Question]: Did everything that you were thinking about three days ago come true?

[Laptev]: No, not everything. It seems to me that the Congress should have shown greater decisiveness. Unfortunately, the Congress got drowned in a discussion of secondary questions. It also turned out to be a habit of the deputies to consider their opinion the only correct one and to foist it on the whole Congress.

[Question]: Do you see yourself right now in the role of chairman of the USSR VS?

[Laptev]: I have been carrying in my pocket a resignation announcement since the time when the Supreme Soviet refused to take upon itself responsibility for charging the Committee on Legislation with checking the legality of the designation of officials at the newspaper IZVESTIYA. Right now, it stands to reason, the situation is different. I think that the question about the chairman should be decided by the Soviet of the Union itself.

[Question]: What do you see as the main result of the Congress?

[Laptev]: The Congress opened up for us the possibility of searching for a new version of the Union of Republics, and it opened up the way to an agreement.

**P. Bunich, President of the USSR Union of Lessees and Entrepreneurs:**

[Question]: What is your forecast—when and how will we transfer from politics to economics?

[Bunich]: An economic union will be established. Even countries of Western Europe will be able to join it. The republics will be drawn into it, even if not right away. It will be the equivalent of an Eastern Market, a holding entity, in which he who has the greater capital will be in greater command.

Right now short first-priority measures should be adopted so that people may see that we are engaged not just in the political distribution of chairs.

Orders can be as follows. On privatization—otherwise the state sector will disintegrate (and this is 70 percent), and without it we shall never get up on our feet. And here it is necessary to prevent disorderly conduct, when each rich collective declares itself a proprietor.

Second is freedom. The loops on the neck, which must be removed, can be enumerated.

Third—the support of entrepreneurship and the protection of it against petty interests, the darkness, envy, and evil. And it must be supported because it is still rickety.

[Question]: When can there be a real improvement in the economy?

[Bunich]: If there will be this volleylike outburst of ukazes, then people will do with their hands what the politicians have not done with their tongues. For example, putsch proponents have declared, not in vain, that they will give land to the people. But they would be deceiving, since the Starodubites will not turn over the land for anything. So we must turn the land over to the people. The NEP [New Economic Policy] produced results in half a year. Are we worse than that?

**L. Kravchenko, Former General Director of Central Television:**

[Question]: In nine months, in executing the will of the President, you have disparaged on TV the fever pitch of political passions. But now times are changing. Someone else has replaced you at TV. Are you offended?

[Kravchenko]: Any man would have been taken off this job, it makes no difference. It was inevitable. Someone had to pay for the fact that GKChP [State Committee for the Extraordinary Situation] documents were broadcast over TV channels. But we had to subordinate ourselves to the orders of the GKChP because these documents were signed not by "the black colonels" but by the highest state officials.

Meanwhile, public figures from the GKChP in turn "scrubbed" me for the fact that symphonic music was played on TV (someone had died, people said). I got into trouble also for "Swan Lake." It came into someone's head that this was Gorbachev's swan song. And that this was done in defense of the President.

....I was disillusioned with my work on TV and was terribly tired.

**F. Iskander, Writer**

[Question]: What was the current Congress like to you?

[Iskander]: It, like the life of American millionaires, passed before me, as if in a fog. It is true that business goes on until parliament is dissolved. However bad it was, it demonstrated one good lesson: one can object to the boss. This was political training for the people. It also showed the wolflike essence of certain of our deputies. They had monstrous adaptability. The punitive organs behind their back used to give them vigor. Right now there is no "vigor."

[Question]: What can be the fate of our President?

[Iskander]: I cannot imagine that, but I know that Gorbachev has done more for the cause of Russian freedom



than all past Russian figures. A terrible fate befell all of them. That, thank God, bypassed him. He has enormous political intuition.

**S. Fedorov, General Director of the MNTK [Interagency Scientific and Technical Complex] "Surgery of the E<sub>2</sub>e"**

[Question] When shall we engage in the main thing—economics?

[Fedorov] When we have destroyed our Union with bedbugs, cockroaches, and stinking toilets, and we shall begin to make a normal international house on the basis of the new economic relationships.

[Question] Doesn't it seem to you that we have become both political and economic impotents?

[Fedorov] It doesn't seem so to me. In four years I raised labor productivity eight-fold. Agriculture did it four-fold. That means we are capable? And ordinary Soviet people did this. Not genies but ordinary peasants who love to drink vodka. But they did it. When there is a motive they love to work, when there is not they jabber.

**V. Bukovskiy, Former Dissident**

In due time V. Bukovskiy was exchanged for Luis Corvalan. He is now a citizen of Great Britain. We met on the steps of the Kremlin Court of Congresses (who could have thought this a few years ago?)

[Question] Vladimir, how do you evaluate what has been going on in the Kremlin?

[Bukovskiy] This is a great event, and I am now finally filled with optimism. For behind my pessimism was what I said back in the spring of this year, that it is necessary to be prepared to struggle with tanks on the streets of Moscow, and the intelligentsia criticized me. And I evaluated the event that occurred today as raising great hopes. But it is still early to rejoice completely. The revolution is moving to the localities. For example, I telephoned Rostov and I was told that everything there is like it was before: the party, the KGB, and so on are operating. And in Irkutsk it was something else: everything was sealed up there. Yesterday I met with Bakatin. I expressed to him my point of view on reform of the KGB, which I know well from the inside.

**Yakovlev Chronicles Perestroika Process; Warns Against 'Neobolshevism'**

914B0387A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with A. N. Yakovlev, USSR People's Deputy, by N. Kishkin and A. Potapov, time, place, and date not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, we would like to talk with you today about the origins of the broken conspiracy, about what helped democracy triumph, and about how to handle the results of the victory, this unique opportunity to bring people together and

return to civilization. First let us look at the past six years and see which processes which occurred in society led to such a tragic denouement.

[Yakovlev] In my opinion perestroika itself initially consisted conceptually of two components, two ranks. The first was the objective need for changes and the understanding that it was impossible to keep living the way we were. It seems like a hackneyed phrase today, but it is certainly true. Even under Brezhnev many of us were saying openly (at least in narrow circles) that we were going downhill. That became even more obvious after the experience of the short-lived Andropov, who tried to use administrative methods to introduce some reforms but with the very same old cadres. And then Chernenko "came to the throne," which finally brought us to our senses. The degree to which the system had rotted through became apparent first-hand if such people could come to power.

And then came March 1985. At that point even the old forces understood that they had to compromise and choose a person of the next generation, even though the credo of Bolshevism is the sharp knife, no compromise.

The second rank is emotional. At that time it seemed to the ruling elite that we were simply making noise about the new proposals. All sovereigns of this world have initially proposed some changes, and then they calm down and enjoy their power. And we certainly have the fertile soil for it, since Stalin and our structure cleverly thought up the separation, both psychological and material, of power from the people. All kinds of tricks were conceived to fence themselves off—guards, dachas, sanatoriums, "loud applause," and apologetic propaganda. Yes, many methods exist to prevent people from seeing real life. That was what the emotional level was like: of course, the new sovereign had to show himself, propose some reforms, and talk about them to his heart's content. Everyone would applaud and say, "Hurrah! A new era has at long last arrived." But then a stop must be put to all this pseudodemocratic business again; it must be locked up and the key must be put in a remote little corner and forgotten.

[Correspondent] But in life everything turned out differently.

[Yakovlev] That is just the point. There were more and more people who were not afraid any longer. Andropov frightened them with exile abroad. And what happened? Nothing at all. It turned out that many of those who had been exiled did not cease to be respectable people, but rather just the opposite. Real understanding of what was going on grew and free thinking grew.

[Correspondent] Does that mean that there was a serious contradiction in perestroika from the very beginning?

[Yakovlev] That is absolutely correct. After giving the nod to great changes, at first what was already in existence began to be improved. And that part of the Politburo which upheld the old positions was prepared

to make some improvements. The logic was simple: things must somehow be managed differently, a few more economic approaches, give the people a bit more freedom, rectify some matters in the political sphere, do some things for the intelligentsia, or at least do not forbid them. But all the same, leave censorship in place. Perhaps take a couple dozen books out of special archives and let the intelligentsia read them. That is, get rid of the savagery.

But at that point the summit of power still had no understanding that all this was simply savagery for the civilized world, a manifestation of the most rigid dictatorship. For the old leaders, and not just those in the higher echelons but those in the middle echelons as well, this whole army which had entrenched itself, promulgated the slogan: "Hold on and don't let go." For them everything that we had was called freedom and socialist democracy. And here they managed to make fools out of some of the people. Even now, as you see, some people believe that the present situation is in fact socialist democracy. Although for any thinking person it is obvious this is not democracy at all. But the stereotypes have been hammered into all of us. And we must confess this, we were always being cunning and hypocritical in some way or another. Understanding that the word did not correspond to reality, we smiled, giggled, and made up anecdotes, but nothing more.

And in many respects we are being cunning even now. Look, for about the last two years before the putsch, we again returned to our old hypocrisy, lies, and political and human cunning. Again we began to say one thing and do another and think yet something else. It is good that the democratic press preserved some kind of niche and gave us an opportunity to break through somehow.

And this attempt to force the creation of a new quality of society into the old, old structures was crowned with failure. The new quality did not fit in the rotten old home.

[Correspondent] In other words, you cannot combine lechery with prayer.

[Yakovlev] You can say it that way. A most bitter struggle began around this. After 1987, when the question of new elections arose, and ones with alternative candidates at that, it horrified the entire party-state elite: "What? Why? Accidental people will appear and the old experienced cadres will leave." They came up with every kind of argument. I remember that in the draft report at the January 1989 Plenum there was even a provision on direct election of party secretaries at all levels in order to eliminate the nomenklatura approach. But it did not happen, for the department of the Central Committee party organs and the entire chain behind it, which in fact ruled the party, rose up. They are a special caste of "workers in the organs", while the rest of the departments were, so to speak, running interference, at the service of that department. And there "infinitely loyal Bolsheviks were deliberately gathered." And even after

1985 there were instructions that only people from the party apparat could be taken into the Central Committee apparat. Why was that done? Just to avoid letting the intelligentsia into the party apparat—if they got in they might, out of the clear blue sky, start asking all kinds of questions or even, God forbid, refuse to go along with something.

Generally at that time the General Secretary was unable or did not want to overcome this resistance of the party apparat bosses.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, wasn't the unexpected decision of the 19th Party Conference on combining posts in the party and soviets an attempt to appease this apparat?

[Yakovlev] Yes, at that time that was exactly the idea. It was expected that the pressure of the deputies elected on an alternative basis would influence party leaders and help involve them in the democratic process. But it turned out to be just the opposite: they began to use the old methods of suppressing democratic structures, and the persecution of democracy went forward with terrible force. And they, you know, have cheered up a lot recently, especially in the Russian Communist Party. They have straightened their shoulders and become bold and impudent.

Now people are talking about the split in society and assign the blame for this to the democrats. In my opinion this is the purest deception. In fact the split began with the plenums of the party Central Committee. They are the ones who are to blame for the split in the party and then in society: it was there that the obvious attacks on democracy and on the democratic press began. For the most part the secretaries of the party obkoms and kraykoms and the people "from the lower ranks" who had been trained by them and promoted to the Central Committee set the tone; those people were especially vocal and read loud speeches, written for them in the obkoms, on behalf of the working class and the peasants. But they did not have any right to speak on their behalf: the sentiments in society were altogether different.

Gradually all this intolerance of the plenums spread to the press, since certain newspapers and journals from among the yellow press took the side of the "party pontificators." For example, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, known to everyone as reactionary journals, and even some of the local press which the partocracy held in their hands. That is when the conspiracy arose, when the moral preparations for the putsch began.

In the economic sphere this took the form of sabotage, both direct and indirect. At that time the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were still adopting unanimous decrees and, based on them, instructions which refuted everything progressive. The cooperatives today are spoken of with anger. But instead of opening the way for independent production cooperatives, the leadership began sucking up to the military-industrial

complex. Even before consumer goods had been produced there, so they made cooperatives out of these shops and began turning money on paper into hard cash. Chaos was created on the money market. There you have the first blow against the financial system, which began to pull down the consumer market.

I remember the arguments about monetary emissions. The managers were always scaring us, saying that if money were not printed in that quarter, we would not be able to pay wages. But many people tried to understand what that meant: were there no goods against which the money could be printed? There were no answers.

So the origin of what we have today lies in the party bosses' resistance to change. And the struggle went on for all these years with the psychological support of the more reactionary part of the press. I was glad that a significant part of the intelligentsia, the film-making, artistic, and acting intelligentsia, took the path of support for the changes. Alas, a different situation took shape with the writers' organization. Of course, many progressive writers tried to protect democracy and progress from the first day. But most of the elite, especially in Russia, firmly upheld the positions of Stalinism. Do you remember how the shameful campaigns against non-Russians, Jews and Masons, and anti-Semitism went? All this is disgusting to recall, but all of it happened. I wish that all these articles would now be printed in individual collections without commentary. The preface would be very short: these articles were published in certain press organs from 1985 through 1991. I think that would be stronger reading matter than any detective novel.

[Correspondent] It would be an indictment.

[Yakovlev] Yes, everyone would know: here are the people who made the ideological and psychological preparations for the putsch.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, how did it happen that all thinking people—Shevardnadze, Petakov, Shatalin, and Yakovlev—left Gorbachev and alongside him there appeared persons of no talent, mediocrities like Yanayev, while Poloznov and company whom no one knew at all moved up? Ultimately all this merged into the adventure of a small group of infuriated people.

When the President's Council was organized, the Politburo was terrified, began to fuss around, and got very nervous. They were terrified that their power would leave and that the President's Council would begin to discuss questions which the Politburo had not discussed. And the hunt began. It was bolstered by prepared statements in the Supreme Soviet. Some people, from the "Soyuz" group or around it, let us say, began to shout: that's bad, so is that, who are they, what kind of advisors are they? That is, an attack began on the President's Council organized by the Politburo and the reactionary part of the Supreme Soviet headed by its leader.

[Correspondent] We all saw that the main danger to the president and his reforms came from the right rather than the left. How come Mikhail Sergeyich did not see that?

[Yakovlev] I think that coordinated disinformation of the head of state played a role here. For example, the representatives of the democratic forces had no sources for conclusions other than their own analysis. But in a totalitarian society one person's analysis means very little. It can always be written off as tired, late-night reflections or intellectual introspection. The intelligentsia was portrayed as a category which always "played the fool" and had very little to say. And when a detailed paper from the KGB was laid on the table saying that a rally had been held and the overthrow of Soviet power was demanded there, it already seemed like the truth. Even though there had been no call for an overthrow.

How was the information prepared? Say, people speak at rallies and say that the system has to be changed by nonviolent means, on the basis of the Constitution, and so on. The information comes in as something altogether different: a rally was held in which certain so-and-so's (their names are naturally mentioned) demanded that the existing order be overthrown. The KGB was involved in this and for a long time this informational-psychological pressure was put on the president. And the pressure from the Supreme Soviet was also savage. For example, the democratic-minded deputies who tried to get a meeting with the president were cut off, but people with reactionary views were readily let in. Lukyanov constantly presented information which was altogether distorted. For example, he had deputies from the Inter-regional Group in his office. I remember the incident, and they said various things. But in fact, the things written on paper were such as to give a negative impression. At that time I asked one deputy who was at the meeting what was talked about there. It turns out they even had a tape: nothing of the sort was said there—Lukyanov's information was bald-faced lies.

Or take the demonstration of 28 March. I already said what supposedly was done, that ropes with hooks were ready to be cast up on the Kremlin walls. Yet more lies and deception to frighten the president. And I think that at that point only the discipline of the demonstrators prevented sad results. And the good-hearted behavior of the soldiers. The organizers of the August putsch should have remembered that even then the soldiers said right out: we will not fire on the people. No, they did not remember.

[Correspondent] So what, besides the firm position of B. N. Yeltsin and the entire Russian leadership, helped uphold democracy?

[Yakovlev] In my opinion this is what happened. This junta, as we call it, had its own logic of thinking, it was different from that of normal people. For them, for example, the concept of "democracy" is a little word that rolls around in your mouth like a pebble; it had no



meaning for them. It was put in circulation to manipulate people, and that was fine. There are plenty such words in dictionaries, especially political ones. Especially since everyone knows that even the most inveterate dictators came to power under democratic slogans.

[Correspondent] Even the National Socialists.

[Yakovlev] Even the National Socialists. But our putschists saw and understood: there was no sausage, no meat, there just wasn't anything; the women in the stores were cursing; there was a great deal of disorder; and the fight against criminals was going poorly. Remember, on a different day, the 20th, the "Vremya" program, I think, reported to the guffaws of listeners how the KGB had cleverly caught a lot of criminals.

[Correspondent] That was meant for fools.

[Yakovlev] So they considered the people fools. That is the whole point. They thought that they merely had to say to people: this is what will happen in three days, in five days, in seven days and so on, and then everyone would rush to embrace them and begin to support them. But in fact this turned out to be the wildest error, because people had already acquired a great sense of personal dignity. And the point is not merely heroism and self-sacrifice at the walls of the "White House," and not just the courage of Yeltsin and his comrades, and not just the position of the army, which was in fact split. The point is that the people rejected the conspirators. They could not fail to see that strikes had begun, that Moscow had stuck its chest out to defend legal power, that Leningrad had announced that it would strike if the mayor and the Leningrad Soviet were seized, that the Urals were rising up. So the important thing was that enormous changes had occurred in people's hearts. They cursed the lack of sausage, but they did not give up their freedom.

[Correspondent] Yes, we certainly saw that: even in the first hours reports came in from our correspondents on the reaction to reject the putschists. But, to be honest, in those very hours we were in shock because we found out that we had not been banned like IZVESTIYA and we were on the same list as SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[Yakovlev] I already explained on television: they were simply afraid to touch you. It is no joke to shut down the trade union and workers' newspaper.

[Correspondent] But our first desire was to refuse to publish, as a sign of protest.

[Yakovlev] But then you would have made a serious mistake. For with your 19-million circulation, at least 60-70 million people read you. And by telling them about the facts of the rejection of the putschists, you helped people understand what was going on.

[Correspondent] Now how should society handle the fruits of the victory wisely? What should it be warned against?

[Yakovlev] You understand that the party apparat was the backbone of the prolonged totalitarianism. (Incidentally, if we could have removed it from vigorous activity, in 1986 or 1987 for example, the situation now would be altogether different.) But now a vacuum has formed, they say, and heaven forbid that it once again be filled up with the same bunch. I want to say openly and through your newspaper that I am very worried that Bolshevism may be replaced by Neobolshevism. I mean all these illegal types of actions—searches, moral terror, and the like. And Lord save us from reprisals and violence. If we again begin to fight against unorthodox thinking and persecute opposition, then what kind of democrats are we? Then the people who say that this is only a struggle for power will be right. Let us in fact bring to trial, under the law, those who acted energetically and participated in the putsch. But a person, an ordinary person, who was asked are you for the Committee for the State Emergency and answered "yes"? Should we really persecute him? He just expressed his own point of view, and thank God he was not afraid to. So do we want a new fear to enter our society? No, that would be an irreparable mistake, and it would be the quickest way to turn victory into defeat.

I am afraid that those who applauded the totalitarian wing of our society are certainly provoking us to exactly this. Only they can now call for buildings to be destroyed, windows to be broken, and people to be seized. Information has reached me that there was an incident in one city where children of military personnel were not allowed in school. I do not believe that a democratic-minded person can do this. Or the decision to ban newspapers. Pardon me, please, when I say it is disgusting for me to hold certain newspapers in my hands, but that is certainly no pretext for shutting them down. Let the reader himself decide: should he read that newspaper or not? Let the reader himself shut it down. Of course, articles were published in some newspapers which come under the Criminal Code, for example those which incited national hatred. But I think it is short-sighted to return to that after the defeat of the putsch.

[Correspondent] History shows that the right always consolidates faster. But up to now the democrats have been arguing about who among them is more democratic, and so they weaken themselves. What problems do you see here?

[Yakovlev] I see serious difficulties in democracy itself. It is very young and we have not yet learned to manage it. We must become competent, both politically and practically, as fast as possible. The processes in the Supreme Soviet, and elsewhere as well, disturb me very much. I am fed up with the endless idle talk and all this nonsense which is sometimes heard there. It is disgraceful. If it continues like that, these parliaments, from top to bottom, will not survive; the people will not stand for it. Take the elections to the Security Council at the last session. Instead of understanding that a group of people was needed who would sit like the damned from morning till night and somehow try to coordinate all the activity, they began to recall which of the candidates it



was who said what or even to suspect that certain people were thirsting for power. Let them take this power, if they know how to work. So that evening I quickly announced that I was withdrawing my candidacy. I didn't need that. Popov and Shevardnadze did the same thing.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, tell us a few words about the Movement of Democratic Reforms [DDR] at this stage.

[Yakovlev] When we created this movement, we had in mind two tasks: putting up a barrier to counterrevolution (we forecast that exactly) and radicalizing the reforms.

On Saturday, the 17th, my announcement was published speaking of the threat of a coup d'etat. And on that Saturday, before the putsch, we held a political council meeting, which decided to discuss this problem in more depth in a week. But, alas, we did not manage to do so.

Now two trends are apparent in the DDR: what is it, a party or a movement? I am sorry to give up the idea of a movement because everyone, including even the republics, can be in it. The republics will not join a party. But now progressive forces from Kazakhstan, and from Tadzhikistan, and from the Ukraine, and even from the Baltics are prepared to participate in a general democratic movement, especially if it is limited by general humanistic principles: nonviolence, constitutionality, freedom, economic, political, and creative, and just international relations. We could appear as a unified bloc in elections. Of course, there will be difficulties: parties which join the movement will want to have their own quotas. But we must work on this level: the stronger character, regardless of which party the person may

belong to, should be supported in a unified bloc. Obviously preliminary surveys will be needed.

Some comrades propose in addition forming a party of democratic reforms within the movement, because there are a great many individual statements from people who are not prepared to join existing parties which are part of the movement but want to be in some party which would be linked with certain names. This still has to be determined.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, what do you think, did a revolution occur in Mikhail Sergeyevich's consciousness during these days?

[Yakovlev] I think that objectively it certainly must have. We had warned him repeatedly that there was no place for him on the right. Even theoretically. His only place is on the left. But maybe he was maneuvering, or maybe he understood that on the right were tanks and bayonets and they could do something dangerous at any moment, while on the left there were only newspaper watchmen, nothing more. It is possible that this reflected an overestimation of the idea that people, dissatisfied with the disorders and the consumer market, were so indignant that a balance had to be kept somehow by relying on established structures. Now that is gone. Mikhail Sergeyevich has in many respects become a man of the years 1985-1986. But now there are many more difficulties.

[Correspondent] And the last question. What are your hopes for the Extraordinary Congress?

[Yakovlev] That its actions are adequate to the situation, that it does not drown the work in words, and that possible attempts by reactionaries to take revenge for the August defeat are stopped.

### **Ethnic Groupings Dangerous Problem in Military**

91SV00794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "Ethnic Groupings as Dangerous as 'Dedovshchina': A New, Alarming Phenomenon in Military Collectives"]

[Text] Of all the letters on this topic received by the editors, this one differed in one respect. Of the two military construction units located near Moscow that were the brief duty stations of Turdybek Nurpolatov's son, the father described one of them as more or less the best subunit in the entire Armed Forces, referring to the other one as a collecting point for all kinds of vices. Nurbek Nurpolatov, as a member of the latter unit, experienced such heavy psychological pressure and outright violence that he could no longer withstand the humiliation and, as described by the father, was "forced to leave his unit and wander like a vagabond, winding up at his home."

The following day, I managed to locate the military construction detachment which N. Nurpolatov left without authorization, in city outskirts, close to a plant known throughout the nation. The letter led me to believe that I would find decrepit barracks, semi-intoxicated military builders looking for a fight with the first person they come across, and indifferent commanders who would have nothing to do with subordinates. However, no matter how closely I looked, I could not see the outrages the letter told about. By the same token, I would not go so far as to say that the unit was the best I had ever seen.

Major V. Perestoronin, the deputy commander of the military construction detachment, did not conceal the fact that the state of affairs in the detachment left something to be desired. It turned out that military builder N. Nurpolatov was certainly not the only person who had committed AWOL. In the second quarter of this year alone, the detachment listed 11 men as fugitives, one of whom was given an early discharge; he should not have been inducted in the first place, because of, shall we say, the level of his mental development. Another one was a patient in the Hospital imeni Yakovenko for the same reason. Some of the fugitives are at large. Their homes are located in areas racked by interethnic conflicts. The men who either returned to their unit or were picked up by the provost service and subjected to disciplinary action have returned to duty. That included military builder Private Nurpolatov. It is true that a dispensation was made in his case by permitting him to remain in a unit located close to home.

Let us return to his previous duty station. Why did a young soldier who was transferred to a unit new to him leave this unit the following day, receive punishment for the first violation, only to turn around and commit AWOL a second time? It bears mentioning here that the latest case of humiliation of a man by a fellow serviceman occurred last year in the unit, after which the

guilty soldier was appropriately disciplined. Other barracks hooligans are kept in check by considerable pressure applied by the military procuracy and by the increasing interest in state of affairs in the unit exhibited by parents. Quite a bit has also been done by commanders - from effecting some improvement in routine garrison duty (something that "suffers" in the case of builders, for subjective and objective reasons) and in normal living conditions on the one hand, to the provision of additional food on the basis of subsidiary farm and greenhouse operation on the other.

"Nonetheless, we still receive reports of 'quiet' rights violations from time to time," said Vladimir Vladimirovich Perestoronin. "They are 'quiet,' largely because there are no witnesses to the offenses, and also due to hesitation to lodge complaints on the part of the victims. There is little chance to spot rights violators some other way, since the victims as a rule can show no bruises or abrasions on their bodies."

Incidentally, those who dare to assault their fellow servicemen for no reason at all are known to command personnel, who take swift action against them. In addition, if one realizes that Nurpolatov himself had nothing against serving in his previous unit, in fact insisted on doing so, we must seek an explanation for his behavior somewhere else, in something other than hazing of recruits by older servicemen or lack of responsibility on the part of command personnel.

I would be less than honest if I were to say that the true cause came upon me all of a sudden or that I have never experienced anything of the sort. When I was starting my military service, I heard men use the word "fellow countryman" and its affectionate form "zema." The term "fellow countrymen" was employed by inductees in referring to men from the same rayon, region, or republic, naturally in the context of ethnic origin. The geographic principle was decisive in selection of friends; even length of service did not have any particular influence on this thinking among fellow countrymen. Protection of the weak and helping fellow countrymen were considered to be a matter of honor; the particular ethnic grouping involved did not show its "unconsecrated" side for some time.

Nonetheless, as it so often happens, righteous matters are often followed by immoral ones. Looking backward, it is difficult to pin down the beginning, the time when a community of fellow countrymen decided to take on another community, or an entire military collective, for that matter, the time of appearance of some kind of "Mafia of fellow countrymen," which has the strong prevail over everyone else in an attempt to facilitate the tour of duty of their fellow countrymen. There is this kind of "unofficial" structure in the unit abandoned by Nurpolatov, also. This kind of structure also exists in other military collectives, such as the one the unfortunate fugitive took a liking to, for example. There was a reason for this liking. With all conditions equal, the two units differed in one respect: In the second military

construction detachment, an ethnic grouping of Chechen held the upper hand, while in the first detachment Nurpolatov's fellow countrymen held sway. It goes without saying that the new location alone - even ignoring humiliation by fellow servicemen of another nationality - frightened Nurpolatov out of his wits. On top of that, there is no real cause to bring charges against members of ethnic groupings. This is merely the initial manifestation of their inherent self-discipline, something that metes out punishment to those who dare to set their doubtful preferences above common interests. The grouping attempts to install its candidates in junior command assignments and endow them with unquestioned authority over other servicemen. In this connection, it sees no need for violence: The use of implied threats is sufficient. Discord arises only with change of personnel, a time when there is a struggle for influence in the unit or subunit. Thus, apparent calmness in a unit in which an ethnic grouping takes root is followed by domination of some servicemen by others.

Of course, hazing of recruits by older servicemen as a phenomenon manifested by individual hooligans still exists. It was the subject of a complaint in a letter written by the mother of Private Golubev, who is serving in Saratov Oblast. A telegram expressing alarm was sent by reserve officer Boronilov, whose son has also suffered from actions in violation of regulations in his tour in Zavitsinsk, Amur Oblast. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to fail to take notice of a phenomenon as dangerous as the ethnic grouping.

There is no doubt about the pain caused us - military people - by the fact that the great, labor-intensive and, more than anything else, necessary and noble work that was being done to bring about ethnic harmony among personnel of the Army and Navy was not permitted to stand the test of time, in that it has suffered damages from the blows inflicted by the centrifugal ethnic trends existing in the country. Of the many concepts compromised by the propaganda that was in the service of the old administrative command system, I believe that the concept of internationalism is least deserving of this. A person asks himself again and again: Is it possible to draw boundaries between multi-ethnic families or set up demarcation posts on millions of pieces of land and postage-stamp size apartments housing representatives of nations and peoples? Is it possible to organize in any place of your choosing - let alone in unified Armed Forces - companies, battalions, and regiments, along the lines of "pure blood?"

Therefore, the concept of internationalism is now infused with a new meaning, a mutual show of respect for traditions, customs, and a right to exercise genuinely equal rights. This in my view has been most fully understood by persons who have gone through Osh, Fergana, Nagornyy Karabakh, and other "hot spots." This kind of understanding is even showing up in the Armed Forces. There is a reason why a position of priority importance is attached in the Ministry of Defense Collegium's appeal to Armed Forces personnel

to problems of internal unity of military collectives, strengthening of military comradeship and soldierly friendship, formation of internationalist qualities among youth, and consolidation of age-old traditions of friendship between peoples. These problems must be resolved by the renewed agencies involved with combat training, with military, moral, and psychological education, and by all Army and Navy command and enlisted personnel working in close harmony with all nations and peoples whose representatives will be serving in the Armed Services of the renewed Union.

### SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Nogai

91UN2588A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 16,  
17 Apr 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" entry edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Nogai]

[Text] Self-designation **Nogai**, named after the military leader Nogai, member of the Dzhuchi tribe, son of Genghis Khan.

According to the 1989 census, slightly more than 75,000 Nogai live in the USSR.

The Nogai language belongs to the Kypchak-Nogai subgroup of the northwestern group of Turkic languages. The Nogai language is divided into three dialects: Karanogai, Achikulak, and Kuban (Ak Nogai).

Most Nogai are settled in the Nogai Steppe in Dagestan and in Stavropol Kray. Nogai settlements also may be found in the Kizlyarskiy, Babayurtovskiy, and Khasavyurtovskiy Rayons, Dagestan ASSR, and in Checheno-Ingushetiya.

By the turn of the century a separate group of Nogai lived along the lower reaches of the Volga and the Crimea. They have now merged with members of other ethnic groups in the area.

The Nogai are the descendants of the Mongol tribes—the Mangat and others—who mixed with the Turkic-speaking Polovtsi and adopted their language.

The Nogai Horde was separated from the Golden Horde during the 16th century. Its various groups traveled east and west of the Volga.

The Nogai Horde itself was split by the end of the 16th century into the Big and Small Hordes which, after a while, were divided even further.

The Big Nogai Horde settled along the lower Volga reaches. The Small Horde lived a nomad life on the right bank of the Kuban, the Sea of Azov, and the territories between the Dnyepri and the Don.

In the 17th century, the Kalmyk tribes, which had been raiding the Nogai, pushed them to the west and the north. In the 18th century the Nogai were grazing their

herds in the steppes of the Northern Caucasus and the northern shores of the Black Sea. They were divided into the Budzhak, Yedisan, Dzhambayluk, and Yedishkul Hordes. The small hordes—Tokhtamysh, Mansur, Kypchak, Karamurzin, and Novruz—lived a nomad existence in the Northern Caucasus.

In 1859-1860 the Nogai from the Kalauaso-Sablinskoye and Kalauaso-Dzhambaylukovskoye districts moved to Turkey. The others merged with the Cherkess and the Abaz in the Batalpashinskiy section of Kuban Oblast.

Nomad livestock breeding was the main occupation of the Nogai. The Kuban Nogai alone practiced the livestock pasturing method. The Nogai raised horses, camels, cattle, and sheep.

Until the very end of the 19th century, the Nogai Steppe was a virgin land. Waterholes were exceptionally infrequent. The richest cattle breeders controlled the wells.

In summer the dying of cattle for lack of water was an ordinary phenomenon. Another scourge was the harsh winters, when it was difficult for the cattle to graze under the snow.

The Kuban Nogai, who had settled in a bountiful area, practiced farming. They sowed wheat, millet, barley, and oats. Forging was developed among the Kuban Nogai who also practiced harness-making, fur-dressing, and leather-dressing.

The Nogai were distinguished by their feudal-patriarchal relations. They had princelings and sultans who were hereditary aristocrats, and minor feudal nobility. Most of them were freemen and serfs.

The Muslim clergy were very influential among the Nogai.

The Nogai were divided into a number of tribes, each of which consisted of four aksakals; each aksakal consisted of several villages. These subdivisions had their own administrations.

The nomad Nogai lived in tents which they moved from place to place.

The Nogai are Sunni Muslims.

#### **SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Serbs**

91UN2588B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 27,  
3 Jul 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" entry edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Serbs]

[Text] Self-designation: Serbi.

Outside Yugoslavia, where they number 8.4 million, Serbs live in the United States (230,000), Canada (60,000), Austria (35,000), Romania (34,000), Australia

(25,000), Hungary (13,000), and Argentina (10,000). Smaller groups may be found in some other countries. According to the 1989 census, some 3,000 Serbs live in the USSR.

Anthropologically, the Serbs are members of the Balkan-Caucasic race of the southern branch of the Big Europeid race.

The Shtokav dialect of the Serbo-Croatian language, spoken by the Serbs, is part of the southern subgroup of the Slavic group of the Indo-European language family.

The literary language is based on the Cyrillic alphabet.

The ethnic nucleus of the ancestors of the contemporary Serbs was formed in the Balkan Peninsula, in the course of the mass migration of Slavic tribes to the Balkans in the sixth-seventh centuries, during which the local population became substantially assimilated and pushed in a westerly direction and in the mountainous areas. The territory which was settled by the ancestors of the Serbs (the basins of the Drina, Lim, Piva, Tara, Ibar, and Western Morava Rivers) and the Serbian principality, which was founded in the middle of the ninth century, contributed to the consolidation processes and the development of the Serbs as a separate ethnic group. Byzantium had a beneficial influence on the ethnic history and development of social relations among the Serbs in the Middle Ages, in the 14th century in particular, when the expanding Serbian principality took over some Byzantine land. Later, for nearly five centuries, the ethnic history of the Serbs developed under the conditions of the Ottoman rule and was complex and contradictory. On the one hand, foreign domination blocked the economic, political, and cultural development of the Serbian people; on the other, conversely, the national liberation struggle against the Ottoman yoke helped the national revival and was a powerful catalyst in ethnic consolidation trends. It was a factor in the upsurge and strengthening of national self-awareness.

The first migrations of the Serbs to Russia began in the middle of the 18th century. It was then that military settlements were founded in the Ukraine, which included Novoserbiya, founded in 1754, not far from today's Kirovograd, and Slavyanoserbiya, which consisted of Serb military settlements in the area among the Siverskiy Donets, Bakhmut, and Luganka Rivers.

For a long time the main traditional occupation of the Serbs in the Ukraine was military service. For example, Serbs who served in the Cossack regiments in the Yelisavetgrad area, were famous for their high military skills. This was reflected in folk etymology of the 19th century, when the words "Serb" and "hussar" were synonymous. Subsequently, their occupations became identical to those of the local population among which they had settled.

The multinational composition of the first Serb settlements in the Ukraine was the initial prerequisite for assimilation processes among the Serbs. The loss of



autonomous rights by Novoserbiya and Slavyanoserbiya as a result of the establishment in 1784 of the Yekaterinoslav Vice-Regency and the inclusion of the Serb military settlers within the free Cossack regiments and the Bakhtum hussar regiment contributed to the further

mixing of the Serbs with the local Ukrainian, Moldavian, Russian, and Hungarian population.

A substantial segment of believing Serbs are Orthodox. Some Serbs profess Catholicism, Protestantism or Islam.

### Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Operations

91UF1129A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 91 pp 51-57

[Article by Georgiy Melorovich Sturua, candidate of economic sciences, sector chief, IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations], USSR Academy of Sciences, columnist for MEiMO [MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA] magazine at USSR Supreme Soviet, under rubric: "At the USSR Supreme Soviet: Intelligence Oversight and the USSR Supreme Soviet: Problems and Prospects"]

[Text] Those who followed the development of events during the perestroika years are apparently well aware that the "Kalugin case" simply could not fail to arise. Of course we shall not discuss specifically that case, but something similar. All the most influential state-political structures have undergone similar tests when "prodigal sons" violated their vow of silence. As a specialist on America, I immediately recalled the middle of the 1970's with the notorious revelation of the unseemly and frankly illegal actions of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].

It would be extremely tempting to make parallels between both histories, but the differences between them are so striking, and, I daresay, obvious that any comparison would be simply senseless. Let us turn our attention if only to an elementary fact: in order to investigate the CIA activities, three commissions were created: a special commission under the chairmanship of Vice-President Rockefeller; and Senate and House of Representatives commissions headed, respectively, by Church and Pike. The degree of effectiveness of the work performed by the commissions was definitely not identical: for example, the first-mentioned commission was obviously intended to save the reputation of the special service. However, whatever the situation was there and whatever pressure was experienced by the commissions, the deeply underlying layers in the work of the CIA proved to be revealed, its management was partially checked, and, what is especially important, a more rigid system was established for congressional monitoring of the intelligence services. Attempts, however, to begin at USSR Supreme Soviet to study the "Kalugin case" came up against fierce resistance and, as yet, have not led to anything. The idea of real monitoring of the special services, an idea formally reinforced by the creation of a parliamentary Committee for Defense and State Security, is having a great amount of difficulty in being implemented.

The dominant theme in the public reaction to the "Kalugin case," completely naturally, was the concern with regard to the KGB's assumed illegal actions and abuses against Soviet citizens. Meanwhile, the demoted

general also slightly lifted the curtain covering the intelligence actions of that department, thus touching upon a layer of ethical problems.

If we consider it to be desirable to have special services with their specific set of "ungentlemanly" means and methods, then we ourselves must work out the legal procedures that regulate their activities, that guarantee that those activities are not directed against the society whose interests the special services are supposed to defend. Society itself, to the extent of its level of civilization and with a consideration of the specific conditions, sets the framework that limit the activities of the special services.

In the 1970's U.S. Senator Aburezk proposed a legislative amendment according to which CIA agents would be prohibited from using in their foreign work any methods that were illegal from the point of view of the domestic American legislation (for example, the bribery of an official, theft, etc.). The amendment was rejected as being a maximalist one that was actually capable of paralyzing intelligence work as a whole. One can be patronizingly surprised at the naivete of the senator and the other proponents of that idea who continue to defend it today. However, one should not rush to make any judgments. Although I do not know the real reasons why the senator had formulated that amendment, I assume that he was guided by completely practical considerations. The vote on the amendment meant that, first of all, it is precisely the legislators who determine the methods used by the special services, rather than the special service deciding for itself, as a narrowly departmental task, what standards to be guided by (here one involuntarily recalls the statements made by certain representatives of the executive authority in the Supreme Soviet, who assert "Don't hinder us from working," but who, essentially speaking, are opposed to being subject to monitoring). Secondly, the decision with regard to the amendment forced the legislators to make a clear statement concerning their position and precisely recorded, in counterbalance to the high-sounding declarations, the degree of distortion of the abstract social ideal.

In addition to questions of ethics and legality, the activities of the special services also touch upon foreign policy. Here one has in mind that traditional link within the confines of which intelligence provides the foreign-policy departments with information. The degree to which the making of foreign-policy decisions that are very serious for the fate of the entire country relies on unreliable intelligence data and its analysis can be discerned easily from the collections of histories starting with the beginning of the fascist aggression against the USSR in 1941 and the sending of troops to Afghanistan in 1979. One can also discuss the possible negative consequences of the intelligence operations for the reciprocal relations with other countries. In foreign historiography there are detailed descriptions of how the revelation of the Soviet intelligence networks in Canada and Australia after the war led to the sharp cooling of

relations with the USSR. Those ancient "intelligence embarrassments" promoted the establishment of anti-Soviet stereotypes, and their consequences are still being felt. Or let's take another example: the use by the Soviet special services as agents of members of foreign communist parties caused serious psychological damage to their prestige. The activities of the special services are too important to have the carrying out of those activities left completely at the discretion of the intelligence workers or even the executive authority.

The KGB leaders repeatedly stated that they were in favor of creating in the new USSR Supreme Soviet a committee whose field of vision would include the sphere of state security. That fact is definitely gratifying and exceptional, since, for probably the first time in our history, a department standing at the very tip of the power pyramid voluntarily expresses the desire to have the people's elected representatives monitor it. During the past year of work by the parliamentary committee, of course, the proper monitoring has not been established, and that could not occur so quickly (here the expectations of many members of the Supreme Soviet with whom I discussed this topic coincided with reality). For the time being, everything is limited to informing the committee of certain aspects of the work performed by the state security agencies. The lack of haste in approving the system for parliamentary monitoring, unfortunately, proved to be supplemented by sluggishness in formulating the concept for that monitoring.

To what degree could intelligence be encompassed by that monitoring? V. Ilyukhin, chief of the USSR Procurator's Administration for Oversight of KGB Activities—which, in the past, was the only monitoring level—stated, "This is monitoring of the legality of investigation and the administrative practice and solitary-confinement cells. Everything else—intelligence and counterintelligence—does not fit within the confines of our oversight. It is impossible and unrealistic to regulate their activities by law."

A statement in approximately the same spirit was made by a certain Soviet specialist who used to be a professional intelligence worker. He asserted that parliamentary monitoring can be carried out only in the most general form: the legislators, by establishing the budgetary limits, but not going into any specific details, would indirectly influence the scope of the intelligence operations and the size of the personnel rolls. But attempts to monitor directly the operations themselves would threaten the security in carrying them out, since the number of people knowing about them would increase. In the expert's opinion, this kind of monitoring would introduce elements of disorganization into intelligence work, since the result would be the establishment of too many levels of coordination. They would also place in doubt the possibilities of legislatively regulating the intelligence methods: it is possible to write any law you like on this account, but it will be impossible to verify its execution, since, in the end, the legislators in their analysis will rely on the information provided by

the special service itself, and that special service will scarcely have a self-interest in revealing its own secrets. What would be more realistic and desirable, according to this specialist, is careful governmental monitoring of the intelligence agencies.

I discussed the same question with the people's deputies—both those whose professional training enabled them to make qualified judgments about questions of state security, and those who, in discussions on this topic, can rely only on their life experience, common sense, and practice as deputies. The impression arose that my attempts to ascertain their position concerning the opportunities for having the Supreme Soviet monitor intelligence activities forced them to think carefully about that problem for the first time. Most of them admitted the lack of any system of views that they had formed on this account. At the same time the people's deputies unanimously stated the need for such monitoring. Yu. Kh. Kalmykov, chairman of the Committee for Legislation, emphasized the right of USSR Supreme Soviet to monitor any agencies of state administration, including those engaged in intelligence.

Many of those with whom I spoke were inclined to think that, if the secrecy rules are unconditionally observed, the monitoring should be carried out, to the extent of its depth, at the following levels: the Supreme Soviet—listening at closed sessions to the annual intelligence reports and the confirmation of the intelligence budget; Committee for Defense and State Security—the more careful consideration of questions linked with intelligence activities; subcommittee for state security—operational legislative monitoring. The leaders of the Supreme Soviet and the "defense" committee are given the right of access to the most secret and most delicate information.

Something that is extremely curious is the definite divergence of opinions as to whether it is necessary to classify the budgetary data in the "intelligence" item. Some people consider that to be possible; others assume that there could be public divulging of only the total amount of expenditures for the activities of the state security agencies within the country, but not abroad. It is extremely typical that certain members of the Supreme Soviet have obviously underestimated the power that is given to them by the Constitution—the right to consider the budget and to decide whether they agree to finance various measures requested by the government. The lack of detailed and reliable data concerning the state budget, as well as simply the lack of experience that one still observes among our legislators (they have been unable to master all the intricacies and refinements of their job in one and a half years), easily explains why the Supreme Soviet, essentially speaking, has not been using its chief instrument—the budgetary-financial instrument—for exerting an influence on the development of state strategy and policy.

As one can see, the idea of parliamentary monitoring of the intelligence services is greeted inside the walls of the

USSR Supreme Soviet, which, of course, does not promise the smooth passage of specific recommendations in execution of that idea. The traditional objection to any "invasion" by the parliamentarians into the area of security is: there can be a "leaking" of information, which would cause irreparable damage to the interests of the country's security. In this warning one can discern a large dose of cunning. Of course, with the increase in the number of persons having access to definite information there is also an increase in the danger of its "leakage." At the same time, ought one to proceed from the assumption that today's users of that secret information are a special breed of people who are close-mouthed, whereas parliamentarians are irresponsible blabbermouths? I might recall that Kalugin's lawyer constructed his defense, in particular, on the fact that many of our official secrets are, essentially speaking, no secrets at all, since they have already been divulged, including in printed form, by former employees of Soviet special services who defected to the West. According to the British JANE'S SOVIET INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, from 1971 through 1985 seventeen KGB and GRU [Main Intelligence Administration] employees became defectors. It is even difficult to imagine the value of any information that could be transmitted abroad by General-Major Polyakov, who was not only a managerial worker in the GRU, but also, for a prolonged period of time, an American spy.

The guaranteeing of secrecy is a necessary condition for the functioning of any special service, but that demand in no way precludes—as has been excellently demonstrated by the experience of the Western countries—parliamentary observation of the special services. Moreover, that experience indicates that the special services should not be the last people with a self-interest in it. Primarily because this removes from them a definite part of the responsibility for various operations that receive the legislators' approval. From the point of view of the special services, permanent regulated monitoring in the final analysis is better than broad public discussions that are provoked by unexpected revelations: a confrontation between society and the special services harms both sides. The removal of the tension between society and the special services that is inevitably generated by their balancing on the brink of the legal and illegal, the moral and the amoral, would be promoted by the public's assurance that the parliamentarians are capable of reliably monitoring the special services.

There is one more aspect to the problem: a parliamentary committee must also be an agency to which a special-service employee can turn not only in order to report violations of the law, but also to resolve a conflict with the leadership, according to former Soviet intelligence worker M. Lyubimov. The importance of assuring that that agency exists can be seen easily from the story told by V. Korolev, a former worker in domestic counterintelligence, concerning the unprecedented instance of the treasonous act by counterintelligence worker S. Vorontsov: having been demoted, he took the initiative

of going to the CIA embassy rezidentura, where he enlisted, assuming the pseudonym "Stas," which was the name of the then-chief of the Second Service of the USSR UGKB for Moscow and for Moscow Oblast. One ought not to simplify things: treason should never be explained, much less justified, by any conflict with the leadership, but in the special service, in order to avoid exposures, one should keep in mind all the factors—and primarily the psychological one. CIA, for example, has a separate subdivision that commissions retired intelligence workers to write their memoirs and then stores their manuscripts. The many reasons why this is done include on that is surprisingly simple: in a person's declining years he tends to reminisce about his past life, to speak about it, and to bare his soul. A secret form of memoirs gives a definite emotional charge to the retirees and simultaneously protects the special service against any "leaks."

Returning to a discussion of the idea of parliamentary monitoring of intelligence, from all the conversations that I had at USSR Supreme Soviet I can conclude that the deputies were intuitively included to what can arbitrarily be called the "American" system. (The "English" system differs from it in that the monitoring on the part of the legislators is limited only to parliament's approval of the total amount of appropriations for intelligence and counterintelligence.)

The "American" system of monitoring was formed over the period of the more than 200 years of the United States' unique history, and simply by virtue of that fact is not subject to being copied. In its modern form it has not existed for a long time—only since 30 December 1974, when, on the crest of a wave of indignation by the American public after the discovery of the CIA's illegal observation of U.S. citizens within the country itself, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. Since 1790, when President Washington requested funds for intelligence from Congress and received them without any complications, until the middle of the 1970's, there existed in the United States a monitoring system that resembles the "English" system (in 1792, 12 percent of the U.S. budget—\$1 million—was allocated for intelligence; by 1990 the expenditures for various intelligence services constituted, according to estimates made by American researchers, approximately \$24 billion, or approximately 2.5 percent of the country's budgetary appropriations).

First of all, the monitoring of the activities of the intelligence agencies by the supreme legislative authority in the United States is carried out by means of the enacting of the appropriate laws. In our country such laws have not yet existed and it is still unclear as to whether they will be envisaged at all. (V. A. Rubanov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Committee for Public Security, emphasized that state security agencies are guided in their activities only by legally binding acts in view of the lack of any laws.) And if they do not exist, then it becomes incomprehensible how any parliamentary monitoring of them can be established, since that



monitoring must be based on criteria that are clearly stated in a legislative procedure. Meanwhile, the 1947 U.S. law governing national security (in subsequent years, amendments were made to it) contains a precisely worded delimitation of the functions of the various departments in charge of national security. In particular, according to the principles stated in that law, CIA is assigned the function of collecting and evaluating intelligence data, and of coordinating the activities of all the other intelligence agencies (in addition to CIA, the so-called "intelligence community" in the United States includes the National Security Agency, which engages in technical intelligence, the intelligence services of the Department of Defense, the armed forces, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Department of Energy, and the FBI). That law states that CIA does not execute tasks of guaranteeing domestic security and does not have the right to subpoena citizens. It is a telling fact that the law establishes a ban preventing the positions of CIA director and his deputy being simultaneously occupied by persons in the military, even if one of them is retired.

In 1980 the U.S. Congress enacted a law concerning the monitoring of intelligence, according to which the various intelligence services in the United States must "completely and promptly" inform the intelligence committees of both houses of Congress concerning their activities. That law stipulates that this must not be treated as the necessity to obtain approval from the committees to carry out various measures. The president received the right, in emergency situations, to provide preliminary notification concerning urgent operations only to the chairmen of the intelligence committees, the Speaker, and the leader of the party minority in the House of Representatives, and also to the leaders of both party factions in the Senate. The president was also obliged to provide complete information to the committees concerning intelligence operations that were not reported in a preliminary procedure, and to indicate the reasons why that was not done. The intelligence agencies were instructed to report any illegal intelligence activity, any significant intelligence failure, and the actions taken to correct the situation. The law emphasized that no principles stated in it should be interpreted as giving justification for refraining to present information to the committees (on the grounds that that would reveal secret information or the sources or methods used in intelligence work).

The enacting of the law was preceded by a political struggle around the Senate bill, in which there was detailed spelling out of the "rules of conduct" for all the intelligence agencies. Two points of view formed: for some, the legislative assertion of the "code of conduct" appeared to be necessary, since it established clear-cut, completely unambiguous criteria according to which it was possible to judge the legality of the actions taken by the intelligence services; for others, the adoption of rules of this sort was unacceptable, since it excessively bound the hands of the executive authority in carrying out

intelligence activities. An interesting argument is the one to which former CIA Director J. Schlesinger resorted. He felt that, with the adoption of the rules, the United States would put itself in a false position, inasmuch as it would openly regulate the conditions in which the workers in its intelligence services could violate the laws of other countries. In Schlesinger's opinion, the United States should not reject the "blanket of decency" that conceals the intelligence worker's actions that are definitely not morally irreproachable. In this argument one can discern only a cunning move that guards the intelligence agencies against interference into their affairs, but nevertheless, apparently, with respect to the principles and methods of intelligence activities there exists a definite limit to openness, which limit is linked not only with secrecy, but also with the necessity of observing the standards of propriety—do not bring frankness to the point of cynicism.

The investigation of the secret U.S. operations in the course of "Irangate" activated a large amount of efforts to enact legislation regulating intelligence activities. A number of senators developed a new version of the law governing the monitoring of intelligence. It included two fundamental innovations. It was unambiguously required for the president to give his authorization in written form for the conducting of secret operations. This was supposed to provide an additional guarantee that legality and prudence would be observed in intelligence work, inasmuch as the president could no longer count on having his role in the making of incorrect decisions remain concealed from Congress. The other innovation can be summarized as requiring the president to inform Congress promptly (also in written form) concerning the conducting of a secret operation, but no later than 48 hours after its beginning. Although initially the bill was approved by the majority of senators, in early 1989 its further consideration was postponed as a "good will" gesture with respect to the new president. It is expected that Congress will return to the bill in 1991, and it will be approved, although in a compromise formulation that authorizes the president to report secret operations several days after their beginning, instead of the original "no later than 48 hours."

The mechanisms that have been legislatively stated in the United States for the reportability of the intelligence agencies and their administrators, including the president, definitely reflect the American specifics. But certain of the basic principles that were previously mentioned with regard to the laws that consider the activities of the intelligence services are worthy of study and creative reinterpretation in the context of our real-life situation. We might recall the difficulty with which the commission of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies came up against the events in Tbilisi. No documents authorizing the use of troops to disperse the rally participants were ever found: the action in Tbilisi was undertaken on the basis of oral orders. It was no simple matter to establish who bore what kind of responsibility.

In a conversation with me, W. Colby, who was working as the CIA director at precisely the time when the commissions were engaged in investigating the administration's activities, formulated in this manner the idea of restraining the influence of the document that had signed: "I had a rule: if I place my signature on a document, it must be the kind of document I will not be ashamed to see published 10 years later on the front page of THE NEW YORK TIMES."

I will add, however, that, unfortunately, the history of the special services in probably all the countries of the world attests to the fact that the threat that a particular document will appear, whether it be in THE NEW YORK TIMES or in PRAVDA, did not so much restrain people from signing it, as lead to its being destroyed without a trace.

In the mid-1970's the United States set up a mechanism that was more serious than previously for having Congress monitor intelligence. The previously mentioned Hughes-Ryan Amendment provided the opportunity for eight committees to request information pertaining to intelligence. Actually, that information was by no means submitted on such a broad scale. The 1980 law established the leading role played as the monitoring level in this sphere by the Senate and House special committees on intelligence (that were formed, respectively, in 1976 and 1977). The results of the work of those committees are extremely instructive, and therefore I shall dwell on some of them.

The results of their activities are evaluated differently by the American specialists themselves. Their existence did not prevent the actions that led to the "Iran-Contra" scandal. Nevertheless, the efforts of the committees have definitely not been fruitless. As was noted in one of the reports of the Senate committee, during the first two years of its functioning, thanks to the committee's interference, changes were made in certain programs for conducting secret operations, and certain programs were entirely canceled. The budgetary tool of monitoring proved to be especially effective, inasmuch as the representatives of the intelligence agencies had to justify every item of expenses and to give explanations for a broad range of operations for which they were requesting appropriations. The effectiveness of the committees' work, to a definite degree, was determined by the position of the executive authority: the Carter administration was more inclined than the Reagan administration to cooperate with them.

American legislators and experts definitely do not count on the complete frankness of the executive authority. At the same time, W. Colby explained, there exists in American society a definite limit beyond which monitoring begins to operate: Colonel North—the central figure in "Irangate"—lied until the threat of impending imprisonment forced him to begin to change his testimony. Congress was put in a more favorable position than USSR Supreme Soviet, which, unlike Congress, does not have at its disposal any powers to pronounce

judgment on contempt for the country's supreme legislative agency, which judgment could be followed by court examination.

The answer given by S. A. Tsyplayev, member of our "defense" committee, to my question of what he thought would define the degree of success of the agencies of the Supreme Soviet that had been called upon to monitor the state security agencies was brief: political will and a taste for work. American researchers also assume that these factors are very important for success in the work performed by the intelligence committees of the U.S. Congress. It was discovered that certain committee members have not been verifying the incoming information too carefully, have not been attempting to "give it their best shot," although much here depends upon the legislators' personal activity rate: the only persons who can have access to definite documents are the legislators themselves, but not their aides, on whose help they have become accustomed to relying.

For the committee members the carrying out of the monitoring functions can even prove to be a risky occupation. American researchers note that the CIA has ways to exert pressure on legislators, including the possibility of blackmailing them with the threat of making public knowledge various spicy details of their personal life or their attempts to bypass the tax legislation. There is also a danger of another kind, when the legislator loses vigilance and, as it were, fuses into that organization that he is supposed to monitor. To avoid this, the U.S. Congress has instituted special rules for rotating the intelligence committees: a person cannot be a member of a Senate committee for more than eight years, or a member of a House committee for more than 6, even though the terms of office are not limited and in a number of instances have been computed in the dozens of years.

In American experience it is possible, I think, to find confirmation of the very important thesis that formulated by our major legal expert, People's Deputy A. M. Yakovlev. Enumerating those means of monitoring that could be used by Soviet legislators—review of the budget, observation of the legality of the actions taken by the special services, steps to aid their depoliticization—A. Yakovlev emphasized: the chief factor is not the outer monitoring—in many instances it can be bypassed if there is no inner monitoring, if the values of democracy remain alien to the workers in the special services.

Not being a specialist in intelligence, it is very easy to take a certain romantic attitude in attempting to forecast the way in which the currently occurring democratization of society, the return of society to values pertaining to mankind as a whole, and the end of the "Cold War" era can exert an influence on the work of Soviet intelligence workers. One definitely wants to hope that all these processes will not simply slide along the surface, but instead will penetrate deeply into the services, for which the thesis "the end justifies the means" was almost axiomatic. The new conditions in the country and in the

world, one must think, can lead to a reinterpretation of certain canons of the intelligence services and can increase the effectiveness of the monitoring of those agencies by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The fact that these hopes are not groundless has also been pointed out by the extremely reassuring statements made by the professionals. This is what V. Grushko, deputy chairman of USSR KGB, and chief of the 2nd Main Administration, says: "During the perestroika years, under conditions of a policy of a new way of thinking, the KGB leadership repeatedly called upon our associates in the West to observe the principle of intelligent sufficiency and to maintain definite civilized limits to the activities of the special services. In particular, we are against the use of such inhuman methods as the kidnapping of people, blackmail, threats, etc..."

V. A. Rubanov, deputy chairman of the Russian Committee for Public Security, assumes that the Soviet special service in the new circumstances could be guided by a number of bans. In particular, the following could be banned: efforts to undermine the constitutional system of another country; use (on the basis of an agreement with the United States and other countries) of United Nations employees in the role of intelligence workers in view of the increasing importance of that organization for the cause of peace.

What, then, today are the real opportunities that the Supreme Soviet has for monitoring the intelligence services? People's Deputy Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev gave a precise evaluation when he said that our parliament, professionally speaking, has not yet reached the point of monitoring intelligence activities, and that the deputies do not yet have the appropriate parliamentary efficiency. In principle, in his opinion, there must appear in the structure of the Supreme Soviet an independent committee on intelligence, which would be empowered to monitor the objectivity and reliability of the information coming in from the intelligence agencies. But for the time being, S. F. Akhromeyev feels, it is necessary to create a group and carry out a study of how it is possible to begin to resolve this task.

One last comment that it is especially valuable even now not to sit around with our arms folded. Because everyone knows that the only person who masters the road is the person who travels it.

### **Precoup Survey Shows Increasing Distrust of KGB**

91US08144 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Sep 91  
Union Edition p 8

[Article by Aleksey Levinson: "Survey: How the KGB Was Doing by August"]

[Text] For six years Gorbachev did not let Lubyanka touch anyone (almost), and he did not let anyone touch it (almost). How this ended is well known both to the president and to the committee.

But at the end of 1989 (only 20 months ago!), only one person in Russia dared admit to interviewers of VTsIOM [All-Union Central Institute for the Study of Public Opinion] that he "does not trust organs of state security at all." On the contrary, every four out of 10 declared that they had full confidence "in whom they should." (The others chose an intermediate answer, or they had difficulty answering).

However, among the IZVESTIYA subscribers even at that time there were two skeptics to every three who trusted. But in other statistical classification groupings that still trusted the GB [Security Committee], there was already a prevalence of those who expressed their distrust out loud. But these were nongovernment service people, bookworms, and readers of journals like NOVYY MIR. In a word, "not the people."

There was a feeling in the "department" that these were the main adversaries. They listened to their conversations and kept an eye on them as new views began to spread more and more from these circles about the totalitarian regime and about the most powerful support of any totalitarian regime—the secret political police. By August of 1990, trust in the "committee" fell by one-third, and the number of those who did not believe in the competence of "competent" organs almost doubled.

As on many other important issues of our life, society began to divide into people inclined to change their opinions and people who held on to their previous opinions. But in this case, it is not a matter of only the inertia of the older generation. The experience of our history showed: "To trust organs" blindly is dangerous for society. But this very same experience said to people who were getting on in years: To declare distrust of the organs openly is dangerous to a person.

By the spring of 1991, Russians who refused to trust the Committee for State Security were still numerically fewer than those who expressed trust in it. But among the young segment of society, especially in the student environment and among people with a higher education, trust and distrust were on a par. Society was thinking it over.

And there was something to think over. For Kryuchkov reported that the CIA had inserted its own agents in the upper echelons of our leadership. This idea characterizes not so much the intellectual level of its inventors, as it did their concept of the "people" who were supposed to believe this. However, according to VTsIOM data, by the summer of 1991, there were not more than 20 percent of those who believed this in even one of the major sociodemographic groups in the USSR (true, there were 26 percent among those who called themselves members of the CPSU). But on the average, there were two nonbelievers for each believer.

Answers to the next question showed that the matter began to take a more dangerous turn for the KGB. Not only did belief in the infallibility of the organs disappear, but the intention began to appear to make demands of



them according to the law. Kryuchkov will have to leave his post if he is unable to support his words with facts, declared 42 percent of those polled (against 11 percent). Among the males who were polled, and, in particular, those serving in the Army and in the organs, this was demanded by half, and, among specialists—"grease monkeys"—by more than 60 percent. However, no less characteristic of the situation is the fact that one very liberal newspaper did not then risk publishing the data just cited.

Perhaps, KGB analysts noted the summer turning point with respect to their department. In any case, of the 2,756 polled in the all-Russian VTsIOM sampling, 19 percent declared complete trust, and 26 percent—complete distrust. The proportions among IZVESTIYA subscribers are 14 percent and 27 percent.

This was in July. Then came August.

#### **KGB Officer Says Gorbachev's Would-be Assassin Acted Alone**

914B0435A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 19 Sep 91 p 3

[Report on interview with Colonel P. Sokolov, USSR KGB senior investigator for especially important cases, by Andrey Abrosimov and Sergey Nagayev; place and date not given: "No Regrets for His Actions"]

[Text] *Aleksandr Shmonov, who shot at M. Gorbachev, was relieved of all criminal responsibility.*

This was the decision that the Moscow city court adopted the other day in the case of A. Shmonov. The court ruling was explained by reasons of insanity. For that reason the accused was sent for mandatory medical treatment.

As you know, Shmonov made an attempt at Mikhail Gorbachev on 7 November 1990. Now came the trial. We asked Colonel P. Sokolov, USSR KGB senior investigator for especially important cases, to tell us what facts transpired in the course of the investigation and also to describe Aleksandr Shmonov himself.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Petr Aleksandrovich, when did the idea of a terrorist act occur to Shmonov?

[Sokolov] As Aleksandr Shmonov explained to us, general dissatisfaction with our life came to him as early as in 1981 (he is 38 now). It was then that he set his mind on the physical elimination of Soviet state leader, L. Brezhnev. But he could not implement that idea in those days; he thought he was still too young and inexperienced. In other words, he spared himself. He knew perfectly well what the consequences of such an act could be for him personally.

Since 1987 Shmonov has developed some special sensitivity in his perception of the life around him. He started to participate actively in rallies and other so-called informal actions. He plunged into all that. He even

abandoned his family, his wife and a little kid. He became very sloppy in his immediate work at the factory.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Shmonov's profession is...

[Sokolov] A fitter. He was working at one of Leningrad's factories. I must say that his was a rather ordinary life. He finished school, then he finished vocational school, started working as a fitter. He served his term in the military...

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Did he learn to shoot while he was in the Armed Forces?

[Sokolov] Yes, but not only there. While in the military, Aleksandr participated many times in range firing, he knew the Kalashnikov submachine gun well. He was the best rifleman in his subunit. However, he used a shotgun for his terrorist act. He learned to handle it while attending courses at the Kolpino interregional society of hunters and fishermen. His records show that he made eight successful shots out of 15 when he took his shooting test.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Did Shmonov enroll in the course to learn to shoot better?

[Sokolov] Not entirely. Membership in the organization allowed him to purchase and keep firearms. In that respect, this step was the beginning of his preparation for the crime.

The shotgun with which he shot at Gorbachev was bought by Shmonov in a second-hand store in Leningrad. This German-made gun was in very good repair. It is 16 caliber, one of the most popular ones.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Our press has already mentioned that Shmonov was registered as a mentally disturbed person. Why was he accepted into an organization whose membership allows the purchase of firearms?

[Sokolov] Aleksandr really was diagnosed as psychologically unstable; he underwent treatment in a Leningrad hospital. That happened in 1978. After he was released he was registered with a corresponding facility. However, he was quite apprehensive of such a label. To escape it Aleksandr used to change his police registration address. Once, after one more move his documents failed to show up in the local psychiatric clinic. In a strange way they also disappeared from the clinic where Shmonov had been on record before that last move. At this time it is rather difficult to understand how that could happen.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Why did he select only Gorbachev for his attempt? Does Shmonov think that Mikhail Sergeyevich is the most detestable person on our domestic political stage?

[Sokolov] During the investigation Aleksandr repeatedly declared himself a supporter of the capitalist way in the



development of our country. But he thinks that Gorbachev is applying the brakes to the reform process and is defending the obsolete Soviet regime.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You are intentionally using present tense as you describe Shmonov's views and assessments. Did he preserve his opinions without any changes while the investigation continued?

[Sokolov] Nothing changed in this respect; when I last talked to Aleksandr he said that he did not regret his actions.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Was that long ago?

[Sokolov] We have not met since his psychiatric evaluation was set up. Incidentally, it was not just requested because of Shmonov's previous record. The investigation also produced numerous evidence proving that Aleksandr is psychologically unwell at present.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Did he have any accomplices or instigators?

[Sokolov] He did not, and that is my unequivocal answer.

### Reappointed Culture Minister Gubenko Interviewed

91US0789A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
11 Sep 91 p 41

[Interview with Nikolay Gubenko, by Viktor Kozhemyako: "'I Would Give Up That Damned Seat...': Three Questions for Nikolay Gubenko"]

[Text] Recently, by Ukase of the USSR President, he was reappointed our country's minister of culture. But his departure from that position had been truly dramatic. Those who, at that time, heard Nikolay Nikolayevich's statement in a talk on television probably remember both the frank, genuinely confessional intonation and the tense inner meaning. Those are things that certainly cannot be conveyed by even the greatest actor. In any case, during those moments in front of the television set I was thinking precisely about this. Now I have the opportunity to ask Gubenko my questions, which, I think, will be of interest to many people.

[V. Kozhemyako] It is generally known that you resigned from the position of minister of culture on 20 August. What prompted you to do that?

[N. Gubenko] The first and main factor was the requirement to grant freedom to the country's President. Because if that individual is isolated from the nation, people lose faith not only in the possibility of democratic changes, but also in the morality on which the law must be based.

The second factor was the requirement to prevent bloodshed. At that time it had not yet occurred. I wrote my resignation on the 20th, and the underground

SOBESEDNIK published it. Unfortunately, I was not able to speak on television until the 22nd, as a result of which public opinion proved to be confused.

But my third reason... As you know, I arrived at the ministerial position in order to ease the fate of people in the cultural field, of whom I am one. But at that tragic moment in history I suddenly felt revealed deep within me Chekhov's idea that an artist must engage in politics to the extent that he must be protected from it.

[V. Kozhemyako] With what thoughts, intentions, and hopes are you returning to this difficult position?

[N. Gubenko] Let me begin with the hopes. Certain of them, to put it bluntly, proved to be ephemeral and have sunk into oblivion. But in general the events of 19-21 August pushed the country toward the radical reforms that the democratic public had always hoped for and the carrying of which had now come closer and had become more realistic.

I was profoundly touched by the attention to the preservation of the single cultural space that had been demonstrated during the days of the very difficult special Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the part of the leaders of the sovereign republics, to whom we made our declaration. By "we" I mean the ministers of culture and their deputies, from the 11 republics in the country that were united in accordance with the formula "11 + 1." The fact that we thoroughly discussed many vitally important problems with Russian President Yeltsin, and the fact that the State Council, at its first session, adopted a decision to preserve and develop the experience of all the republics, which was our guide for the past two years, but, most important, the fact that the President of the country and the republic leaders had made an intelligent decision to preserve the single cultural space, all provide hope for the consolidating basis of such concepts as spirituality and morality, the expressers of which are the people in the field of culture and art, our intellectuals.

Within the near future we intend to put the emphasis in our activity on interethnic cultural exchange, and also on those priority programs that have been defined by the council of the republics' ministers of culture. They are, for example, the program for developing the culture of the Chernobyl zone, and cultural programs for Semipalatinsk Oblast and the Arals zone. I am thinking a lot about how to provide methodological assistance to the republics.

[V. Kozhemyako] But don't you regret that the ministerial position separates you from your beloved activities as a director and actor?

[N. Gubenko] Yes, I regret that very much. I am somewhat consoled by continuing to work at the Theater on Taganka. I am playing Boris Godunov. And I am continuing to think about a movie that I will begin making immediately after I leave the ministry. The August

events will find their artistic expression in that movie. Including my personal drama.

So, needless to say, I would have given up this damned seat long ago if I did not realize that there are many people who trust me and who hope that I can do something here that is beneficial for them.

### **Hijacking Attempt Result of 'Joke'**

91UF1152A Moscow LUBYANKA, 14 in Russian No 2, Apr 91 p 1

[Article by LUBYANKA, 14 Correspondent A. Artamonov: "Hijackers and Jokers"]

[Text] The people who flew on this Airbus on February 10 (Flight 1211) did not note that each step they took was being monitored. The day before, Vnukovo Flight Service received a letter of a threatening nature with a demand to "turn off" the aircraft to New York.

Experienced agents immediately determined: Either a psychotic person or a joker had written the letter. However, they had to conduct a complete inspection and preparations in accordance with the tip: a very thorough inspection of the aircraft, cargo, and the passengers' personal baggage. A team of commandos, fire crews, and ambulances were at full combat readiness in the shelters.

It turned out to be a false alarm. But are there really few combat situations today? In the last two years, we have observed a tremendous surge of aircraft hijackings. In 1989, competent organs prevented (at the preparatory stage) 28 cases of air piracy and they stopped direct hijack attempts three times. Last year, approximately 30 hijackings were carried out.

Our law is adequately severe with regard to this type of crime. Article 213(3) provides for from three to 15 years imprisonment (and execution by a firing squad if there are victims). Today the overwhelming majority of countries that adhere to international law extradite hijackers to that country where they committed their crime. Law enforcement agencies have significantly increased their level of preparedness to combat air piracy.

Nevertheless, a noticeable reduction in this type of crime has not been observed. Just last year, we detected more than 100,000 attempts to carry objects and substances banned for transportation on air transportation. In so doing, 319 firearms were seized, 400,000 pieces of ammunition, more than 700 kilograms of explosives, 30 projectiles, 83 training grenades, nearly 100 tons of flammable and toxic liquids were seized.

And there is one other problem—jokers. The last of them was at the end of February. The scheduled Magadan-Moscow flight was already ready to land at Domodedovo when the crew was given a note from unknown persons with a demand to change course for Istanbul or the aircraft would be blown up. Later it was ascertained that three young people... were joking. They themselves

admitted it. Indeed, only when it had already become obvious that they would be found out anyway: the investigation of the tip was conducted precisely and rapidly.

But how much did this cost us? How much money and nerves did this joke cost not only the intelligence services and the aviators but also the passengers? The 15 days that the jokers received naturally will not compensate for the losses. I think that it is time to change criminal law. In this case, there must be material responsibility. Such jokes must be fined and major sums. Let us make these jokes dear in the direct meaning of the word for the jokers themselves.

### **Conversion Prompts Researcher To Sell Military 'Secrets'**

91UF1152B Moscow LUBYANKA, 14 in Russian No 2, Apr 91 p 2

[Article by LUBYANKA, 14 Correspondent A. Mikhaylov: "A Haunting 'Victim of Conversion'"]

[Text] He is well over 50 years old. He has a long life in science, professor's work at VUZ's [higher educational institutions], a doctor's degree, and the rank of professor behind him. He confidently entered the office and sat in the chair offered to him. There was neither a shadow of doubt nor an element of remorse. Is it possible that it only seems so at first glance?

The diplomat waited for him in his car. He had had the foresight to lock the door. Having caught sight of his "client," he opened the window a bit and, after exchanging greetings, let him in the car, having turned the tape recorder on beforehand. An old hand at different machinations, the foreigner met the contact not without some apprehension. The real matter was the initiative offer of services by a Soviet scientist, an expert in the development of PVO [Air Defense] systems! And it is now when war is threatening in the Persian Gulf.... An obsession still grated on the foreigner, some sort of sticky, humbly pleading speech, a lightning-fast readiness to acquire, deliver, make Xerox copies of documents, and to make a description of his invention. His for now! But later....

The professor laid down his sweeping conditions: departure from the USSR with his son and two military antimissile defense experts, total financing of its development, and 40 percent of the profits after its introduction. And in general, as they say, full room and board. Indeed, there had not yet been any conversation with the Ministry of Defense experts so far but he was certain that they would agree (Where did he get the certainty that the officers would betray their oath?).

The professor placed an ideological foundation under his services: to help one of the belligerent parties. That is why he was ready to depart for the other side of the earth's surface right now, in order to realize his invention in material by the sweat of his brow. "No one

needed him in the Soviet Union. Intrigues, envy, and indifference to fresh thought...." But not only this could interest him: For many years, he had worked in science that was directly related with the development of the country's air defense system.... So the possibilities were significantly broader than those offered thus far.

The conversation proceeded listlessly. The foreigner was interested in many things but he had already come to a conclusion for himself: Article 65 of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code] (simply—espionage) is fraught with lengthy periods of confinement, his career would be ruined, and his personal business was quite remote from military secrets: hard currency, precious stones, and other minor matters that provide joy in this life.

The foreigner did not listen to the pesky proposals until the end and he summed up the results. "All of this is interesting but alas.... We still do not have the capabilities to realize your invention. We will leave the ideas you have proposed until peacetime."

The Mercedes did not manage to travel 200 meters when its way was blocked by three black Volgas. "An agent provocateur!", thought the diplomat, hurriedly locking the doors. But they had already put this "agent provocateur" in a parked Zhiguli a little way from there.

The KGB agents were stunned by the results of the operation which they had conducted. They "felled" a hard currency dealer with a foreign passport and the one whom the agents call the "initiator" rushed off into the arranged networks, "having collapsed all of the development." And simply—the man who at his own initiative is attempting to sell what is covered by the Top Secret security classification.

The foreigner tossed the cassette with the recording of the negotiations that had just taken place out the window. The conversation about his hard currency activities was now deprived of any basis. The Mercedes was hidden around the corner.

The apprehended citizen was read his rights in the reception room of the USSR KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast. However, when a specific conversation began with regard to what had been seized, he began to become confused, to stammer, and to equivocate. He explained the presence in his briefcase of a "For Official Use Only" security classification by saying that the flight of creative thought requires its constant presence. "When I'm riding in the metro, a thought comes to me, I open my note pad, and write it down." Since it was impossible to assess on the spot either the work itself or the information with the security classification, they decided to terminate the conversation.

An investigation of the military experts showed that there were no secrets in the work which the professor gave to the foreigner. But the magnetic recording made in the Mercedes assigned everyone to their places. The professor's obvious intention did not leave any doubt.

But.... There was no corpus delicti in his actions at that moment. As they say, he wanted to but did not succeed. And it is this that caused the KGB agents to breathe a sigh of relief.

We are sitting with him, an impressive, gray-haired man in the office of the BSSR KGB Directorate for Grodnen Oblast where the unsuccessful "spy" works. There is a video monitor and a compact microphone on the desk—necessary attributes for a basic conversation: as they say, "let us put the cards on the table." The first frames of the video recording reduced the professor's zeal by several orders of magnitude and they shifted the conversation into a constructive channel. He found the strength within himself to not stoop to a lie....

What compelled a man who had worked in defense science his entire life and who could perfectly imagine the consequences of his rash step to seek contacts with the West for the purpose of transferring technical information there? Money, career, world fame? Maybe each person poses the question to himself in his old age: "What have I achieved? What have I managed to do for science and for society?" These are reasons of a subjective nature. Let us leave moral standards in parentheses. Ultimately, each person determines for himself what is moral and what is not.... But there was logic in the professor's words. A logic born of real problems.

Conversion of the defense industry has placed many experts and scientific developments in a dead end situation when engineers' thinking is operating at full speed and the paths for its realization have been reduced to a minimum. They ask a scientist who has worked in defense electronics for his entire life to develop a new type of saucepan....

But does this affect only defense workers? How many promising developments that are capable of providing a powerful impetus to our industry are traveling through the offices of bureaucrats who are indifferent and removed from science and creativity. A purely sloganeering regard for scientific-technical progress. The main thing is to proclaim but few people are concerned with how to give life to new native technologies or how to encourage a scientist in a civilized manner.

Did these causes not give rise to a powerful outflow of scientific cadres from the USSR, is this not prompting people with painful pride on the path to treason, and does this not give rise to pessimism which does not promote progress?

Treason did not occur in the case with the Grodnen scientist. Legally. And therefore there will not be the dock or a court sentence.

And one more thing. The name of the main hero is not in this article not because I am experiencing any special sympathy toward him—any treason is revolting and this kind of "initiative" treason is doubly so. But I am deeply convinced that the professor has to come to the appropriate conclusions. But let it not be on the moral but on



the legal level, having admitted that they snatched him from the brink of disaster. To which one inch remained.

### **LUBYANKA, 14 Staff Introduced**

91UF1152C Moscow LUBYANKA, 14 in Russian No 2, Apr 91 p 3

[Untitled and unattributed article]

[Text] This is that very striking press service with the light writing hand with which LUBYANKA, 14 appeared. In the second row (from left to right): **Andrey Oligov**—deputy head of the service and a TV star (see "Dobryy vecher, Moskva!" [Good Evening, Moscow] on Thursdays); **Mikhail Abrosimov**—knows everything or almost everything about the past UKGB for Moscow and Moscow Oblast because he is its museum director; **Aleksandr Mikhaylov**—also a TV star (see that same show) and the head of the press service; **Sergey Bogdanov**—one more TV man (see that same show); **Andrey Artamonov**—the primary person responsible at LUBYANKA, 14; **Andrey Kostromin**—makes TV stars since he operates the television camera; **Sergey Vorobyev**—the most informed man since he manages the computer data base. In the first row (from right to left): the famous **Katya Mayorova**—briefer, journalist, and "Miss KGB" (See the last issue of LUBYANKA, 14), and also **Zhenya Bondov**—super-secret press service agent (by the way, a direct descendant of that very Pronin).

This is the gang that wrote this newspaper for you.

### **U.S. Approach to Defectors Viewed**

91UF1152D Moscow LUBYANKA, 14 in Russian No 2, Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Defectors: How the CIA Regards Them"]

[Text] According to information in the American press, the total number of defectors from the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe since 1945 until the present time totals nearly 750 people. And as THE NEW YORK TIMES reports, American competent organs divide them into three categories.

Defectors whom the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] takes care of belong to the first category. Their number includes agents of the various intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations of the countries mentioned above and also American intelligence agents from among local citizens. In accordance with Law 110 and the 1949 Law on the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Attorney General and the head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, can "in the interests of U.S. national security or in the interests of American intelligence" provide unimpeded entry into the country for up to 100 foreign citizens per year.

CIA departmental directives state that, if necessary, American intelligence must provide lifelong material assistance to these individuals (The annual payment totals \$30,000 at the present time). However, the referenced provision of the directives, as a rule, is not disseminated to the defectors. As one American intelligence agent stated, "these individuals will remain more complaisant if they remain uninformed about the duration of financial aid from the CIA."

Former diplomats, servicemen, and mid-rank state employees belong to the second category of defectors. Their allowance totals one half of the allowance of first category defectors.

The third category consists of low-rank state employees, sportsmen, writers and artists. These individuals are deprived of material assistance and must independently provide for their own existence on U.S. territory.

The defectors have the right to acquire American citizenship. As a rule, they need to live on U.S. territory for no less than five years to do this. The CIA Director has been granted the right to petition for presentation of American citizenship to foreigners (not more than five people per year) who have rendered "invaluable services" to the U.S. Government after they have stayed in the country for one year.

The CIA, jointly with other American departments, is obliged to provide defectors with documents, to develop appropriate legends in required cases, and to take steps for their job placement. However, in practice, the majority of defectors have been compelled to independently find work for themselves. In so doing, only a few have been able to find a job that meets their inclinations and level of intellect and the primary mass of defectors are hired by small business enterprises. As a result, dissatisfaction with the CIA and other intelligence community organizations that "have cast them to the whims of fate" arises among many defectors.

A number of social organizations that are closely linked with the activities of the American intelligence services undertake attempts to alleviate somewhat the lives of these foreigners in the country. Among these organizations is the Jamestown Foundation. The foundation receives voluntary contributions from businessmen (but not from the CIA or other government institutions).

A memorandum sent by Foundation President W. Heymer [transliterated] in 1989 to both intelligence organizations contains critical comments. Specifically, it points out that the CIA, having "squeezed" everything possible from the foreigners, ceases to have anything whatsoever to do with them. In W. Heymer's opinion, these individuals are unique sources of information and analysts on the problems of the USSR and the Eastern European countries. "The fundamental transformations that are occurring in these countries do not reduce the value of defectors, rather, on the contrary.... These people are helping us and it is our duty to assist them."



### Legality of Recent Pardons Questioned

914B0380B Moscow IZVESTIYA 4 Sep 81 Union Edition p 8

[Article by S. Mostovshchikov: "It Has Been Decided To Consider Gdlyan, Ivanov, and Kalugin Decent People"]

[Text] *Hey, Nikanor Ivanovich! What is an official person and a nonofficial person? Everything depends on one's point of view in looking at a thing. Everything is relative and subject to change. One day I am nonofficial, and the next, look, I am official—or it may be the other way around, Nikanor Ivanovich. This is the way things are!*—M. Bulgakov, "The Master and Margarita"

On 12 July 1991, USSR Procurator General Nikolay Trubin signed a letter on behalf of Mikhail Gorbachev, announcing that sufficient evidence had been obtained in an investigation to justify the filing of criminal charges against Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov for exceeding their judicial authority. On 31 August 91, Nikolay Trubin decided on his own to drop the charges against Gdlyan and Ivanov, citing "extenuating circumstances with a consequent lack of the elements of a crime in this case."

Criminal charges were also dropped in the case of Oleg Kalugin, once widely known for allegedly disclosing state secrets. Additionally, Kalugin was relieved of the necessity of attempting for a tiresome length of time to have his case adjudicated by Ryzhkov, Kryuchkov, and Gorbachev, inasmuch as the President of the USSR personally revoked all decisions—including a decision of his own—to deprive this formerly highly placed KGB official of his decorations, his rank of Major General, and the pension befitting his rank.

True, it is extremely difficult to judge just what kind of triumph is being celebrated in our country, whether it is a triumph of justice or of some other kind. But if we are concerned with the act of restoring historical justice, then we are entitled, to put it mildly, to certain misgivings as to whether there are any ongoing organizations in our country responsible for law enforcement within the USSR. And if this should simply turn out to be a case of somebody acting in the heat of the moment, then cooling in his commitment, the question arises: Do we have laws

After several telephone calls, I managed to confirm the fact that there are indeed people who bear responsibility for law enforcement in the USSR. But they have differing views with regard to what has happened. Deputy procurators general Yanas Dzenitis and Vladimir Kravtsev viewed these decisions with caution by declining to comment. On the other hand, Viktor Ilyukhin, a member of the Collegium of the USSR Procuracy and head of the directorate with oversight responsibility for compliance with the law in state security organizations, was more outspoken in expressing his opinion. He said:

"I am categorically opposed to the decision made by Trubin, and I consider it unlawful. It is not a judicial step but political one, and it is intolerable. I was involved personally in the Gdlyan and Ivanov case. And what is to happen now? Was the evidence gathered for nothing?"

Most likely, the experts will argue among themselves; for arguing is an accepted way among us of generating the truth, which often turns out to be a truth long familiar to everyone else. For example, common sense suggests that it is generally not worthwhile to start criminal proceedings against people if one does not have a sufficient amount of evidence. But in the Soviet Union it is forbidden to engage in many investigative activities or even look for evidence if criminal proceedings have not been formally instituted. It is a fairly simple matter, however, to voice one's suspicions to the entire country in this way in order to stir up an investigation.

Well now, once again there is cause for triumphant celebration as persons previously out of favor are now declared to be trustworthy. Oleg Kalugin was offered a position in the KGB, which he turned down. For the time being he serves on a voluntary basis as an adviser on matters related to prospective reforms by the newly appointed chief of the KGB. But according to Kalugin, the KGB intends to pay him the salary of a member of the collegium in an advisory role. In addition, the state will compensate him for the general's pension he did not receive, which was R350 prior to 1 January, but which this year is in the range of R700-800.

As a journalist, I tend to regard past events as things that are best put behind us. But, frankly, one thing concerns me: Who among us today feels adequately insured with respect to being in favor or out of favor with those in power? Is justice among us still a mere category of the administrative command system?

**Dissatisfaction With Burlatskiy's  
'Unprofessionalism' Led to Ouster**

914B0414A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 4

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Correspondent Sergey Kiselev interviewed by KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA: "A 'Plot' Against Burlatskiy? What Is Happening at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA"]

[Text] Kiev—The attempted coup d'etat on August 19-21 of this year and—forgive the association with Chernobyl—the efforts to relief its consequences have brought changes in the operation of many mass media, among them the change in leadership of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the closing of the newspapers PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, the CPSU Central Committee weekly GLASNOST, the newspaper DEN (which de jure belonged to the country's Writers Union but de facto, as has now been learned, belonged to the Ministry of Defense, which financed it), RADYANSKOY UKRAINI, PRAVDA UKRAINY, and other publications, which in effect laid the ideological and theoretical foundation for the coup.

There have also been changes at such democratic central publications as MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, OGONYOK, and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, which are under new management. Where MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI is concerned, the situation is clear: Yegor Yakovlev, the newspaper's editor in chief, has gone on to head the country's State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. Everything is more or less clear with our fellow countryman Vitaliy Korotich, editor of OGONYOK: On the day of the military coup, August 19, he was supposed to return to Moscow from the United States, but at the last minute he cancelled his flight. The journal's staff has not forgiven him that.

Now a scandal has broken out at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA as well. On the next to last day of the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the body was addressed by USSR People's Deputy Fyodor Burlatskiy, the publication's editor in chief, who claimed that right-wing forces on the staff were plotting against him in a bid to settle scores.

A correspondent for KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA asked Sergey Kiselev, a longtime writer for our newspaper and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's correspondent for the Ukraine, to tell about the situation that has come about at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

[Kiselev] The speech at the session by our former editor in chief, Fyodor Mikhaylovich Burlatskiy, reminded me of an old joke: "Is it true that Ivanov won a Volga automobile in the lottery? Yes, it's true, but it wasn't a Volga, but 1,000 rubles, and it wasn't in the lottery, but in a card game, and he didn't win it, he lost it."

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Nevertheless, is it true that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief F. Burlatskiy has been removed from his post by the labor collective?

[Kiselev] Yes, that is completely true. The fact is that the 18 months during which F. Burlatskiy edited our newspaper were truly a tragedy for both the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff and our readers. I remember how in the spring of 1990, when LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief Yu. Voronov, who was constantly ailing, was preparing to leave the post, the newspaper staff made every effort to make sure that none other than F. Burlatskiy, then LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's political commentator, would fill the vacancy. I want to stress that initially, our editorial board supported F. Burlatskiy so fervently only because he was a real figure capable of prevailing over the other candidate for the post of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's chief, Aleksandr Prokhanov, that "nightingale of the General Staff" and ideological inspirer of the recent coup. In addition, we hoped that as a democrat, as a political figure, and as a supporter of perestroika, F. Burlatskiy, on taking up the reins of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, would be able to restore the newspaper's former glory, which had gradually eroded in recent years.

Unfortunately, our illusions were dispelled rather quickly. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA became F. Burlatskiy's personal platform, a vehicle for his all but weekly and enormous moralizing articles. It's hard to calculate how much time F. Burlatskiy spent at the newspaper per se during those 18 months: A month? A month and a half? All the rest of the time he was either attending sessions of the country's parliament or traveling to foreign countries, clearly abusing these business trips, which did nothing for the newspaper. This also irritated the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff. And the results of F. Burlatskiy's leadership of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA are readily apparent, so to speak. A great many talented staff members (N. Loginov, G. Tselms, A. Chernichenko, T. Khlopyankin, and others) left the newspaper. The publication's circulation is plummeting catastrophically: In 1991, we had 1.2 million subscribers. And if we have managed in the past six months to pull together our last journalistic skills and to put out a more or less interesting newspaper, it is not thanks to the editor in chief, but in spite of him.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Still, why did the scandal, which, as is now becoming clear, had been brewing for some time, break out immediately following the suppression of the coup? Was this a random coincidence?

[Kiselev] Needless to say, it was not. You see, the attempted coup d'etat showed quite clearly just where everyone stands; it was, if you please, a kind of "lice inspection." I'm not going to go into details. I will only say that F. Burlatskiy, who was vacationing in the Crimea, did not rush back from his top-level sanatorium

to Moscow, to the editorial board he heads. He called his first deputy, Yu. Poroykov (who, incidentally, conducted himself worthily, honestly, and bravely during the coup) a couple of times, but he remained a kind of vacationing spectator, so to speak. In any event, F. Burlatskiy wasn't showing much courage in deciding to sit things out on the Black Sea, waiting to see what would happen. He returned to Moscow only on August 22, attributing his absence to difficulties in getting plane tickets. But that is a fiction, to put it mildly. As the correspondent for the Ukraine, I contacted the Deputies office at Simferopol Airport and learned that although it was indeed difficult to get a flight out of the Crimea, as it is every summer, all USSR, RSFSR, and Ukrainian People's Deputies who wanted to fly back were nonetheless provided with tickets, along with their families.

That was the last straw that exhausted the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff's patience. We had had enough of Burlatskiy's boorishness. We had had enough of his lordly ways. His inability to serve as editor in chief, his failure to understand what the newspaper is, his unprofessionalism—we had had enough of all this too (which, I should point out for the sake of fairness, did not reflect well on either LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's editorial board or our collective). And then came the cowardice on the days when the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA publishing house was surrounded by armored personnel carriers, when many of our staff members were spending their nights defending the approaches to the "White House"—that we simply couldn't tolerate.

Nevertheless, we did not seek to stage a universal scandal; we naively hoped that F. Burlatskiy, on reading the letter requesting him to resign and signed by the newspaper's staff members, would immediately step down. But that didn't happen. First F. Burlatskiy demanded a joint session of the editorial collegium, the trade-union committee, and the bureau of the journalists' organization, where virtually everyone told him the things I have just recounted to his face. However, F. Burlatskiy dismissed any criticism of himself, accused the editorial staff of plotting against him, and demanded that a general meeting be held. It was held, but F. Burlatskiy, calling the editorial offices two hours before it was set to begin, said he wasn't coming. The meeting of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA labor collective unanimously passed a vote of no-confidence in editor in chief F. Burlatskiy and demanded his resignation.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But as far as we were able to understand from former LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief F. Burlatskiy's speech at the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by no means all of the editorial staff supported the demand for his resignation. For instance, such a nationally respected and uncompromising journalist as LITERATURNAYA GAZETA commentator and USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Shchekochikhin, who can hardly be suspected of opportunism, nevertheless seems to have walked out of the meeting that expressed no confidence in F. Burlatskiy.

[Kiselev] Here too, F. Burlatskiy was engaging in wishful thinking. Yura Shchekochikhin addressed the aforementioned meeting and said that he had no doubt as to the need for Burlatskiy's resignation, but that he was against such a noisy "checking up on flights." Let me cite an open letter from USSR People's Deputy Yu. Shchekochikhin to USSR People's Deputy F. Burlatskiy that was published in the next issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. It will clarify the situation to a considerable extent:

"Dear Fyodor Mikhaylovich! I consider your speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on August 30 of this year to have been improper. The matter of the editor in chief of the independent LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is the concern of the founder and only the founder—the labor collective of the independent publication. I have regarded and regard as inadmissible the hysteria both inside and outside the editorial staff of the newspaper of our country's intelligentsia surrounding your resignation, the need for which no one on the editorial staff, including me, now doubts. But I repeat: This is the internal affair of the editorial staff, not the union parliament. On August 27, the day of the general editorial staff meeting (which took place, unfortunately, without your participation), I attributed, in an interview with the WASHINGTON POST, the need for your resignation to just one factor (with due regard for the reputation of the newspaper and your personal reputation): LITERATURNAYA GAZETA needs an editor in chief who will devote the bulk of his time to the newspaper, and let parliamentary and other public activities come after that. By virtue of your speech at the session, you force me to cite another—and the most important—reason why you cannot continue to serve as LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief. The reason is in your inexplicable, as far as I am concerned, absence from the editorial offices during the days of the coup, when the essentially occupied newspaper was left without its editor in chief. Respectfully, Yuriy Shchekochikhin, USSR People's Deputy and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA commentator. Lugansk, August 31, 1991."

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] And one final thing. When a newspaper collective wants to get rid of one editor in chief, it no doubt seeks to put another in his place.

[Kiselev] We haven't gotten that far yet. We have already burned ourselves once in a rash election. No doubt every LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff member has his own candidate for the post. Some want to see a well-known writer in the position, while others want a professional journalist able to generate ideas. Time will tell who actually gets the job. In any case, there shouldn't be any haste in electing a new editor in chief for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and I hope there won't be.



**TASS Director on Importance of Self-Financing,  
Journalists' Opinion**

914B0440A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Vitaliy Ignatenko by I. Kosarev; place and date unknown: "I Am in Favor of TASS Without Authorized Statements"]

[Text] [Kosarev] Why did you leave the president?

[Ignatenko] TASS found itself in a difficult situation. President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin decided that a new, professionally trained person had to take over. Fifteen years ago I had worked for the agency and although today this is the new TASS I nevertheless agreed.

[Kosarev] Immediately after the failure of the coup, I read in a paper that: "For the last time TASS is authorized to state." In this connection, the following question arises: Will the agency you head be burdened, as in the past, with political duties?

[Ignatenko] We would like a situation in which no one would authorize us any longer, twist our arms, or "hang" over the journalists. No, this will be an official information service in charge of minutes of congresses and major political events. It will cover visits by heads of governments and receptions. However, such a service would account for no more than 10 percent of the agency's potential. The other associates will handle the free flow of information based on facts and common sense.

[Kosarev] Recently, correspondents such as Petrunya, whose names have become familiar both in the country and abroad, have been active in TASS. Do you believe that a lie motivated by political views is justified?

[Ignatenko] Nothing can justify a lie. In the case of a journalist, it indicates less a political preference than the absence of professional ethics. A journalist may be wrong, he may like something and hate something else. Nonetheless, his pen must be motivated by honor, conscience, and the law. That is the key in which we are restructuring TASS. We are converting to a contractual system in the course of which, naturally, we shall also resolve personnel problems. As you know, the agency's collegium has already submitted his resignation. I accepted it but asked them to remain on the job for a while, for TASS does not rest even a single hour of the day. Let me say, however, that most of the collective consists of honest and principle-minded people.

[Kosarev] What steps are you taking to commercialize the agency?

[Ignatenko] We shall operate on the basis of total self-financing. And although it is still too early to say this, a number of subdivisions are already operating on the basis of total cost accounting. In order to improve our financial affairs, above all we shall have to improve the reputation of the agency, a great deal of which has been

lost lately. I am relying heavily on the young journalists, on the so-called middle level, who had no decision-making authority whatsoever in the past.

[Kosarev] It is no secret that there are major differences between TASS for domestic and foreign consumption. How will it be in the future?

[Ignatenko] I am trying to eliminate the double tapes, one for public consumption and the other for domestic. There will be a single tape and this will put an end to this division of the journalists. As it is, the journalists write one thing for external and another for domestic consumption. Furthermore, such changes are inevitable, for in a traditionally free information market within the country, news is supplied also by Interfax, Postfactum, and other agencies.

[Kosarev] Mikhail Sergeyevich admitted at the press conference after the coup that circumstances made him become an information fan of the BBC and Radio Liberty. What can you tell us about the stated information preferences of the president?

[Ignatenko] He reads a great deal and is aware of all more significant news items found in journals and newspapers. Unquestionably, like any other person, he has his likes and dislikes. However, they are not based on simplistic criteria such as, for instance, "right wing" and "left wing." It is rather a question of the content of the various publications or even of the potential of journalists. He and I have quite frequently discussed articles by Otto Latsis, Tatyana Ivanova, Aleksandr Pumpyskiy, Aleksandr Bovin, Anatoliy Druzenko, and many other political journalists.

[Kosarev] If one may say so, TASS is the source of information for many newspapers, including MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. What changes in your work should we expect as of now?

[Ignatenko] Today, for instance, if you paid attention, we have announced that as of this day our political observers and journalists will express exclusively their own viewpoint in their writings, which do not have to coincide in the least with official positions. In the final account, the TASS journalists as well have the right to express their personal views on events and, I can assure you, society can only benefit from this.

**Former CC Publishing House Turned Over to  
RSFSR Jurisdiction**

914B0382D Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by T. Brilyakova: "PANORAMA—a Russian Publication"]

[Text] In accordance with a Decree by the President of the RSFSR, the CPSU Central Committee publication PANORAMA is being transferred to the jurisdiction of the state administration organs of Russia. The publication's workers' collective has announced its sponsorship



of the independent publication PANORAMA. PANORAMA's collective has appealed to the state administrative organs of Russia, requesting that it be given the status of a enterprise for lease with the option to buy. Departyization has taken place in the collective. One hundred thousand rubles out of the publication's profit have been set aside to aid in eliminating the consequences of the attempt at a government coup in this country.

### **DIALOG Collective Plans To Reregister Journal**

914BO382C Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "DIALOG Chooses Freedom"]

[Text] A meeting of the workers' collective was held at the magazine DIALOG. It discussed the fact that the magazine had always held to the implicit value of the human personality, has spoken out for the consolidation of all democratic forces, for a dialogue between various political parties and movements, for lawfulness, the principles of a legal society. For holding this position, DIALOG has been exposed more than once to attacks and "organizational decisions" made by its former sponsor—the CPSU Central Committee.

The editorial collective announces that it will continue to take positions that protect human interests and rights, honesty and objectiveness in explaining the processes that are taking place in our society.

The DIALOG collective has adopted a decision to become the magazine's sponsor, and has announced the departyization of its editorial staff.

### **Moscow Newspaper Office Searched in Coup Investigation**

914BO382A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by V. Volgin: "A Mass Witch Hunt Begins?"]

[Text] On 2 September, a search was conducted in the editorial offices of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY TELEFONIST by order of the Frunze Rayon prosecutor's office. An order of RSFSR Prosecutor Stepankov on investigating the actions of officials and the mass media during the putsch served as a basis for it.

The editor was "searched", the correspondents were witnesses. The search had a formal character, the two latest issues of the newspaper were "seized", documents and orders received from the GKChP [State Emergency Committee] or the leaders of the network were demanded. None were found.

A search protocol was left.

The entire editorial collective is disturbed by the kinds of actions being taken by the prosecutor's office. Even a murderer is given a lawyer for protection. Who will protect the common man from tyranny, from whatever source?

### **[signed] L. DAYNICHENKO Editor of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY TELEFONIST**

We contacted the prosecutor's office of Moscow's Frunze Rayon, where, incidentally, not only MOSKOVSKIY TELEFONIST, but ISZVESTIYA, TRUD and other well-known publications are located. Will they be searching us, too? Deputy Prosecutor V. N. Tikhonov noted, not without humor, that this possibility was not excluded, and explained that this is being carried out in accordance with a special order from RSFSR General Prosecutor V. Stepankov to kray, oblast and autonomous republic prosecutors to conduct searches of institutions affiliated with organs of power, the MVD, the KGB, military organizations and the mass media. The purpose is the seizure of documents received during the days of the putsch from the GKChP.

Besides this, Viktor Nikolayevich announced bitterly that he was being forced to detail qualified investigators to this colossal but ineffective task, tearing them away from the investigation of serious criminal cases.

We are convinced that the prosecutor's office should and does have the right to take all necessary legal actions in the investigation of the criminal case of the so-called GKChP. However, we doubt (and V. Tikhonov is in complete agreement with us on this) that the mountains of paper being confiscated today throughout the entire republic, or the search protocols, will ever be read by anyone. And as to the fact that mass searches of collectives that are not guilty of anything are causing anxiety attacks in thousands of people—we have no doubts. Or the fact that similar "measures" will not be conducive to the stabilization of the situation in our country. Somehow, all of this doesn't fit very well with the concept of "democracy", and it overshadows the joy of victory as well.

### **MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA Distances Itself From Party, Coup**

914BO382B MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Aug 91 p 1

["To Our Readers: An Announcement From the Workers' Collective of the Editorial Offices of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA"]

[Text] Three days of illegality, humiliation and blood are behind us. The courts will give what has occurred a juridical evaluation. The USSR Supreme Soviet qualifies the actions of certain persons and executive organs. Today, it is extremely important for us to understand our role in what has happened, to determine our attitude towards the future of the newspaper.

These days demonstrated the inability of present party structures to answer for the fate of the country and the party with new strength. For everyone, what happened has become a test that forced us to answer the question: who are you in life, in politics, in journalism?

And we must admit that the newspaper's former line, which was based on subservience to the will of party organs, on the tactic of "noninterference", has led to a dead end. We do not wish to follow it any further.

The leadership of the Moscow Gorkom of the CPSU, like the leadership of the party's Central Committee, under conditions during which the power of the legally elected President of the USSR, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was suspended, did not find within themselves the strength to join battle with the conspirators, as thousands of people at the Russian House of Soviets did. Emergency sessions of the CPSU Central Committee and Moscow Gorkom plenums were not called. Moreover, not a single member of the gorkom or the party Central Committee attempted to utilize the continued publication of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA or other party newspapers for public protest.

After this, do current members of the Moscow Gorkom of the CPSU have the right—and on these days, none of them even visited the editorial offices of the newspaper sponsored by the gorkom—to determine the line or to control MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, which was created by decades of journalists' and printers' labor?

We will not hide the fact that confusion and indecisiveness were evident in the newspaper's leadership, as well. The conditions of an emergency situation took their toll. But in the August 21 issue, we had already published an appeal to our readers about the intolerability of closing newspapers and television and radio channels. On the same day, despite the closing of our publisher's print shop, a special edition of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA was issued.

But this, of course, was too small a contribution to the protection of constitutional norms. And, realizing this, now we are thinking of ways to bring the newspaper to a different level of political and civic maturity.

The recent actions of our sponsor—the Moscow Gorkom of the CPSU—have been a constant threat to the newspaper's authority. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA's charter has not been ratified, the contract between the founder and the editorial staff has not been signed.

We are certain that there are important reasons for changing the status of the newspaper, which was registered October 8, 1990. Continuing to consider it a public political publication, without depriving Muscovites of a public tribune, the editorial staff collective, in accordance with the provisions of the USSR Law: "On the Press and Other Media for Mass Information" up to the decision to change the newspaper's status, takes upon itself the responsibility for determining the course of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. A corresponding announcement is being sent to the USSR Ministry of Information and the Press.

Adopted at a meeting of the workers' collective August 22, 1991.

### MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA Journalist Protests Editor's Expulsion

PM1209142591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Sep 91  
Single Edition p 4

[Letter from V. Ryashin, former first deputy chief editor of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA: "Deja Vu"]

[Text] Scarcely had the fireworks celebrating the victory over the putschists ended when the bonfires of mob law—so far bloodless, thank God—started up. The saddest thing is that some of our colleagues are among those adding fuel to the "sacred" fire of hatred.

On 22 August the Moscow Journalists' Union expelled MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA Chief Editor Valeriy Lysenko, among other heads of newspapers which were allowed to publish by the so-called GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] and which published its documents. It was a hasty verdict, like a wartime tribunal, and unjust. The point is that from 29 July through 20 August I had the job of chief editor, so I was the one primarily responsible for its political course.

I am reporting this not only in defense of a comrade who was summarily dispatched. Make no mistake: Even now, as in the days of the putsch, we are faced with a choice. Although now the choice is: What would we prefer—national reconciliation or blind vengeance?

I am not looking for excuses, I am not seeking sympathy. But I have to say it pains me to see some of my colleagues either vying with each other to make public denunciations or assuming the role of investigator. Well, it is possible to imitate lawyers. But only in one way, I think—in an unhurried quest for the truth.

Let us judge one another by our actions, by facts, not by "suspicion of intent," which is what the authors of the newfound idea of the communist press' "intellectual preparation of the conspiracy" are inciting society to do.

What we do not want is a new political purgatory, with tests of loyalty and with enforced assurances of devotion to the authorities, even the most democratic. This has all happened before in Russia's hapless history...

V. Ryashin, former first deputy chief editor of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA

### VZGLYAD To Resume Broadcasts on Contractual Basis

914BO382E Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Lyubimov and Aleksandr Politkovskiy, heads of VZGLYAD, conducted by L. Pavlyuchik: "VZGLYAD Comes Up From Underground"]

[Text] —Guys, we have not been on the screen for half a year. The information that did appear was disorganized and scanty: VZGLYAD is working underground. You will

agree that this was an unusual situation in the seventh year of restructuring and openness...

[Politkovskiy] After Kravchenko closed VZGLYAD, the age-old question of the Russian intelligentsia arose: what should be done? It was at that time that I proposed an idea to Lyubimov—to go underground. To film and publish cassettes, to disseminate them abroad over the air channels in republics that were interested in our view of events. In some three days, Lyubimov put this idea into action, and in doing so, saved the entire collective from the prospect of having to save itself one by one.

[Lyubimov] I would like to offer some elucidation: our underground, thanks to the support of Russian structures, was, all the same, a symbolic one. After the program's closure, none of us were persecuted or pressured... And so "VZGLYAD [The View] From Underground"—is more like a journalistic name for the company that we have organized than the harsh reality of life. But even so...

The excellent dramatist Aleksandr Volodin made the observation at one time: "In every tragedy hides the possibility of future success." Our excommunication from the ether gave us the opportunity to concentrate on the solution of long-standing serious problems: receiving author's rights to our product, acquiring the technology that is necessary for independent work, and finally, the preparation of assistants, or, if you will, our replacements. Politkovskiy and I brought together young kids who were able and ready to film without fear, without looking over their shoulders at the authorities, without lies... "You do not have the right," we would tell them, "to work for a certain group of people or, even less, for one person. You should not have allies among the democrats or the partocrats. Your sole ally is your conscience." It seems that they have adopted that truth. Their actions during the putsch have provided complete confirmation of this.

[Pavlyuchik] Incidentally, about the days of the putsch... Were you afraid? I ask because the junta knew you personally...

[Lyubimov] I was not afraid for a second. Maybe this was because I had already spent my fear in the years of working at VZGLYAD. After all, each program was its own small war, which demanded courage and victims and a willingness to keep going to the end. For this reason, I decided that I was already in trouble anyway [Russian saying: "seven misfortunes—one answer"]. Especially, as I had no doubt whatsoever that the junta would win.

[Pavlyuchik] Win?

[Lyubimov] Yes, because I could remember the kind of country I live in. Here, unfortunately, government coups have been successful—both in 1917 and in 1964... Our society, as it seems to me, still has not developed an immunity to things like this. As you can see, I was mistaken. But this is my universal rule: I never believe in

the predetermined happy ending. I work towards it, putting into it my strength, nerves, health, but I do not look upon it as a final goal. It is better to be pleasantly disappointed than the opposite.

[Politkovskiy] We were ready to be seized at any minute. For this reason, we took all kinds of precautionary measures so that the remaining collective would be able to work and film if the junta was there to stay. At 10:00 on the morning of August 19, a group of our people had already gone out on a shoot, while the rest of our equipment had been dispersed secretly among various apartments by one in the afternoon. And this was done in such a way that it still would have been possible to film after the second or third discovery...

[Lyubimov] And we went to the "White House" knowing that the familiarity of our faces could only "expose" the working group, which in our absence would have been able to pass either as a foreign company, or as our colleagues from the program VREMYA... In the "White House", we were kept busy "storing away" information, talking with people—working with Bella Kurkova, we broadcast over a loudspeaker in the square, trying to give people information and cheer them up. Incidentally, it was here that I did something underhanded for the first time in my journalistic career: I said that several hundred people's deputies were gathered in the "White House". In reality, there were only 250. We were ashamed to tell people the actual number...

[Pavlyuchik] Tell me, did you sleep for those three days?

[Lyubimov] Maybe a few hours. From seven to nine in the morning was a "dead" time, when there was no information, so it was possible to switch off then...

[Politkovskiy] On the second day, I broke. On the third, it got bad for Lyubimov. Whoever was able worked the microphone.

[Pavlyuchik] What struck, amazed, agitated you during those days that we can now call with confidence "historical"?

[Lyubimov] I was amazed at the courage of the ordinary people who came to the square, to the "White House". I have no wish to offend the people's deputies who were inside the building, but some of them were filled to the brim during those minutes with feelings of their own greatness. They had already signed themselves up as national heroes. And there were others whose jobs may have brought them there. While here unnamed Muscovites came not for the sake of future glory, not for the sake of honors. They came, ready to die if the junta went for all or nothing. These were indeed saintly people. That is how they will remain in my memory.

[Politkovskiy] Besides what Sasha has said, one other episode etched itself in my memory... When it was announced that in order to avoid danger, the women should leave the Supreme Soviet building, I glanced into the corridor and saw that the first to run were men.



There were not many of them, but even so... While the women were calmly, in the most appropriate way, leaving the building, I said to Bella Kurkova, "It's time for you, too, mother, to think about leaving." She immediately replied: "I am not a woman, I am a journalist..."

[Lyubimov] One must not judge people in times of fear. But at the same time, the behavior of men during an emergency situation is a subject that is of burning interest to me today. I am certain that those who, willfully or not, worked for the junta during those days—I am thinking of the majority of the leaders of the permitted newspapers, television, TASS, highly-placed workers in the party-state apparatus—they did not behave like men. Today they can say as much as they want about higher considerations, but the interests of the state cannot, should not lie in such monstrous contradiction to normal human conceptions of conscience, order, cowardice and courage. The coup showed the immorality of our governmental, political apparatus, and it is for this reason that the next edition of VZGLYAD, which we are now conditionally calling "A Putsch Without Tanks", will be dedicated to this subject.

[Pavlyuchik] In the days after the coup, you literally did not leave the television screen. Aren't you afraid of becoming too familiar? Especially, as the first editions of the returning VZGLYAD, according to my taste, bore the marks of haste, hurriedness, divergent graphic decisions.

[Lyubimov] Content and form, word and image—this is the subject of an age-old theoretical dispute. I have not participated in it for a long time. For the simple reason that for me, television is first of all—information. Exact, objective, timely. And in this sense, the first editions of VZGLYAD brought very important, I would say, strategically important, information about the putsch, about its heroes and victims, active personalities and shadowy sources of inspiration. We managed to say many important things first and at the tops of our voices. And for us, this was of fundamental importance. And as far as graphics placement, in comparison with some of the programs that were returning during those days, we look, in my opinion, quite decent.

[Pavlyuchik] To the joy of some and the skepticism of others, Vladislav Listyev, who acquired tremendous popularity in the role of the showman from POLYE CHUDES [Field of Wonders], appeared on the program VZGLYAD. In the past few months he has taken a lot of flack from journalists, whose reasoning has gone something like this: his friends are hiding underground, while he shows off on the screen in a white frock and bow tie...

[Lyubimov] The "bravery" of some critics, who, risking nothing, and who knew nothing about the situation, hand out hasty evaluations right and left, makes me laugh. While Listyev was doing VZGLYAD and POLYE CHUDES at the same time—everyone was happy. As soon as VZGLYAD disappeared—they stopped being happy. But, after all, it was not Listyev who closed it down. Not even, if you wish, Kravchenko. They should have directed the fire of their criticism on the people

who did this. But no, they recouped their losses with Listyev... As far as Vladislav goes, he was tied through a contract to VID—VZGLYAD's mother company—and, I dare to think, did his job as was appropriate and professional, at the same time helping our underground VZGLYAD. And in this sense, his conscience is clean, and our relations are free of suspicion and insincerity.

[Pavlyuchik] Could the situation arise where Mukusev, as well, would return to VZGLYAD?

[Politkovskiy] He was the one who left us—right after his sensational publication in OGONYEK. Now, he is seriously ill. He is facing an operation, and we sincerely wish him well.

[Lyubimov] We have no political disagreements with Volodya whatsoever. Creative, moral differences—yes, there are some. But this is normal. People, our viewers, like the fact that we are different, that we think and speak differently. I am certain that no matter what the future fate of our collective is, no matter how its composition changes, everybody understands that VZGLYAD is Listyev, and Zakharov, and Lyubimov, and Politkovskiy, and Mukusev. This is its face or faces—as you like. While life, unimpeded breath was given to it by Anatoliy Lysenko and Eduard Sagalayev, who helped VZGLYAD stay on its feet while the nation still slept.

[Politkovskiy] Today it has awakened for good, and we want to be together with it.

[Pavlyuchik] And in conclusion, a few words about your future...

[Lyubimov] We are tying our future to the joint stock company "Vzglyad", which will replace "VZGLYAD from the Underground". We will be working on contract with interested organizations.

[Pavlyuchik] In other words, you have no intention of returning to the staff of All-Union Television?

[Politkovskiy] Something fantastic has happened to us—something that is completely in the spirit of Mikhail Bulgakov. The thing is, that there has been no order for our dismissal from Central Television. Nor have there been announcements from us requesting we be released from our duties. But we are not to be found in the staff schedule... And so, we will not be surprised if our names turn up there tomorrow. But in any case, we have no plans to return to the television-radio company.

[Lyubimov] A return to the screen is another issue. We have plans to start a new program, STUDIYA 13-31, in October within the framework of VID. It will be aimed at the most responsive and free audience, towards those who are at this time thirteen to thirty-one years old. Naturally, there will be politics there, as well, but a place will also be found for all that is unusual, bright, interesting in our lives.

Our young staff is preparing this program, and, judging by their plans, these kids will go farther than VZGLYAD. This means that the half a year that we spent underground was not in vain.



### TV Transmitter Constructed by Voronezh Team Permitted Coup Broadcasts

914B0403A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Sep 91  
Union Edition p 8

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Mirolevich, Voronezh: "How the Television Transmitter Appeared on the 'White House' Roof"]

[Text] We know that from the very first day of the putsch the "White House" always had a "voice." A ham radio transmitter had started working there. Realizing the complexity and danger of radio broadcasting under the threat of the retributions promised by the insurgents, we nevertheless understood that technically that was possible. But on 21 August Russian Television suddenly came to life, and VESTI came out—our television center had begun operating in the "White House"! In the besieged fortress a television transmitter had appeared by magic and begun operating. Where had it come from? And how did it get there?

It turned out that it had been shipped in from Voronezh. The people who made it and everything else have already returned home from Moscow and are currently completing a new work order from the Russian Television and Radio Company: it is necessary to manufacture approximately 1000 more copies of this unique piece of equipment.

The request to provide television and radio communication for the Russian House of Government was received by the Sintez Firm in Voronezh (which had been created a year previously by specialists from the Zarya NPO [Scientific-Production Association] and the radio electronics school) from Moscow on the morning of 19 August. The firm's specialists had understood the situation when only half a word had been spoken, and, one must say, went into the underground. They locked their doors and stayed on the job for more than 24 hours, completing the work order.

In the evening of the 20th they loaded the television transmitter in the car of Nikolay Khokhlov, the deputy director of the firm, and dashed to Moscow. In addition to Khokhlov, there were three more specialists in the car: Andrey Kamshilin, Oleg Pargachevskiy, and Sergey Bryakov. The cargo itself occupied an ordinary traveling bag—the television transmitters produced by the firm are compact. The ones operating at our television centers occupy almost a room.

Of course they realized what was threatening them if anyone discovered what an ordinary passenger car was taking to Moscow. But they got through. At a prearranged spot, people were waiting for them. Then they were taken to the "White House," where they began a job they were familiar with—installing the television transmitter.

From the roof there they could see everything: the snipers in the windows across the street, the unarmed

defenders down below, and the military equipment on the approaches to the barricades. They were being protected. Both by their own sniper, and by the members of OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments]. They also had built a barricade. A barricade that was absolutely priceless. From it they could pierce through the television blackout and show people what was actually happening.

Foreign journalists who were watching the installation were delighted when the television transmitter began operating with a home-made antenna—a metal ladder had been adapted for that use. (They themselves had not known that, at one time, Nikolay Khokhlov had defended a dissertation on antennas.)

For more than 24 hours they remained on duty without any replacement on the "White House" roof, but now there were five of them: they were joined by another person, Nikolay Sinyukov, who had come with another work order that had been executed by the firm, a powerful radio transmitter.

And one final line. Inasmuch as the people from Voronezh had set up their apparatus right at the flagpole, the job of replacing, after 73 years, the single-colored flag over the "White House" and over all of Russia by the first three-color flag was carried out by Nikolay Khokhlov, Andrey Kamshilin, Oleg Pargachevskiy, Sergey Bryakov, and Nikolay Sinyukov...

### New St Petersburg TV-Radio Chairman; '600 Seconds' Returns

LD1109194691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Sep 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Viktor Yugin, deputy of the Russian parliament, has been appointed chairman of the St Petersburg television and radio company by Anatoliy Sobchak.

It is also reported that the "600 Seconds" program is to go on the air tomorrow after a lengthy break.

### TV Third Program Established in Komsomolsk

LD1209044791 Khabarovsk Radio Khabarovsk Network in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Sep 91

[Summary] Imported equipment is being assembled in the radio and television station in Komsomolsk-na-Amure. It will enable the third program of local television to begin operation. The studio's broadcasts are currently transmitted during limited breaks in the Second All-Union Program. Now viewers in Komsomolsk, Amursk, Solnechnyy, and other settlements on the Amur and eastern BAM, will see the complete First and Second Programs of Central Television, while the third channel will transmit material from the kray and local studios.

### Ecological Fund Official Describes Organization's Activities

91WNO7184 Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
10 Aug 91 p 12

[Interview with Professor E. Girusov, cochairman of the USSR Ecology Fund and doctor of philosophical sciences, conducted by DELOVOY MIR correspondent Yelena Druzhinina: "Will We Turn the Planet Into a Star?..."

[Text] Mankind is living with an incorrect purpose: Hundreds of years of civilization are being built not on the union with nature, but on the struggle with it. "Sometimes it seems to me that in the image of man we have a piece of enraged matter, which has taken on the goal of destroying itself," muses Professor E. GIRUSOV, doctor of philosophical sciences and cochairman of the USSR Ecology Fund. Our correspondent met with him.

[Correspondent] Eduard Vladimirovich, isn't your attitude a bit too gloomy for the head of an ecological organization? Pessimism is perhaps not the best helper in a matter...

[Girusov] I have been working on ecological problems for over 30 years now. Therefore, I have the right to consider myself not a pessimist, but rather an informed realist. The state of the ecology today is such that it gives no cause for maintaining a good attitude. The main misfortune, in my opinion, is that people have not developed an instinct for danger of upset in the ecological balance. We do not understand that we cannot bring nature to an extreme degree of exhaustion. After all, from here on it will begin to disintegrate already without our participation. This is what we, specifically, are observing today.

Lately I have been tormented by some ecological nightmares. What is happening? People extract huge quantities of various substances from the earth with maniacal persistence. These excavations are doubling every 8-10 years. The waste products from processing raw materials and the energy expended both for extraction and for processing are also doubling accordingly. There is a certain greedy progression which will ultimately crush mankind. And there is only one way to survive under this pressure. We must change the paradigm of life and scientific knowledge.

[Correspondent] This is what the USSR Ecology Fund was created for? They say it was your idea. What does it do that is constructive for the ecology?

[Girusov] Two-and-a-half years ago, already after the emergence of the USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection] (which did not make us very happy), I proposed to those who think as I do—representatives of various sciences—to create an Ecology Fund in the country. I was supported in this matter. And thus, the birth of an independent public organization took place. Under the word "fund" we

understand not only monetary funds, which is obvious, but also a community of intellectual forces.

Environmental protection is not simply the most important cause, to which we must directly summon everyone. Life shows that appeals and agitation do not yield results. Nature must be protected not out of duty to service, and not even out of common sense, but at the call of instinct, which we have stopped heeding. Yet for this, there must be a turnover in the consciousness of the people, a reappraisal of values. Of course, we cannot achieve progress without ecological education. And we would like to create a certain standard of it in the fund. Moreover, we must rid the adult population of the illusion that purification structures, even the most super-modern ones, will save nature. This is self-deception. Any purification structures only push the problem of pollution back in time or shift it to other territories. The solution is to create waste-free technologies in all spheres of human activity.

The fund's assets consist of contributions, entry and membership dues. Both organizations and individuals join the Ecology Fund. Right now we do not have much money—around 2 million. We are directing it primarily to the regions of ecological and elemental disasters.

We are already conducting around 200 programs. Inventors from all over the country are coming to us. We support the projects which, in our opinion, are the most promising. Recently, for example, we invested money in the creation of an ecologically pure seagoing vessel: A sail-powered polymaran [multi-hull sailing vessel]. We hope it will prove its consistency and will go into series production. Polymarans could be used for passenger and cargo shipments. Recently we were approached for help by Leningrad specialists with an interesting idea—to use timber by-products for producing lignin.

We support such ecological developments. For quite a few years we have been investing in visual aids on ecology for schools. We have helped organize the all-union ecological newspaper, ZELENYY MIR [Green World].

The Soviet section of the World Information Center has been created on the basis of the USSR Ecology Fund. This is a network of effective computer communication for non-government organizations. At present, an ecological data bank is being formulated throughout the country. In Kemerovo, Sverdlovsk, Nizhny Tagil, Kiev, and Odessa—in many ecologically unstable areas—branches of this section will be opened.

[Correspondent] What problems are you facing?

[Girusov] They are endless. But the main ones are not in the fund, but in ecology itself. I see that no amount of money will be enough to bring it to a normal state.

The situation is so terrible that from the standpoint of ecology it is difficult to perceive man, who created it, as a rational being. Rather, on the contrary, this is a being

which amazingly strives toward self-destruction. Sometimes it seems to me that in the image of man we have a piece of enraged matter which has taken on the goal of destroying itself. We do not have to look far for examples.

What are we doing when we constantly increase the number of thermal and atomic power plants? After all, the multiplied radiant energy which they produce can already be seen from space. The Earth is taking on a reddish glow. Nevertheless, physicists are proudly asserting that they are close to synthesizing nuclear energy. Yet this achievement of science merely increases the chance that Earth as a habitable planet will turn into some variety of stellar body. And I, unfortunately, do not see a real or quick possibility for withstanding the press of atomic energetics together with the military-industrial complex. Moreover, there is an escalation of the ignorant squandering of natural riches. In the Far East, for example, something horrible is going on with the cutting of the taiga and the export of the timber to Japan in exchange for rags. We at the Ecology Fund have seriously taken up this question. After all, the Far Eastern taiga and the Amazonian selva in South America are the biosphere's last hope. It is specifically the forest which produces oxygen that gives breath to the Earth. It formulates the planet's climate.

[Correspondent] Do you see any practical possibilities for a breakthrough in the ecological situation? Or are you simply stating the inevitability of a catastrophe?

[Girusov] These possibilities are, for example, demonstrated by the coal miners. In striking (although under other slogans), they are helping the ecology both in the fact that they are not excavating soil from the nether regions, and by the fact that they are curtailing thermal power by not providing the fuel which pollutes the environment. The shortage of traditional raw material for the power industry will inevitably make it necessary to seek an alternative to it: Wind power, solar power, etc. In various countries they have long ago focused serious attention on these power sources.

We have begun to create standard ecologically pure cities, settlements, and water reservoirs. We have begun, of course, from that which is easiest—from the village of Pushchino near Moscow. Pushchino is a scientific city, and it is not difficult to bring about order there. It is much more difficult to do so in Ust-Kamenogorsk—one of the most ecologically unfavorable cities in Southern Kazakhstan. A section of the USSR Ecology Fund has been created there. Work is in progress on an ecological map of the city, with identification of the largest polluters and the routes of progression of industrial wastes. Later we will send a mobile ecological laboratory to Ust-Kamenogorsk. We have made an agreement with the German government that the USSR Ecology Fund will receive 100 vehicles from the equipment which is being left behind there by Soviet troops. We will equip these vehicles with mobile laboratories.

Of course, in two and one-half years the Ecology Fund has not yet had time to do much. Nevertheless, there are around 100 cooperatives working under the roof of our fund. Many of them are really engaged in activity which is beneficial to the ecology, as for example the collection and treatment of waste products from industrial enterprises. We are ready to develop and support interesting ideas and endeavors. Our doors are open to new members of the fund, including foreign partners. Understanding the state of the ecology in our country as being catastrophical, we are instilling in those around us the idea that we must immediately give up the passive position.

[Correspondent] Perhaps the time has come to create a political "greens" party following the example of other countries? If it were to appear, would you join it?

[Girusov] I would be one of the first. Such a party is absolutely necessary for our country, with its very sick ecology. And I am not the only one who thinks so. Sociological surveys show that the idea of creating a "greens" party is supported by 15 percent of the population. This is not at all a small number for the success of a party. In other countries they started with less.

#### **Atlas for Forecasting Natural Disasters Planned**

91WN0718B Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
10 Aug 91 p 12

[Interview with Professor Sergey Myagkov, coordinating council chairman, conducted by DELOVOY MIR correspondent Aleksandr Yuryev: "An Atlas of Catastrophes"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council on Unfavorable and Dangerous Natural Phenomena and Protection Against Them recently held an all-union meeting. Specialists tried to evaluate what natural disasters threaten USSR territory in the next few years and decades, whether they will become the "fuse" for technological catastrophes, and if so—where and when. And whether it is possible, if only partially, to reduce the scope of the losses. Our correspondent Aleksandr YURYEV met with the chairman of the coordinating council, Professor Sergey MYAGKOV.

[Myagkov] I cannot name exact figures, because they are confidential. However, the general evaluation is such: The loss from natural surprises and technogenic accidents in our country is huge, admits Sergey Mikhaylovich. In the 80's, approximately one-third of all industrial catastrophes in the world occurred in the USSR. And this, alas, is not the limit. The sum of factors—from widespread obsolescence of technological equipment to constantly growing resistance to the environment (after all, we are going into ever more remote and inaccessible regions)—works against us. Thus, there are the coming changes in climate, which certainly do not facilitate ecological stability.

[Correspondent] Quite a perspective! I makes one not want to live...



[Myagkov] Nevertheless, live we must. We must adapt to the conditions which we have created for ourselves. Therefore we, i.e., the members of the coordinating council, and our colleagues are proposing that a detailed atlas be compiled for the entire USSR territory, showing the dangers and natural disasters which await us. This atlas may be used to predict the scenarios of possible catastrophes: Visual, vivid descriptions with whose aid the specialists in industrial safety and civil defense could professionally prepare for the consequences. In other words, to "superimpose the outlines"—to combine the violence of nature (earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, avalanches) with the peculiarities of a specific territory. You yourself understand that a little candle factory in the region of a cataclysm is one thing, but a military facility with an unpredictable content is something else entirely. From here come the schemes for location of industrial and household buildings, the necessary number of rescue services and strategic provisions.

Then again, natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods are flowers as compared with that which awaits us in connection with the global warming of the climate which will begin quite soon.

[Correspondent] Many scientists believe that it will not begin...

[Myagkov] That is what some of our country's scientists believe, who have been raised on plan economics and plan economic management. They are sure that nature develops according to a preordained schedule. In their opinion, there are no specific prerequisites for warming of the climate.

There are! This is the position held by researchers throughout the world, and there are also many of them in our country. According to general evaluations, the Earth's climate will begin to change in the direction of warming in three decades. Preparations for this inevitable process are in full swing abroad. The Americans, for example, are allocating millions of dollars for a national climatic program. And we are the ones who should really worry, primarily—the Siberian region. Because Siberia will become the record holder in the program of natural variations caused by the warming. Following these, technological variations will begin.

[Correspondent] What types of catastrophes are you predicting there?

[Myagkov] Architectural-constructional, if we may call them this. Almost everything in Siberia is built on permafrost. Piling foundations are sunk into the permafrost and are held only by it.

According to general notions, the average annual temperature in the Transbaykal region will rise by two-three degrees, and in the northern Siberia—by four-six degrees. In 20-40 years there will be full degradation of the permafrost, and it will be retained only in Taymyr. The layer of permafrost into which the foundation pilings have been sunk will melt in two decades.

[Correspondent] So it turns out, the Siberian cities will start to float?

[Myagkov] They will float! They will slip away. The traditional Siberian winter roads will also become soggy along with them.

Then the forests will begin to perish. They will not have time to spread to the North Atlantic Ocean. Transplant them? By that time we will have a heap of other problems which we risk drowning in.

[Correspondent] We run this risk if we do not arm ourselves with reliable scenarios of all the possible climatic changes?

[Myagkov] Believe me, I do not intend to tug the blanket onto myself in demanding that our work be given unquestioned priority. There are many other problems which are also very important and current. However, I have outlined for you the Siberian perspective. In my opinion, it is obvious and convincing. We can also expect a great drought in the Ukraine and in Kazakhstan—also in our near future.

[Correspondent] Sergey Mikhaylovich, this is the first I am hearing of such a menacing perspective. I believe most of our readers also do not know anything about it. It seems that a small circle of specialists is engaged in it, and only they are worried about it...

[Myagkov] You are close to the truth. It is true, about two years ago there was a USSR Council of Ministers program which appeared, dealing with the continued development of the country under conditions of a changing climate. It appeared—and then suddenly disappeared somewhere. Did they make it confidential? That is too bad! The maximum number of specialists should be involved in it. Leaders of republics and local Soviets, industrialists and urban developers should be acquainted with its content. Who knows, perhaps at this very moment a decision is being made somewhere about the construction of some facility which for well-known reasons will begin to float in 30 years! Yet the people making the decision do not even have a clue about all this.

In striving to compensate for the absence of necessary information, as well as for the clear absence of work in this direction, our Coordinating Committee on Unfavorable and Dangerous Natural Phenomena and Protection Against Them is preparing an atlas of natural disasters through its own efforts. It will deal with three conditions of the climate: The current one, the one at the beginning of global warming (approximately the year 2020) and the one at the end of it (2050). Here we will take into consideration all categories of losses, as well as the specifics of natural cataclysms: They are divided into destructive and exhausting. In general, every administrative-management region will receive over 100 maps. We will complete compilation of the atlas in five years. Then it will have to be published. This is a matter for the



Cartography Main Administration. But in any case, the country must have such an atlas by the end of the 90's. Later will be too late.

### Experts See Hope for Caspian Sea Problems

91WN0706A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
9 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by Staff Correspondent Namik Azizov: "The Khazar Can Still Be Saved"]

[Text] The "Hoary Khazar," "Pearl of Nature," "Wonder Sea"—what epithets have not been applied to this sea, a body of water unique on the planet with a centuries-old history! Many peoples have found shelter on the Caspian's shores. And it has fed them and united them. But people have not always returned the good favor, and here is the retribution: the ill-considered and sometimes downright predatory use of natural resources has resulted in disaster for the sea. In laying the foundation for offshore oil production in the distant 1940s and 1950s and raising man-made islands, the legendary "Oil Stones," the geologists and oil workers could not have supposed that millions of tons of oil from beneath the sea would eventually cause it countless problems and result in environmental disaster. Hundreds of square kilometers of the sea's surface are now covered with an oil film because of mismanagement, negligence and technological backwardness. Vast zones of the Apsheron water area, having lost their capacity for biological self-purification, have become dead in the literal sense of the word.

The Caspian's glory is also dimming as a chief supplier of the noble sturgeon. There is nothing left in the sea but sprats. And for all this we must "thank" the oil workers and power engineers, chemists, municipal-service operators and agricultural workers who year after year polluted the Caspian Sea's water and coast.

Let me cite figures from a report by Arif Mansurov, chairman of Azerbaijan's State Committee for Environmental Protection, delivered at the First International Conference on the Problems of the Caspian Sea. They vividly characterize the technogenic burden on the Caspian's ecosystem. Azerbaijan alone discharges into the sea annually more than 500 million cubic meters of heavily polluted effluent and more than 300 million cubic meters of effluent that has been treated according to established norms. In addition, more than 3,000 tons of petroleum products, 28,000 tons of suspended matter, 74,000 tons of sulfanol, more than 300,000 tons of chlorides, tens of tons of phenols and hundreds of tons of synthetic surfactants enter the sea.

Azerbaijan is also the leader in the use of toxic chemicals on irrigated land. Most of the toxic chemicals and mineral fertilizers are stored in the open air, and the technology for irrigating and watering the soil lags behind the requirements of modern farming techniques.

Therefore, all of the chemicals go into rivers and drainage collectors, and from there—into the sea.

And one more problem: the level of the Caspian has risen sharply. That is threatening huge economic losses and social upheavals. The news from Turkmenia is increasingly alarming—industrial facilities are in danger of being flooded. Large areas of farmlands have been submerged in the Lenkoran zone of Azerbaijan. If the water's current rate of rising persists, waves will soon lap the lower terrace of one of Baku's main attractions, Sea Boulevard. It will be necessary to urgently move industrial facilities that are spread out along the coast of Baku Bay. For all practical purposes, all the Apsheron beaches have already been flooded. Coastal railroads and highways are in danger of being destroyed.

The participation in the conference of a wide range of specialists, and the interest shown in it by the Ayaz Motalibov, president of the Azerbaijan Republic, made it possible to examine practically all aspects of protecting the Caspian ecosystem.

Grigori Voropayev, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Scientific Council on the Problems of the Caspian Sea:

"All the region's peoples and states have a stake in saving the sea. One of the most disturbing topics of the conference was the rising of the Caspian's water level. But I do not see any grounds for panic. Our ancestors knew about the distinguishing characteristics of the sea, which has periodically grown shallow and periodically overflowed its banks. But unlike our contemporaries, the ancient Caspians—the people who gave the sea its name—never settled on the shore. Unfortunately, we have forgotten these elementary truths and are now looking for the guilty parties. We must intelligently assess the nature of the natural processes that are occurring in the sea and not tie up funds in constructing capital-intensive enterprises along the shore."

Murat Mukhamedzhanov, the learned secretary of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences' Institute of Hydrogeology and Hydrophysics:

"We clearly see what awaits the Caspian if the degradation of its ecosystem is not stopped. We must act in two areas: along with the development of basic research on hydrology, the recycling of industrial waste, etc., we must do everything possible to reduce the discharge of untreated effluent into the Caspian. Moreover, organizational and economic-management programs must be nationwide, rather than departmental in scope. For example, in Kazakhstan our Committee on Natural Disasters has made a proposal to the government that specially earmarked capital investments be allocated starting in 1992 to deal with the consequences of the rising water level of the Caspian. It is time to finally establish economically substantiated norms for charging for the use of natural resources and the damage caused to nature."

Valeriy Tsikeyev, chairman of the Kalmyk ASSR State Committee for Environmental Protection:

"The restoration of the Caspian's health must start with stabilization of the process of environmental pollution. And not just in the Caspian basin but in all the oblasts through which the water arteries that feed the sea pass. We need a unified program for saving the sea that is geared to the long range, and not just to the perfectly foreseeable five-to-ten-year future. Otherwise we will just shift our present concerns onto the shoulders of future generations."

Vladimir Ivanov, director of the Caspian Fisheries Research Institute:

"One often hears it asked which is more important: oil production or preservation of the Caspian's unique fish stocks. I do not accept such an approach. One cannot oppose the one to the other. These areas of economic activity can and should be intelligently combined. By eliminating the main causes of the trouble—flawed oil extraction methods and accidental discharges into the sea, we will substantially improve the ecological situation."

"Rational economic activity requires that the use of natural resources be dealt with legislatively. And that who ever violates the law pays out of his own pocket."

The statements of [John Hartley], a scientific consultant with the British Petroleum corporation who represents three countries in Baku—the United States, Great Britain and Norway—as well as the Amoco and Statoil companies, which are participating in the competition for the right to establish a joint venture to work the promising Azeri offshore deposit, were in line with the stand taken by most of the conference's participants:

"We see our task as defining a spectrum of data on the state of the Caspian. On that basis we will work out a strategy for further activity. I look at the fate of the Caspian Sea optimistically. The situation is not so bad as to give up. It is very important to thoroughly analyze the mistakes that have been made in the case of the Aral Sea and not to repeat them. Our company is providing

clear-cut environmental guarantees in connection with the exploitation of the Azeri deposit. The latest environmentally clean technologies and equipment that will not pollute the sea will be used there."

Doctor [Russel Hinds], vice president of the American company [Kelley-Hinds] International Incorporated, which specializes in environmental protection, offered his services in protecting the Caspian. The region of the Texas-Louisiana coast of the United States where the company's headquarters are located and the adjoining area of the Gulf of Mexico are similar to the oil-producing region of the Caspian Sea and have similar environmental problems. [Kelley-Hinds] has extensive experience in cleaning up territories polluted by the waste products of petroleum extraction and refining. The company proposes to design and build a common system for the collection, transportation and treatment of all waste formed in petroleum extraction and refining within the boundaries of the Apsheron Peninsula and its surrounding waters. A special technology for doing the work on land will make it possible to turn the waste into recycled products for use in construction—for example, in road building.

Protection of the Caspian is a problem of more than local significance, and one country alone cannot solve it—that is something on which all the conference participants agreed. It is necessary to set up not only a regional fund for saving the Caspian but an international fund, as well, pooling the efforts of the world community. I am wholeheartedly "in favor." But let me interject the reminder that this is just combating the consequences. We must learn how to anticipate events, not by intervening in natural processes but by gearing our actions to be commensurate with them. In ecology, as in medicine, the principle "do no harm" must become fundamental.

The conference on the Caspian's problems is over. It adopted a package of proposals for developing a comprehensive program for protecting the world's largest lake. A preparatory committee was formed for organizing a Supreme Caspian Council. This nongovernmental agency will unite the efforts of scientists and specialists to stabilize and improve the environmental situation.

### Yelena Bonner Urges Republics To Observe Human Rights

914B0380D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 3 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Yelena Bonner by G. Vasilyeva: "The Time for Sakharov's Constitution Is Past—As Usual, We Are Late..."]

[Text] In a niche of a memorial plaque on the wall of the house, on windowsills, bookshelves, tables, and everywhere else there are flowers. No one comes to this house without flowers. The apartment itself is surprisingly bare. There are no unnecessary things, no stylish furniture, no knickknacks. Just a lot of books and photographs: Andrey Dmitriyevich happy, Andrey Dmitriyevich weary, Andrey Dmitriyevich with a shopping bag by the entrance...

[Yelena Bonner] I live very simply as you can see. I have nothing of my own—not even a TV set. I walk to a neighbor's apartment to see the Supreme Soviet in session. Since I am going abroad, I have decided that this time I will buy a TV set. Sometimes, it turns out to be very useful.

[G. Vasilyeva] Yelena Georgiyevna, perhaps we are celebrating victory in vain. The putschists have achieved what they wanted. The Union Treaty is unsigned.

[Yelena Bonner] The putsch gave the nudge that resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And this raises an extraordinarily important point, perhaps the most important point that I have to make to the readers of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. It concerns all the former Union republics, all the autonomous areas, and all the parties. These young sovereign states must come into being without any infringement of human rights. In principle, there are two democratic rights to uphold: the rights of the individual (as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and the rights of the people to self-determination.

On 3 September I am scheduled to appear before the Danish Parliament, which is holding hearings on the subject: "The Helsinki Act: Human Rights—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." They have invited not just private groups but state delegations from all 35 countries represented at the Helsinki Conference [in August 1975]. This is the main point of my speech: Our August victory is yet to be won. For the republics must have an unconditional right to full independence. But the sole criterion of economic aid to the republics must be their observance of human rights. Right now there a whole lot of alarming reports coming out of the republics, signaling attempts to interfere with the rights of certain ethnic groups. I want to remind people of the fact that the Sakharov Committee has considerable influence on public opinion in the West, and this influence will be used to counter these attempts. I say this to the Belorussians, I say this to the Baltic peoples, I say this to the Moldavians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Turks, and Uzbeks. I say this to all the republics and their political

leaders: Any attempt to carry out repressive policies in dealing with the ethnic minorities will result in these republics being left to stagnate without assistance from the civilized nations and, I hope, without any help from democratic Russia. It behooves a democratic Russia to bear in mind that Russia has already been turned into a prison of peoples—we must not revert to that condition. Right now a new Cabinet of Ministers is being formed, but this is an artificial contrivance of the center with dangerous implications. For this center is Russia.

[G. Vasilyeva] But, Yelena Georgiyevna, even Sakharov thought it possible and normal for a union of equal and sovereign states to be placed under the leadership of a parliament in which more than half of the seats would be reserved for representatives of Russia.

[Yelena Bonner] The time for Sakharov's Constitution is past. As usual, we are late in trying to jump on the last car of the train. Today we must consider how to go our separate ways with the fewest losses. It amazes me that the deputies attending the Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet talked for three days about the past when they should have been talking about other things entirely.

[G. Vasilyeva] Nevertheless, our national territory constitutes a single economic region. In my view it is apparent that if the Union falls apart, everyone will become weaker—and no one will win.

[Yelena Bonner] The fact that the Ukraine has declared its independence does not mean that it has gone off with all its land and natural wealth to Australia. And no one in the West will be buying Estonian sportswear, although I myself am looking for some to buy for my grandchildren. We are all bound together economically, and no sort of national independence will be able to sever these ties.

[G. Vasilyeva] On the territory of the RSFSR there are about thirty autonomous areas—to say nothing of other minority groups. How many pieces can we break up into or is there a limit beyond which a people cannot claim a right to separate statehood?

[Yelena Bonner] There are no limit, and this very lack of limitation in Europe has led to the existence of Monaco, San Marino, and Luxembourg. As Europe seeks to become increasingly integrated, we are currently coming apart. But the peoples of Europe have known freedom for a good deal more than a decade. A slave who gulps a breath of freedom cannot immediately aspire to integration. He must first cast off his chains.

[G. Vasilyeva] Right now there are endless explanations being heard about who was where during these tragic days—with many sidelong glances and reproaches, often undeserved. How do you feel about this?

[Yelena Bonner] It is not for people to judge where there is no need to judge. I have neighbors on all 10 floors who have known me since 1954. Yet when a campaign was

launched against me, only two of these families would talk to me when we met on the stairs. Today I get on with everyone. Yet if the putsch had been successful, I think they would again be looking the other way. It is not for me to judge them. They have been raised in this fashion by our society. When the Supreme Soviet was in session, one person stood up who did not speak Russian very well. He said that he was a communist, but that he could not comprehend what was happening, and he almost cried. And I almost cried with him. I am always on the side of those who stand up for things.

### Reappointed Culture Minister Addresses Newsmen

PM1109155791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 11 Sep 91 Single Edition p 2

[G. Orekhanova report: "It Is a Pity We Are Acting in Accordance With the Old Methods." USSR Culture Minister N. Gubenko's Press Conference"]

[Text] The official reason for this press conference at the USSR Ministry of Culture was the events that occurred during the night of 6-7 September at the Lenin Library where, as the press reported, representatives of a Jewish community had appeared and demanded that they be given ancient Jewish manuscripts that are kept in the manuscript section of the Lenin State Library.

However, this press conference was the first meeting that USSR Culture Minister N.N. Gubenko had had with journalists following his reappointment to this post.

Opening the press conference, the minister specifically said:

"We are living through the agonizing birth of a new state. We do not know what it will be like, but the fact that it must be dependent on the notion of 'culture' is indisputable. An analysis of the reasons for the events of 19-21 August once again attested to the fact that there is a lack of culture in this country, and for all this period, all of the 11 culture ministers of the republics represented here, not to mention B.N. Yeltsin, have without exception spoken of the need to establish culture as the future state's newest priority.

"We have succeeded in convincing the president of the country and the leaders of the republics," Gubenko said, "that just as there should be a single economic space and a single defense space, there must also be a single cultural space. Therefore it is impossible to split the stocks at the Lenin Library, where property that is common to all nationalities is kept; the same goes for the Hermitage, the Pushkin Museum, the Tretyakov Gallery, and the library of foreign literature where stocks have been built up over centuries and it would be impossible to split them up into exclusively national 'apartments.'"

At the State Council B.N. Yeltsin raised the question of the need to preserve a cultural space and submitted to

this council for its consideration a Decree on Making the USSR Minister of Culture Responsible for Coordinating Interrepublic Cultural Ties.

During the press conference the question of renaming the Lenin Library arose. To this the culture minister replied that "I do not welcome this campaign style of renaming things."

How do you feel about the plan to move Lenin's remains?

"The Lenin Mausoleum was the fixing of a historical moment of boundless love felt by most of the people for this man. A man who gave hope to the illiterate, poverty-stricken, and starving people. It is not his fault that his successors perverted his dream. I would keep the mausoleum."

Answering a question about the future of the collection of ancient Jewish books and manuscripts which the religious community "Agudas Khasidey Khabad" [name as transliterated] is claiming, Gubenko said that the collection should remain in the Lenin Library since it is an important scientific and cultural treasure.

"While there is a single Jew still living in this country," the minister said, "we cannot ship their sacred objects abroad. Otherwise the exodus of Jews from the USSR would increase."

Answering a question about his membership of the CPSU, Nikolay Gubenko confirmed that he is staying in the Communist Party for the time being, but he may join the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan since he sympathizes with the views of Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The culture minister criticized the USSR president for having read aloud "someone's subjective notes" from the 19 August Cabinet of Ministers session, thereby striking a blow against ministers who had unequivocally condemned the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

"It is a pity that we are starting to act according to the old methods. Right now I am going to the prosecutor's, where I will be giving evidence in front of a television camera. At a later stage they will probably make an entertaining documentary film about the interrogations..."

With a reminder that Germany removed cultural treasures worth 1.2 trillion rubles from our country during the Great Patriotic War, N.N. Gubenko laid particular emphasis on the fact that the Ministry of Culture was starting to implement a program of exchanging cultural treasures on a reciprocal basis only.



### **Soviet Culture Fund Transferred to Russian Jurisdiction**

914B0416A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Sep 91  
Union Edition p 7

[Article by L. Osheverova: "In Russia There Are Now Two Culture Funds. Will There Be Twice as Much Culture?"]

[Text] The Board of the SFK [Soviet Culture Fund] resolved to transform the Soviet Culture Fund into the Culture Fund of Russia, as proposed by its chairman, Dmitry Likhachev.

As the successor of the old fund, the new one will apply all of its energies and resources to caring for Russian culture, while not ignoring cooperation with the independent funds of sovereign republics, compatriots, and charitable organizations abroad. In principle, there is nothing new about this decision because previously, virtually all the money (96 percent) was spent to finance precisely Russian programs.

President of Russia B. Yeltsin approved of this idea. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that its own culture fund, the All-Russian Culture Fund, already exists in the republic. Its chairman, L. Proskurin, failed to respond to D. Likhachev's proposal to cooperate, which was interpreted as a refusal. At the same time, numerous activists in oblast, kray, and city culture funds of the Russian Federation supported the academician's idea, believing that this reorganization will make it possible to participate in the renaissance of Russian culture more productively.

So, there is a confrontation. By all signs, it will end in "divorce" proceedings and the splitting of assets and funds. Naturally, all of this deeply concerns the Soviet Culture Fund. This does not have to do with greed (the Soviet Culture Fund maintains not only the All-Russian Culture Fund, but also 46 oblast funds), but rather with how the funds received will be used: Having been carried away by commerce, the All-Russian Culture Fund has failed to develop a program to this day. In addition, the division of finance will complicate the holding of numerous charitable functions planned by the Soviet Culture Fund.

Nonetheless, the Board of the Soviet Culture Fund intends to make a transition to Russian jurisdiction in the hope that the emerging organizational difficulties will not interfere with the important endeavor of defending culture, which is actually what this public organization was created for five years ago.

### **Celebrating 7 November as National Holiday Questioned**

914B0437A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Sep 91  
Union Edition p 1

[Article by Aleksey Portanskiy: "'On the Occasion of Your National Holiday...' What Are They Going To Congratulate Us With on 7 November?"]

[Text] Neither a military parade, nor a rally of the working people has been planned for the coming anniversary of the October Revolution. It does not seem worthwhile to give the people one more chance to abuse the CPSU, Bolsheviks, Lenin, the revolution, etc. All that was canceled and correctly so. But whether we want it or not, the day of 7 November remains our national or, rather, official holiday. In other words, it remains an unalienable aspect of a sovereign state similar to the national territory, for instance, or the capital, the official language, the flag, etc.

Every country has its national holiday. In the United States, for instance, it is 4 July—Independence day, in China it is 1 October—the day when PRC was established, it is 3 March in Morocco—the day when the current king came to power. In other words, a national or official holiday is the day which focuses on the memory of the most important event in the history of the country, the event that has directly affected its political structure.

Any day now the capitals of the countries that have diplomatic relations with us will start working on the texts of congratulations, addressed to us, by 7 November 1991. It is a rather important and responsible issue in the practice of international relations: The messages with congratulations contain an assessment of the level of their ties with Moscow and future perspectives are outlined. Wishes of success and prosperity for the Soviet people are necessarily included there. But I can hardly imagine how these wishes will be phrased concerning the very day which provokes more and more depressing feelings in us. Just imagine such a situation: A person made a mistake long ago, in his young years, but now he has started a new family; however everybody continues to congratulate him, in the presence of his new family, on the anniversary of his first marriage, which was dissolved long ago.

Is that absurd? Of course, it is. But we also find ourselves in a unique situation in that respect.

The Baltic republics have become independent states and will definitely cease to celebrate 7 November as each of them has its own national holiday now. Will the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia celebrate this day? I doubt it. Whose holiday will 7 November remain then? Russia's? That is also doubtful. From now on, Russians are going to remember and honor the days of August 1991 and someone has already suggested considering the day of victory over the putschists as the national holiday of Russia.

Thus, we also divorced our previous government system and that happened two weeks ago, at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. The unitarian, union state that had existed for seven decades is no more. The ideological, geopolitical, historic, and symbolic characteristics of the former state are gradually and irrevocably disappearing, together with the state itself. In that respect, putting an end to the 7 November celebration is an absolutely

legitimate and inevitable result of everything that happened. We have already abandoned many things with the era that ended on 21 August: the empire, the only and the infallible party, suppression of dissent, and other "blocks" from the foundation of totalitarianism.

We should not overdramatize the situation. November 7th should remain in our calendar as a memorable historic date accompanied by an adequate explanation. But not as the official holiday of our country! It is possible that we need some special act which would sum up the past in a way, so that we can overcome the order formed over seven decades. Laying the foundation stone of a temple, in the spirit of centuries old Christian traditions, could become such an act. Incidentally, the famous Cathedral of Sacre Coeur in Paris was built to commemorate the fall of the Paris Commune.

In short, this, definitely, is not a major problem but it still needs an urgent solution—just look at the calendar...

#### **MVD Passport Official on Changes in Residence Permit System**

91US0786A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 7 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Lt. Col. of the Militia Anatoliy Vasilyevich Gunayev, chief of the passport department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Leonid Shirokov: "No Happiness Without a Registration Stamp?"]

[Text] [Shirokov] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, why is a residence permit needed in our time?

[Gunayev] The residence permit as an institution of the passport system plays an important role in carrying out the function of state control, of keeping track of the movement of citizens. It is used to obtain data on the reasons for migration and on the social and demographic characteristics of migrants. As strange as it may seem, today the residence permit helps in resolving the housing problem and in the distribution of goods.

[Shirokov] Alas, this same residence permit also restricts the rights of citizens to freely choose their place of residence...

[Gunayev] Yes, that is so, but this does not in any way conflict with international norms. For example, the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights states that anyone who is legally in the territory of any state has the right within the bounds of this territory to free movement and the freedom to choose his place of residence. At the same time, this pact indicates that the mentioned rights may be subject to restrictions if they, in particular, are needed to maintain state security, public order, health, or the morals of the population.

[Shirokov] But there are frequent cases in which, for example, the documents for a higher educational institution of a secondary school graduate are not accepted

because of the lack of a residence permit for the location of the educational institution.

[Gunayev] This is illegal. There are no prohibitions in our country on acceptance to institutes with respect to the residence permit.

[Shirokov] Those convicted of crimes who were released from their place of incarceration are likewise not given residence permits in the cities?

[Gunayev] Such things did indeed take place before. After the signing of the concluding document of the Vienna meeting in January 1989, legislation on the questions of residence permits in our country began to be adapted to international legal standards in the humanitarian sphere. Many normative acts have been abolished hindering Soviet people in their choice of place of residence. Restrictions have been removed on the giving of residence permits to citizens with a criminal record throughout the territory of the USSR.

[Shirokov] What is the future of the institution of residence permits?

[Gunayev] Of course it needs to be reformed. Nevertheless, the resolution of this question must not be rushed. During its existence, registration was one of the economic and social conditions in the life of the society and for this reason one must not take a frivolous approach to its elimination. In our view, the reform of the institution of residence permits must be done in several steps as the country overcomes the critical social and economic situation. In the stage at hand, one could painlessly abolish all restrictions to the registration of citizens that are no longer needed.

[Shirokov] Will it now be easy to get a residence permit in Moscow?

[Gunayev] The right to live in Moscow must be determined by the status of the capital. Moscow is a special city and appropriate rules must be in effect there. Let us await the decisions of the legislative bodies.

As for the registration of specialists and workers from other cities invited to the capital, it has been put on a commercial basis in accordance with the instructions of the authorities in Moscow. The Moscow Housing Authority [Moszhiluchet] has been given permission to sell to organizations 50 licenses on a auction basis. In so doing, the purchase of licenses does not imply an obligation of Moszhiluchet to allocate housing to such citizens. The license merely gives the right to invite a specialist (with his family members) to Moscow and his residence permit for the housing space offered by the interested organization in the established manner, also including in a housing construction cooperative. But such a procedure does not affect citizens coming to the capital to stay with their close relatives, for they are given residence permits on a general basis.

[Shirokov] Thus, in the near future there will be no change in the administrative nature of the residence permit?

[Gunayev] We are close to changing from the permission system of registration to registration in the chosen place of residence, thereby creating the conditions to guarantee every citizen of the USSR the right to free movement within the country. It is for this purpose that the preparation of the corresponding law is being concluded at this time.

[Boxed material] **Article 21: Every person has the right to free movement within the country and to a choice of his place of residence or temporary residence. Restrictions of this right may be specified by law only.**

(From the "Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of Man" adopted by the Fifth Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on 5 September 1991).

### **Patriarch on Religious, Political Issues**

91UN2635A Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 33,  
26 Aug-1 Sep 91 p 11

[Unattributed interview with Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, reprinted from the Italian weekly SABATO: "The Joy of a Common Spiritual Birth"]

[Text] **Should one take advantage of the explosive combination of religious-theological ignorance and political exaltation to solve church problems. The Italian weekly SABATO published an interview with Patriarch Aleksiy II on this and other subjects.**

[SABATO] Your Holiness, first of all I would like to ask you the following question: What is your opinion of the current relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican?

[Aleksiy II] They are extremely difficult. During the 1970-80's our church felt support from Catholics in our opposition to the restrictions imposed by state atheism. They brought in books published in Russian by Catholic publishing houses, which brought us Christ's gospel. Moreover, these publications were extremely sincere, explaining the common principles of our religion and not touching upon the theological issues that clearly divide us. But today... I must tell you that today the attitude of our believers toward the Roman Catholic Church is getting worse each month. I will say more: It is getting worse with each step the Vatican takes aimed at establishing itself on traditionally Orthodox territories—not only in the Ukraine but also in European Russia and Siberia. How, for example, can one justify the appointment of a Catholic bishop to Novosibirsk? All the Catholics there would make up one or at most two parishes. Nothing like this ever happened in the past. I personally had the impression that after the Second Vatican Council the Catholics had abandoned their aggressive plans and had entered on a path of serious

dialogue with the Orthodox Church as a whole. It seemed to us that Christian common sense had prevailed. But the political situation had no sooner changed—especially in our country, where things became much more open—no sooner was there a possibility of expanding their presence in Orthodox countries than the council's position immediately changed. Unfortunately, we must state that the Vatican has now resurrected its previous principles, which can contribute neither to our dialogue nor—and this is the main thing—to any rapprochement whatsoever. Our church has retained its apostolic structure with its fundamental rule: One city, one bishop. And now when "parallel" bishops appointed by the Vatican appear in Russian and Ukrainian cities, we consider this to be an open affront to Orthodoxy. In our opinion, the current proselytism of the Catholics and the action of the Uniates in the Eastern Ukraine are erecting an even higher wall between Russia and Western Christianity.

[SABATO] You have spoken about the Greek-Catholic Church. What path do you see to solving the crucial and no less difficult problem of relations between Orthodoxy and the Uniate Church in the Ukraine.

[Aleksiy II] The Uniate Church in the Ukraine is now becoming less and less a theological and church problem. It is a problem of political revenge and nationalistic self-awakening. We would like to draw the attention of Catholics to the following: Should one take advantage of the explosive combination of religious-theological ignorance and political exaltation to solve church problems? The unity of the church is built on love. But the attitudes of modern-day Uniates are fed not by love (for apostolic unification or Western Christian traditions) but by a hatred for communists and for those realities which in the minds of ideologists of nationalism are associated with communists—Russia and Orthodoxy.

I am afraid that by taking into its home people who live with hatred and competition, who are bursting with the spirit of national dissension, the Catholic Church will ultimately only increase its own internal problems.

[SABATO] Catholicism has always been strong because of its universal and extra-national spirit. Can one be sure that this spirit resides in the Ukrainian separatists?

[Aleksiy II] It seems to me that the problem of the modern-day Uniate Church is a problem not so much of the Russian church as of the Catholic Church. For our part, we are not forcing anyone to maintain relations with us and in the future we must keep in mind that love is above legal justice. If we are speaking only about problems of property, it would be easy to solve them. But by giving a church building to the Uniate community will we also be giving them thousands of souls who do not consider themselves to be Uniates?

We want the problem of precisely how the community will use the given temple to be decided democratically each time it arises: If the majority of the church decides to be come Uniate members, so be it. But if the majority



sees its roots in the Orthodox tradition, one must not use administrative methods to destroy the unity of various Orthodox believers. The majority of the community must retain the temple, but at the same time it should build a church for the local minority.

[SABATO] Could you give us your opinion about the declaration of Metropolitan Sergiy who proclaimed the church's loyalty to the Soviet state in 1927?

[Aleksiy II] I do not disavow it because you cannot disavow your own history. Being a man of the church, I must take responsibility for everything that has happened in the life of my church: not only the good, but also the distressing, the sad, the erroneous. It would be much easier to say that I did not sign that declaration and I know nothing about it. History will judge whether the declaration helped the church out during difficult times. I would not want to make a final judgment about Metropolitan Sergiy's activity. But, you see, he was given a set of "alternatives": Either he signed it or several hundred bishops who had been arrested would have been shot... Part of the bitterness he felt lives on in my heart... But looking at the matter today from the standpoint of historical truth, we see that Metropolitan Sergiy's declaration cannot be considered voluntary since, subjected to terrible pressure, he had to make this declaration that was far from the truth in order to save people's lives. At the same time we must state, although it is very unpleasant, that the declaration is essentially a lie. Its purpose was to "place the church in a correct relationship with the Soviet Government." But this relationship—and from the declaration it is clear to what extent this relationship was based on subordination of the church to the interests of the state—is incorrect from the standpoint of the church. The tragedy of Metropolitan Sergiy lies in the fact that he tried to reach an agreement with the criminals who had seized power by "relying on their word."

I think that this year we really have managed to get out from under the tutelage of the state and therefore we have a moral right to assert that Metropolitan Sergiy's declaration is a fact which belongs to the past and we are no longer guided by it. This means only that, in our opinion, the state can make mistakes, including the most serious kind, and sometimes even criminal ones. And in this case we have the right to attest before God, before our own conscience, and before the whole world to the fact that God's truth has been violated. I should like to recall here our statement regarding the tragic events in Vilnius in January of this year when we unequivocally stated that the use of military force is a great political mistake. In church language such a mistake is called a sin. In particular, we unequivocally expressed to all our opinion about the causes of the Vilnius tragedy: "They are the unchanging temptation and eternal disease of statehood: The state is automatically inclined to equate its own interests with the interests of the people, and by state interests is meant the convenience and ease of administration."

[SABATO] In spite of that, in the Soviet press from time to time there are articles accusing the church of having close ties with the state-political apparatus.

[Aleksiy II] I know that. In this connection I would like to ask those who accuse me of having ties with the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB just which KGB subdivisions recommended that I speak out against the acts of violence in Vilnius? In which department of the Central Committee did they recommend that I speak about the totalitarian nature of the very idea of "scientific socialism" (I spoke about this in my speech on 14 May in the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok), sharply criticizing the calls for a civil war? Which party functionaries advised me to bring up in the same breath World War II and Chernobyl and the decades of the harshest antireligious war that have ever occurred on our land? Perhaps it is a "connected" patriarch who would say that the victory of socialism is like an ethnic catastrophe? This is precisely what I was speaking about this summer in Minsk.

Of course, I have committed mistakes and sins in my church activity. Sometimes I have had to sacrifice self-improvement for the sake of those around me. The patriarch or metropolitan who subjects his flock to a predicted threat of violence commits a crime before God, before the people, and before Russia. This is much more dangerous than protecting the church through compromises. But a church with several million believers cannot go into the catacombs. The church hierarchies have taken sin on their soul: the sin of silence, the sin of lies for the sake of the good of the people, for the sake of not disappearing from real life for good.

I too, when in charge of an eparchy or when manager of affairs of the Moscow patriarchate, while insisting on one thing have had to concede something else. From those who have suffered because of these concessions, this silence, this forced passivity, or the appearance of loyalty on the part of church officials of this period—I ask forgiveness, understanding, and prayer from all these people and not just from God. I say to them: "Forgive me, beloved, forgive me, my children."

[SABATO] You are undoubtedly concerned about the transfer of several parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Orthodox Church.

[Aleksiy II] The danger of differences of opinion in church life disturbs me more than anything else. The church and its people need wisdom, tolerance, and recognition of their own responsibility. Clergymen who are fanning dissension in order to prove the correctness of their own position are prepared to reject the clergy of the Russian community and our church.

In the future it will be more and more difficult to smooth out the differences that are becoming apparent with the foreign church and those parishes which it is creating in Russia. We are speaking about people imbued with a



group spirit, in other words, people who are not so much inclined to search for the truth and to defend the positions they have held in the past.

I would like to remind you that the foreign church from the very beginning of its existence promised that as soon as the Moscow patriarch had his freedom, the foreign synod would turn over to him all of its business that has accumulated during the period of separation. Now the question is being put in a different way: All the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church must listen to their opinion and repent at their bidding. I think, however, that we must not judge anyone, and everyone should repent including the "Karloviants" (another name for the Russian Orthodox foreign church, from the name of the Serbian city of Sremsky Karlovtsy where it was formed in 1921—ed.)—if only because of the official support they rendered to Hitler or the fact that this church's episcopal synod sent a message to U.S. President Johnson when he called for "God's blessing on the heroic American Army courageously fighting in Vietnam." The napalm bombs in the jungles of Vietnam burned not the ideals of communist but children. We never made statements like this regarding Afghanistan. We must not separate the church out of political motives. As long as we are living in Russia and they are in America this is not a schism but only a minor separation. But when the same path is entered upon by two churches, in each of which the clergy instead of preaching the gospel is forced to explain why he cannot enter the other church, that is a schism. There can be no "free Russian church," "liberal Russian church," "monarchist Russian church" or, for example, any kind of "cadet" church either. When society is torn to pieces by national and political antagonisms, the church must become a place where various people can recall and recognize their unity and the worth of the children of God, the unity of their faith and their unity in God's love for everyone.

[SABATO] You have made your first visit to Israel. Were you asked questions about anti-Semitism in Russia?

[Aleksiy II] I met with Prime Minister Shamir and also the Israeli president and religious leaders in Jerusalem. I got the impression that they understand that Christianity, particularly Orthodoxy, should not be considered

a source of anti-Semitism. The Israeli declaration of their readiness to help our church solve the problems of its property in Palestine and also problems related to the resumption of pilgrimages to the Holy Land was very important.

[SABATO] Does the Russian Orthodox Church intend to canonize Emperor Nikolay II and his family?

[Aleksiy II] With respect to this question the Patriarchate is receiving many letters, both in favor of canonization and against it. One should understand that canonization means nothing in the fate of the canonized individual. God has already passed his judgment on them. Canonization has meaning only as a church-pastoral act for the people who are continuing their earthly existence. Canonization of a martyred tsar is a completely separate act. There is now a very strong tendency to canonize all the acts of his life. Not how he died but his entire life and politics. This creates the threat of ideologization instead of canonization. And here one must consider a multitude of problems.

[SABATO] The last question. Do you believe in a special spiritual mission for Russia?

[Aleksiy II] Russia has her own destiny which is different from the destinies of other peoples. But we cannot artificially return to the situation that existed 70 or 300 years ago. That is utopia. But we can and should try to return to our lost value system. When we said "Holy Russia" that certainly did not mean that Russia considered herself "holy." Russia was seeking holiness and purity. And if we truly want to revive "Holy Russia" we must revive the hierarchy, the system of values to which the best pages of our history are linked. They are linked to the confidence Russia received along with Orthodoxy: Holiness is the only normal human condition. Any sin, even a minor one, distorts human nature.

The absolute, the aspiration for the absolute is a national feature of Russia which was reflected in the Bolsheviks as well. In torment Russia experienced the worship of false gods as well. God gave our people the desire to search for the truth, to search for God. In spite of the difficulties, in spite of the clear vanity of earthly ways, through the Cross I believe we will arrive at the joy of a common spiritual birth.

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